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General Introduction 
 
Visuospatial attention can be allocated to a specific region of interest by 
making a saccade towards it (i.e. overtly) or in the absence of any eye 
movement (e.g. covertly). Attentional shifts may be based on an entirely 
voluntary process or be automatically and involuntarily triggered by stimuli 
from the outer world. The attention catching power of environmental stimuli 
may differ according to the category they belong in. Biological stimuli with 
particular social valence, such for example an oriented gaze, exert a stronger 
influence on attentional shifts with respect to non biological stimuli  even when 
these provide strong directional cues (e.g. arrows). The capability of gaze to 
orient the behaviour of another individual is fundamental to social cognition in 
highly social groups like human and non-human primates. This type of joint 
attention mechanism makes possible complex cognitive operations ranging 
from “mind reading” to “anticipation and understanding of intentions and 
behaviours of the other individuals”. Not only gaze but also pointing hands 
provide cues that allow one to gather information on the external world and on 
co-specifics. These cues may influence the behaviour of an onlooker at entirely 
automatic and involuntary levels. Indeed, viewing gazes or hands pointing 
leftwards may reduce speed and accuracy of rightward eye or hand movements 
even if subjects are specifically instructed to ignore the distracting gaze or 
pointing stimuli.   
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The present dissertation has two main objectives. The first objective was aimed 
at investigating the neural underpinning of reflexive shifts of attention  
triggered by social and non-social cues and the possible modulatory role of 
gaze and hand pointing distracters on saccadic and hand pointing responses, 
respectively. Behavioural studies published by our laboratory (Crostella et al., 
2009) show that observing gaze or pointing movements directionally 
incongruent with the eye or hand movements to be performed by an onlooker 
delayed the actual execution of eye or hand movements. This pattern of results 
suggest that reflexive joint attention is mapped according to somatotopic and 
not only spatial frames of reference. The specific behavioral relationship 
between distracting and body parts found in this studies made possible data-
driven exploration of the fronto-parietal network involved in body-part specific 
triggering of visuospatial attention during saccadic and pointing tasks. 
The second objective aimed at exploring whether reflexive joint attention is 
modulated by the relationship between the social status of the gazing individual 
and the onlookers’ personality. Political psychology studies indicate that choice 
behaviours, such as voting preferences, are strongly influenced by the voters’ 
specific personality traits (such as for example the perceived similarity with a 
political Leader). We applied the gaze-cuing paradigm to individuals with 
known political preferences. Distracting gazes belonged to political leaders or 
opinion-makers of the same or opposite political party with respect to the 
voters. Therefore, using fMRI, we investigated whether “high-order social 
variables” such as political affiliation, political attitudes 
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personological similarity modulate neural responses in the reflexive social 
attention circuit.   
In Chapter 1, I will briefly review some notions about Covert vs. Overt visual 
orienting. On the basis of Corbetta and Shulman (2002) attentional models, I 
will distinguish between anatomical substrates of dorsal and ventral fronto-
parietal attentional networks. In Chapter 2, I will consider the concept 
“Reflexive Joint Attention” as central core of my researches. Importantly, I 
will focus on the “Social Meaning” of important biological and social cues, i.e. 
automatically orienting to others’ gaze and/or shifting the attention toward the 
direction indicated by a pointing hand. Finally, the neural bases of following 
gaze and pointing gesture will briefly introduced in the last sections of this 
chapter. Chapter 3 is the “leitmotiv” of my topic. The reason for a placement of 
reflexive shifts of attention into a theoretically “Social Somatotopy” frame will 
be clarified along the chapter. Thus, I will explain the importance of a “shared 
representation” of another person’ body respect to our own body and how 
visuospatial attention may be modulated by social body stimuli through a 
“sensorimotor mirroring process” that takes place according to body-part 
specific reference frames. Chapter 4 is a “wide shot” of Brain Imaging 
Technique. For sake of simplicity, I will introduce only functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) technique and basic notions relative to it, even if 
others toolbox such as Eye and Pointing (home made) tracking have been 
employed in my experiments. In Chapter 5, I will illustrate the first fMRI 
experiment (Cazzato et al, 2010; HBM in press) by means we demonstrated 
that reflexive shifts of attention triggered by social signals are coded in the 
- 4 - 
fronto-parietal cortex according to effector-specific mapping rules. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will deal with two experiments, (the first behavioral and the second 
fMRI) which share the fact that human observers (voters) are more attracted by 
the distracting gaze of an ingroup rather than an outgroup politicians (1st 
experiment) and that the proneness to follow the ingroup politicians (and 
opinion-makers) is reflected in brain responses of particular regions of interest 
(ROIs) of the fronto-parietal attentional network (2nd experiment). Importantly, 
both studies seem to suggest that the perceived similarity between the observer 
and the model played a role in mediating social attention. Because the analysis 
are still in process, I will give some tentative conclusion resuming the results 
obtained by these studies. A “Future Directions” Section will describe a new 
project I am working on, concerning “Reflexive social attention mediated by 
gaze-observation: role of the perceived fairness of others induced by economic 
interactions”.  
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Chapter 1 
Orienting of visuospatial attention 
 
1.1 Covert vs. Overt visual orienting  
 
Attention is the mental ability that allows us to adaptively select stimuli 
coming from the external world, specific responses among those available in 
our behavioral repertoire, as well as mental representations concerning space 
and time (Mesulam, 1999; Nobre, 2001). Therefore, shifts of visuospatial 
attention are fundamental for optimizing processing of places, objects, or 
instants in time. Thanks to saccadic eye movements that allow to process 
information with the maximal acuity foveal region, we are able to rapidly and 
efficiently explore visual world, under both naturalistic and laboratory 
conditions. The exploration of a visual scene occurs by means of saccadic eye 
movements that rapidly (in 50–70 msec) bring the fovea, the retinal region of 
highest acuity, and the neural machinery associated with it onto stimuli of 
interest. Stimuli are processed during interspersed periods of fixation that last 
up to 250 msec. This set of processes is defined as ‘‘overt visual orienting’’. 
Behaviorally relevant stimuli, however, can be attended to in the absence of  
exploratory saccadic eye movements. It means that the locus of attention is 
dissociable from eye fixation. In addition, attention can be directed toward a 
location either voluntarily or reflexively when a stimulus abruptly appears in 
the visual field. This set of processes is defined as ‘‘covert visual orienting.’’ 
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Many researchers have found that advance knowledge of the position of an 
upcoming stimulus facilitates its detection even when eye movements are not 
allowed (Eriksen and Hoffman, 1972; Posner, 1980). For example, in a 
classical experiment, Posner (1984) presented a target at 7 degrees to the left or 
right of fixation. Before the presentation of the target, an arrow was presented 
at fixation pointing toward the correct target location on 80 % of the trials. On 
20 % of the trials the arrow pointed toward the wrong location. Manual 
reaction times for the detection or discrimination of the target were faster when 
subjects were able to anticipate its location. It happens because the arrow 
(central cue) provides advance location information that can be used to bias the 
processing of target stimuli. Because the cue has to be interpreted and 
voluntarily used, this form of cueing is called ‘‘endogenous’’. The cue per se is 
not necessary! Similar results are obtained when subjects are asked directly to 
‘‘pay attention’’ to a certain location (Berlucchi et al., 1989). A similar 
facilitation of stimulus processing is found when advance location information 
is provided as a sensory stimulus presented at the most likely stimulus location 
(Jonides, 1981). This form of cueing is called ‘‘exogenous’’ and strongly it 
depends on sensory information. The effects of spatial cueing on visual 
processing are not limited to the simple detection of suprathreshold visual 
stimuli, but extend to many other visual tasks, including threshold detection of 
luminance and discrimination of shape, size, color, and motion (Bashinski and 
Bachrach,, 1984; Downing, 1988). The widespread effect of spatial cueing on 
vision indicate that processes that mediate spatial selection have wide access to 
visual processes specialized for feature and object analysis. The enhancement 
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in stimulus processing produced by spatial cueing, in the absence of eye 
movements, is thought to reflect the activation of a mechanism that shifts 
attention to the stimulus location before its appearance. This may facilitate 
stimulus analysis in two related ways: 1) visual processes could complete 
stimulus analysis more rapidly at the attended location, because it takes time to 
reorient attention to the new (unattended) stimulus location; 2) attention could 
more directly influence visual processes by enhancing their sensitivity at the 
attended location. This would explain how attention also improves sensory 
thresholds (Bashinski and Bachrach,, 1984).  
When recording brain activity either at the whole brain level or at the level of 
single neurons, different types of signals will correspond to the activation of 
the attentional mechanism (‘‘source’’ signals) and its interaction with the 
visual system (‘‘site’’ signals). For example, a source signal would be 
associated with a shift of attention to a location and would be recorded in areas 
that implement the attentional mechanism and or in visual areas responsible for 
stimulus analysis. In visual areas, a source signal may prime visual processes to 
a more efficient response. Once a stimulus is presented, stimulus analysis may 
be enhanced by attention. This would produce a modulation of visual 
processing (‘‘site’’ signal) that marks the site of the interaction between source 
attentional signals and visual processes. Whereas source signals provide 
information on the organization of attention systems, site signals provide 
information on how sensory (or motor or cognitive) systems are affected by 
attention.  
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The discovery of a mechanism for covertly (without eye movements) directing 
attention to locations raises the question of its relationship to mechanisms 
responsible for saccadic generation. Attention and eye movements usually 
move synchronously and select common targets in the visual field. Shepherd 
and colleagues (1986), highlighted that this relationship can occur along three 
forms. According to the “Independence Hypothesis”, attention and eye 
movement generation can involve entirely different mechanisms. It means that 
locations could be simultaneously computed in separate spatial maps by 
attentional and oculomotor systems. This assumes that it should be possible to 
operate simultaneous shifts of attention and eye movements in opposite 
directions. To the opposite, the “Identity hypothesis” states that attention and 
eye movement generation involve the same mechanisms. It assumes that a 
location is encoded by the attentional mechanism in a set of motor coordinates 
that specify direction and amplitude and that are also used for planning a 
saccadic eye movement (Rizzolatti et al., 1987). Finally, the intermediate 
position is the “Interdependence hypothesis” that claims attention and eye 
movement processes share resources or computations at some stage. For 
example, both attention and eye movement systems may depend on an early 
sensory visual representation. When both systems select the same location on 
the representation, their performance is optimal; when different locations are to 
be selected by each system, their performance is impaired.  
Early papers provided conflicting evidence on whether preparing an eye 
movement toward a location enhanced the visual processing of stimuli 
presented at the same location and, vice versa, whether a shift of attention 
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facilitated oculomotor execution (Remington, 1980; Klein, 1980). Furthermore, 
under certain conditions attention could move in the opposite direction of an 
eye movement (Berlucchi et al., 1989). Altogether these results indicated that 
attention and eye movements were either independent processes (Klein, 1980) 
or separate but functionally related processes (Berlucchi et al., 1980), such that 
they could be recruited in isolation or in concert depending on task demands. 
The succeeding “generation” of work has established that attention and eye 
movements are more tightly related. Shepherd and colleagues (1986) 
manipulated spatial attention by varying the probability that peripheral probe 
stimuli would appear in different positions, and eye movements by cueing 
saccades with a central arrow cue. They found that the preparation of a 
saccadic eye movement enhanced the manual detection of stimuli presented at 
the saccadic target location, irrespective of the direction of attention. That is, 
even when attention and eye movements were cued to opposite locations, 
stimuli at the location of the saccade were always detected more rapidly. The 
latency of the saccades was also uninfluenced by the direction of attention. 
Hoffman and Subramaniam (1995) confirmed in a dual-task situation that 
target detection is superior at the saccade location regardless of the direction of 
attention. In this experiment, saccadic latencies were slowest when attention 
and saccades were directed toward opposite locations. Klein (1980) suggested 
that processing facilitation at the saccade location is induced by saccadic 
execution, but not saccadic programming.  
The current view is that attention and eye movement systems are tightly 
related. During the preparation of a saccade, the selection of a location is 
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controlled by the oculomotor system, even when attention is directed elsewhere 
through cognitive manipulations. This supports an “identity view” in which 
attention shifts are organized in oculomotor coordinates. Because the direction 
of attention is dissociable from eye position during fixation, an additional veto-
going signal has been postulated to prevent breakdowns of fixation (Rizzolatti 
et al., 1987). It is still under discussion whether attentional processes are 
separate when a saccade is planned but not performed, or when the eyes are 
fixated (Klein, 1994; Rafal et al., 1989). Finally, these findings are consistent 
with the notion that attention and eye movement systems may be separate but 
share resources. For example, the slowing of saccadic latencies in Hoffman and 
Subramaniam (1995) is consistent with some sharing of common resources. 
However, the prevalent control of saccades on location would suggest that the 
eye movement system has preferential access to those resources.  
 
1.2 Neuroanatomical models of visuospatial attention: 
Dorsal vs. Ventral fronto-parietal attentional networks  
 
Several lines of evidence indicate that two cortico-cortical neural systems are 
involved in attending to environmental stimuli (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). 
A dorsal fronto-parietal network, whose core regions include dorsal parietal 
cortex, particularly intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and superior parietal lobule 
(SPL), and dorsal frontal cortex along the precentral sulcus, near or at the 
frontal eye field (FEF), embodies the top-down control mechanism proposed 
by biased competition and related theories (Bundesen, 1990; Desimone and 
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Duncan, 1995; Wolfe, 1994). The dorsal system is important in generating and 
maintaining endogenous signals based on current goals and pre-existing 
information about likely contingencies and sends out top-down signals that bias 
the processing of appropriate stimulus features and locations in sensory cortex. 
This conclusion is based on evidence that the dorsal network is preactivated by 
the expectation of seeing an object at a particular location or with certain 
features (e.g., movement in a specific direction) (Corbetta et al., 2000; 
Hopfinger et al., 2000; Kastner et al., 1999; Shulman et al., 1999), by the 
preparation of a specific response (Astafiev et al., 2003; Connolly et al., 2002), 
or by the short-term memory of a visual scene (LaBar et al., 1999; Pessoa et 
al., 2002). The dorsal system is also involved in linking relevant stimuli to 
responses, as it is modulated when people change their motor plan for an object 
(Rushworth et al., 2001). Under some conditions, the preparatory activation of 
the dorsal fronto-parietal network extends to visual cortex, presumably 
reflecting the top-down modulation of sensory representations (Giesbrecht et 
al., 2006; Hopfinger et al., 2000; Kastner et al., 1999; Serences et al., 2004; 
Silver et al., 2007; Sylvester et al., 2007). Accordingly, anticipatory activity 
may predict performance to subsequent targets (Giesbrecht et al., 2006; Pessoa 
and Padmala, 2005; Sapir et al., 2005; Sylvester et al., 2007). Finally, recent 
studies show that electrical or magnetic stimulation of FEF or IPS leads to a 
retinotopically specific modulation of visual areas and parallel improvement of 
perception at corresponding locations of the visual field (Moore and 
Armstrong, 2003; Ruff et al., 2006, 2007).  
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To the opposite, the ventral fronto-parietal network is not activated by 
expectations or task preparation but responds along with the dorsal network 
when behaviourally relevant objects (or targets) are detected (Corbetta et al., 
2000). Both dorsal and ventral networks are also activated during reorienting, 
with enhanced responses during the detection of targets that appear at 
unattended locations. For example, enhanced responses are observed when 
subjects are cued to expect a target at one location but it unexpectedly appears 
at another (i.e. ‘‘invalid’’ targets in the Posner spatial-cueing paradigm) 
(Arrington et al., 2000; Corbetta et al., 2000; Kincade et al., 2005; Macaluso et 
al., 2002; Vossel et al., 2006) or when a target appears infrequently.  
Core regions of the ventral network include temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
cortex (anatomically defined as the cortex at the intersection of the posterior 
end of the STS, the inferior parietal lobule, and the lateral occipital cortex), 
defined as the posterior sector of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and gyrus 
(STG) and the ventral part of the supramarginal gyrus (SMG) and ventral 
frontal cortex (VFC), including parts of middle frontal gyrus (MFG), inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), frontal operculum and anterior Insula.  
An early theory of how the two networks interact (Corbetta and Shulman, 
2002) proposed that when attention is reoriented to a new source of 
information (stimulus-driven reorienting), output from the ventral network 
interrupts (as a ‘‘circuit breaker’’) ongoing selection in the dorsal network, 
which in turn shifts attention toward the novel object of interest. Although both 
attentional networks have been most extensively investigated in vision, the 
available evidence indicates a supramodal function (Driver and Spence, 1998; 
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Macaluso et al., 2002). The ventral network (TPJ and IFG in the right 
hemisphere) registers salient events in the environment also in the auditory and 
tactile modalities (Downar et al., 2000), and similar dorsal and ventral parietal 
and frontal regions are modulated by reorienting to invalid targets (Arrington et 
al., 2000; Corbetta et al., 2000; Giessing et al., 2006; Kincade et al., 2005; 
Macaluso et al., 2002; Mayer et al., 2006; Vossel et al., 2006).  
The Dorsal and Ventral Attention Systems form separate functional-anatomical 
networks and a basic question is the degree to which different regions in each 
putative system cohere as a functional-anatomical network. The hypothesis of 
two attention networks, originally based on the patterns of activation under 
different task conditions (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), has been strongly 
supported by studies of interareal correlation of low-frequency (<0.1 Hz) 
fluctuations of the spontaneous (not task-evoked) BOLD signal over time, 
called functional connectivity by MRI (fcMRI) (Biswal et al., 1995). Several 
groups have reported a number of fcMRI networks (e.g., visual, auditory, 
somatomotor, default, attention) (Fox et al., 2005b, 2006a; Fransson, 2005; 
Greicius et al., 2003; Mantini et al., 2007), which are related to the underlying 
anatomical connectivity (Vincent et al., 2007) and replay at rest the patterns of 
functional activation evoked by behavioral tasks (Fox et al., 2005b, 2006a; 
Greicius et al., 2003; Hampson et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 2007). In other 
words, brain regions that are commonly recruited during a task are 
anatomically connected and maintain in the resting state (in the absence of any 
stimulation) a significant degree of temporal coherence in their spontaneous 
activity. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that the integrity and strength 
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of spontaneous functional connectivity are behaviorally significant (Hampson 
et al., 2006; Seeley et al., 2007; He et al., 2007b). For instance, breakdown of 
interhemispheric functional connectivity in posterior parietal cortex correlates 
in a group of patients with post-stroke neglect with their visuospatial deficits 
(He et al., 2007a). Regions that putatively belong to the dorsal and ventral 
attention systems, based on their consistent activation in the Posner cueing 
paradigm to spatial cues and unattended targets, respectively, also show 
significant interregional correlation at rest (Fox et al., 2006b) or during an 
active task with the mean task signal removed (He et al., 2007a). There is a 
remarkable similarity between the dorsal parietal and frontal regions identified 
by a meta-analysis of task-evoked activation studies and those showing high 
resting-state correlations. Similar results are found for ventral frontoparietal 
regions coactivated during stimulus-driven orienting (Fox et al., 2006a; He et 
al., 2007a). Moreover, the right hemispheric bias observed in the ventral 
attention network in several activation studies (Arrington et al., 2000; Corbetta 
et al., 2000; Downar et al., 2000) is mirrored in fMRI (Fox et al., 2006a; He et 
al., 2007a). While segregation between dorsal and ventral attention networks is 
nearly complete, spontaneous activity in right posterior MFG correlates with 
both networks, indicating that right MFG may contain intermixed neuronal 
populations respectively connected with dorsal or ventral regions (Fox et al., 
2006a). This result raises the possibility that ventral and dorsal networks do not 
directly interact but are principally linked through prefrontal cortex (Fox et al., 
2006a). The functional segregation of the two networks in the absence of a task 
may allow their flexible recruitment during active behavior. For example, 
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while dorsal regions are active following the presentation of an instructive cue, 
ventral regions are not recruited or are even suppressed (Shulman et al., 2003; 
Todd et al., 2005). However, following the presentation of a target, both 
ventral and dorsal regions respond briskly (Corbetta et al., 2000; Hampshire et 
al., 2007; Shulman et al., 1999, 2003).  
To conclude, the correspondence between activation and connectivity analyses 
provides strong evidence for separate dorsal and ventral attention networks 
forming distinct functional systems. The Ventral Network is activated by 
important stimuli that reorient attention. While reorienting to an object can be 
driven by salience and behavioral relevance, relevance is the critical factor that 
determines whether an object activates the ventral network (Downar et al., 
2001). Thus, the ventral network might be considered a prime candidate for 
mediating orienting to salient but unimportant stimuli, i.e., exogenous attention 
(Posner and Cohen, 1984), because under passive conditions it is highly 
responsive to distinctive sensory events in all modalities (Downar et al., 2000). 
But this hypothesis has now been tested and rejected (Kincade et al., 2005). 
Kincade and colleagues separated the BOLD activity produced by an 
uninformative but salient peripheral cue, a red square in an array of green 
squares, from the activity produced by discriminating a subsequent rotated T or 
L. In control conditions, subjects were presented with a neutral display of 
randomly intermixed color squares or a foveal cue that oriented attention 
voluntarily. Exogenous cues (the red square) did not activate the ventral 
network , even though performance was better at that location, indicating that 
these cues were effective in generating a shift of attention. In contrast, the 
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dorsal network (IPS/SPL and FEF) showed stronger activation for exogenous 
than neutral cues, although the strongest recruitment was recorded for 
endogenous cues (data not shown). Many other studies have measured 
activations in exogenous orienting paradigms that have combined activations 
during the cue and target periods (Kim et al., 1999; Lepsien and Pollmann, 
2002; Mayer et al., 2006; Peelen et al., 2004; Rosen et al., 1999). Although 
these studies are more difficult to interpret, they indicate that the ventral 
network is not recruited by orienting to uninformative but salient cues 
presented before a target appears (see Peelen et al., 2004, for an exception). 
Similarly, de Fockert and colleagues (2004) showed that uninformative but 
salient distracters that attract attention did not activate the ventral system, 
although they did activate the dorsal system.  
The overall conclusion is that exogenous orienting recruits the same dorsal 
fronto-parietal network that is responsible for directing attention based on goals 
or expectations. Conversely, the ventral network is well activated by stimuli 
that are important, even if they are not very distinctive. Indovina and Macaluso 
(2007), for example, showed that unattended targets of low salience activated 
regions in both dorsal (FEF, precuneus) and ventral (IFG and anterior insula) 
attention networks, in line with previous results (Arrington et al., 2000; 
Corbetta et al., 2000; Macaluso et al., 2002), to a much greater degree than 
highly salient but irrelevant distracters. Finally, the ventral network is activated 
by irrelevant objects when they are similar to a target object. Serences et al. 
(2005) asked subjects to categorize red foveal letters interspersed among a 
rapid, successive series of colored foveal letters (rapid serial visual 
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presentation, or RSVP) while peripheral distracter letters were occasionally 
presented in the target color (red) or in a non-target color (green). This 
situation is analogous to when we look in a crowd for a friend wearing a red 
sweater and notice people wearing red but not green clothes (‘‘contingent’’ 
orienting; Folk et al., 1992). TPJ activation was only observed for the red 
distracters, consistent with the hypothesis that the ventral network responds 
mainly to stimuli thought to be behaviorally relevant (see also Downar et al., 
2001). In summary, the ventral network is not activated by orienting to 
distinctive but unimportant stimuli (exogenous orienting), except perhaps in the 
special case where subjects do not have an ongoing task, but does underlie 
reorienting to environmental stimuli based on their task relevance. An 
important conclusion from these neuroimaging studies is that the psychological 
distinction between exogenous and endogenous orienting (Jonides, 1981) may 
not map onto different neural systems. Rather, a more fundamental distinction 
appears to be between systems involved in orienting, both exogenous and goal-
driven, i.e., the dorsal attention system, and those involved in stimulus-driven 
reorienting, i.e., the ventral and dorsal attention systems.  
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Chapter 2 
Reflexive orienting to Biological vs.  
Non-Biological cues: Gaze, Pointing and Arrow 
 
A fundamental aspect of attentional shifts resides in their directionality. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, orienting of attention may be either entirely voluntary 
or triggered by external stimuli presented in the peripheral or in the central part 
of the visual field. It has been held that attention was automatically and 
reflexively triggered by peripheral stimuli and not by central stimuli (Posner et 
al., 1980). However, it is now known that even central stimuli can reflexively 
catch attention particularly when these stimuli have high social valence such as 
for example directional gaze stimuli (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen and 
Kingstone, 1998). Indeed, the behaviour of individuals belonging to highly 
social groups (e.g. human and non-human primates) is profoundly influenced 
by others’ gaze. Detecting others’ gaze direction provides helpful cues on their 
overt behaviour (e.g. deriving information about a potential danger from the 
gaze of the observed subject) as well as on their mental states (emotional, 
intentional) (Emery, 2000). Thanks to these mechanisms we can implement a 
series of predictive behaviours that are crucial to individual and social 
adjustments. Gaze direction is fundamental for the interindividual sharing of 
attention as attested by the fact that two-month babies spend more time in 
looking at the eyes than at other face regions (Maurer, 1985; Batki et al., 2000; 
Farroni et al., 2002) and smile to ocular contacts (Aitken and Trevarthen, 
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1997). Moreover, four-month babies perceive others’ gaze and interpret it as 
directional cue (Farroni et al., 2000).  
Another important biological cue that proved to influence the shifts of social 
attention is the directional indication provided by a pointing hand (Butterworth 
et al., 1998; O’Neill, 1996). Through pointing humans are able, already at 14 
month of age, to catch visual attention of another individual and to re-direct it 
towards specific objects or spatial locations (Butterworth, 1998). In humans, 
producing and understanding pointing gestures is a fundamental pre-requisite 
for social interactions in that these cognitive operations allow the 
interindividual communication and provide the ability to link words to objects 
(Horne and Lowe, 1996). In particular, the “protodeclarative” pointing signals 
to other individuals potentially interesting objects and places.  
In the next sections, I will review some critical points about social valence and 
neural bases of normal gaze perception. In the same vein, I will introduce some 
basic concepts of social meaning and neural underpinning underlying the 
processing of pointing hand gesture.      
 
2.1 Gaze perception, Theory of Mind (ToM) and Joint 
attention mechanisms 
 
The direction of someone else’s gaze typically signifies where his/her attention 
is being directed. The term “joint attention” refers to a triadic relationship 
involving two persons (A and B) and one object, as both person attend to the 
same object. In other words, when the gaze direction of B will inform A of his 
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attention onto the object and A will also attend to it, this is called “Joint 
Attention”. However, only one of them uses the other’s gaze direction to orient 
to the same target (A sees that B looks at the object and A then looks at the 
object). When both individuals are aware of each other’s object of attention 
and a check that both individuals attend to the same target is do, than the 
proper definition is “Shared Attention”. This implies that A sees that B looks 
at the object and will attend to the object; B notices that A attends to the object 
too and A and B look at each other’s eyes (mutual gaze) to make sure they both 
attend to the same object. This mechanism of Shared attention is more complex 
than joint attention and both play fundamental roles in social cognition (See 
Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the various social situations involving the use of 
gaze direction. The ages at which the various capabilities emerge are in parenthesis. 
(Adapted from Emery, 2000).  
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Gaze following has been reported as early as 3–6 months of age (D’Entremont 
et al., 1997), although the exact age at which this capacity emerges is 
controversial (Emery, 2000). Before 9 months, infants can follow their 
mother’s gaze but are not capable of directing their attention towards the object 
of her interest. The joint attention capacity, which includes not only gaze 
monitoring but also pointing gestures, emerges around 9–14 months (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997a) but it’s only around 18 months of age that infants can 
attend to the same object of interest as their mother if the object is situated 
outside of their own visual field such as behind them (Butterworth, 1991).  
Joint attention is fundamental for the acquisition of language, because initiate 
the association between a word and the object it represents. Being able to orient 
one’s attention in the direction of gaze of the person naming the object is thus 
crucial (Baldwin, 1993; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997a). For example, if a mother 
says ‘‘cat’’ while looking at a cat, a child listening for the first time to this 
word will orient his attention in the gaze direction of the mother and will 
associate the word to its meaning. This learning strategy based on the use of 
people’s gaze direction emerges between 12 and 19 months of age (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997a) and positive correlations between gaze-following at 10–11 
months of age and subsequent vocabulary scores at 18 months have been 
shown (Brooks and Meltzoff, 2005). A recent modelling study showed that 
gaze-following behavior at 10–11 months of age significantly predicted 
accelerated vocabulary growth until 2 years of age, even after controlling for 
the effects of age and maternal education (Brooks and Meltzoff, 2008).  
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Baron-Cohen (1995) proposed the existence of an innate module specialized in 
the detection of gaze direction (eye direction detector, EDD), because of the 
important role of gaze early in development. Firstly, EDD would detect any 
eyelike stimulus than it would determine whether the observed gaze is directed 
towards oneself or elsewhere. This module would play an essential role in the 
development of shared attention and in Theory of Mind (ToM). The term ToM 
refers to the capacity to explain others’ behaviors in terms of mental states, 
such as intentions, desires and beliefs and was originally introduced by 
primatologists to describe the possibility that chimpanzees understood certain 
mental states in other chimpanzees (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). This 
capacity was called a “Theory of Mind” because it is impossible to directly 
access others’ minds; we are simply guessing and inferring their mental states. 
ToM skills emerge around 4–5 years of age (Mitchell and Lacohée, 1991) and 
usually is assessed by using cartoon tests portraying social situations in which 
understanding false belief is essential (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Brune and 
Brune-Cohrs, 2006). In addition, a module called the intentionality detector 
(ID) has also been proposed. The ID understands any movement in the 
environment in terms of volitional movement, i.e. the goal-directed movement 
of an external agent (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Both EDD and ID would contribute 
to the development of shared attention, itself necessary for the development of 
ToM. Finally, Perrett and Emery (1994) proposed a direction-of attention- 
detector (DAD) module that could process not only gaze cues but any 
attentional cue including head and body orientation. They also proposed a 
mutual attention mechanism, suggesting the activation of EDD or DAD would 
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be necessary for joint attention while shared attention would require the 
activation of the mutual attention mechanism in addition to EDD or DAD.  
In Baron-Cohen’s Theory, gaze direction is thus an important and privileged 
stimulus for the attribution of mental states. A test based on photographs of 
isolated eye regions has even been developed for the evaluation of ToM 
capacities in adults (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b, 2001a) and in children (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001b). In this force-choice test, subjects need to designate, 
amongst four words evoking a mental state (e.g. preoccupied, puzzled, 
reassuring, jealous), which one best describes the eye region presented. This 
test was called the “reading the mind in the eyes” test and was found 
appropriate in revealing ToM impairments in special clinical populations such 
as autistic spectrum disorders. The processing of gaze is thus an extremely 
important step in developing a social cognition and a theory of mind and relies 
on a very rich neural network.  
 
2.1.1 Brain areas involved in gaze processing 
 
Numerous PET and fMRI studies have shown that gaze processing, usually 
studied with faces rather than isolated-eye stimuli, involves mainly the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) region (Allison et al., 2000; Bristow et al., 2007; 
Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Hooker et al., 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Puce et 
al., 1998; Wicker et al., 2003). The role of STS relies to the processing of 
biological motion, with gaze being a specific type of biological motion (See 
Puce and Perrett, 2003). The STS is also involved in the gaze orienting effect 
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but not in attention-orienting to arrows (Kingstone et al., 2004). However, 
discrepancies are found in the comparison between averted and direct gaze 
conditions. Some studies have found larger activations of the STS for direct 
gaze (Calder et al., 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003) while 
others have found larger activation of that region for averted gaze (for the left 
STS, Hoffman and Haxby, 2000). Moreover, some other studies have not 
found STS differences between averted and direct gaze (Pageler et al., 2003). 
To the opposite, a study of Hardee and colleagues (2008) reported the non-
selectivity of the STS for gaze direction or emotion from eye regions in 
agreement with recent monkey data (Hoffman et al., 2007). In other gaze 
processing studies however, the STS is not even activated (George et al., 
2001). It has to be emphasized that the term STS region is general and some 
studies report anterior areas (e.g. Calder et al., 2007; Kingstone et al., 2004) 
while others report posterior ones (sometimes referred to as pSTS, See Allison 
et al., 2000). Therefore, the no-convergence of results could be due to a 
difference in the actual localization of the so-called STS region in addition to 
differences in the paradigms and stimuli used.  
Another key brain structure involved in processing the eyes and their gaze is 
the Amygdala. Although conflicting results were found about the role of this 
region, it has been proposed that the amygdala responds to gaze and to emotion 
underlying specific and devoted neural nodes. For example a fMRI study of 
Adams and colleagues (2003) who used only front-view faces, found that the 
left amygdala responded more to an angry face with averted rather than direct 
gaze and more to a fearful face with direct rather than averted gaze. The 
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conclusion was that Amygdala reflects the ambiguous source of threat 
expressed by these faces. In another study, in which head orientation always 
matched gaze direction so that the averted gaze condition was in fact a 3/4-
view face with averted gaze, the authors found the opposite results, with larger 
left amygdala response to direct than averted-gaze angry faces (Sato et al., 
2004). Interestingly, Sato et al.’s study showed a positive correlation between 
the activation of the left amygdala and the negative emotion experienced by the 
subjects in viewing these faces, but not with the perceived negative emotion of 
the faces which did not differ between the two gaze/face orientations. The 
authors suggested that the amygdala activation reflects the emotional 
significance of the facial expression and the viewer’s emotional reaction 
towards the expression (Sato et al., 2004). A recent study also suggests a 
hemispheric difference in amygdala response linked to the type of eye stimulus 
used. The left amygdala activated only for fearful eyes but not for gaze shifts 
even though the eye white area had been equated between gaze and fear 
conditions, while the right amygdala responded to all conditions equally, 
including joyful and control eyes (Hardee et al., 2008). These results contrast 
with the idea that the amygdala responds only to the eyes’ white area (Whalen 
et al., 2004) and rather suggest a hemispheric difference in stimulus selectivity 
for this structure. According to Hardee et al. (2008) hypothesis the lack of 
selectivity of the right amygdala could reflect a mechanism tuned to the fast 
and coarse detection of potential dangers, while the left amygdala could reflect 
a mechanism tuned to details enabling the verification of whether the threat is 
real. Thus, in addition to its likely role in orienting attention towards the eye 
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region, results from the neuroimaging literature suggests the amygdala 
response may not be modulated by gaze direction per se but rather by the 
emotional implication of a given stimulus for the subject in a particular task 
context. This interpretation may explain why, like the STS region, 
discrepancies between direct and averted gaze have been found for the 
amygdala. In addition to the stimuli and possible personal emotional 
involvement of subjects, these inconsistent results (including for the STS and 
amygdala) could be due to a different sensitivity of all these areas to a specific 
gaze direction depending on the subject’s task.  
In agreement with the recent neuropsychological study (Vecera and Rizzo, 
2006), a few neuroimaging studies also reported the involvement of frontal 
areas during gaze processing. For example, a recent study (Calder et al., 2002) 
in which direction of gaze was manipulated implicitly while subjects had to 
judge the size of the eyebrows of face pictures, reported activation of frontal 
regions. In addition to the STS region, a larger activation was found in medial 
frontal areas (BA8/9 and BA10) for averted compared to direct gaze or even 
faces with closed eyes. This bilateral activation of superior frontal regions 
(BA8) was also reported in an explicit gaze direction judgment (Hooker et al., 
2003). The involvement of the superior and medial frontal gyri (BA6) was 
reported in another gaze study (Wicker et al., 1998) but as the task was passive, 
it is difficult to know whether this region was involved in gaze processing per 
se or was responding to other factors. Similarly, the isolated eyes of Hardee et 
al. (2008) involved bilateral activation of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) that 
was not selective to gaze shift or emotion but it is difficult to interpret the 
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involvement of this region as the task was implicit. Importantly, these frontal 
regions, especially the medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices, are found in 
numerous ToM and joint attention studies, just like the STS and the amygdala 
(Adolphs, 1999; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Williams et al., 2005). This suggests 
that gaze processing recruits a large network of brain areas involved in ToM 
and social cognition and that the various degrees of involvement of each of 
these regions depends on the specific task utilized.  
Finally, a few studies have also reported the activation of some parietal areas in 
gaze perception. The intraparietal sulcus (IPS) was reported for the viewing of 
averted eye movements (Bristow et al., 2007; Hardee et al., 2008; Pelphrey et 
al., 2003) and perception of averted gaze in static faces (Hoffman and Haxby, 
2000). Other studies have reported the activation of the inferior parietal and 
superior parietal lobules for the movement of eyes within faces (Calder et al., 
2007; Wicker et al., 1998). Most important, because the parietal cortex 
including the IPS is involved in covert shift of spatial attention (Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002; Grosbras et al., 2005), gaze-related activity in these regions is 
usually thought to reflect the engagement of the attentional system for 
encoding the spatial direction of another’s gaze and orienting attention in that 
direction. This general role is supported by the non-selectivity of that region 
for gaze as reported by Hardee et al. (2008). Although, the review of the 
neuroimaging literature on gaze perception confirms the results from the 
neuropsychological literature regarding the involvement of the amygdala, the 
STG/STS, the FG, some parietal and frontal areas, in agreement with a fronto-
parietal circuit for gaze as found in a meta-analysis involving 59 neuroimaging 
- 29 - 
studies (Grosbras et al., 2005), this analysis also found that gaze perception 
shared common neural substrates with visually triggered saccades and visually 
triggered shifts of  attention (Grosbras et al., 2005). In particular, the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) area, which is adjacent to the pSTS region is common 
node both shared by gaze direction perception and visually triggered saccades. 
However, the precise role of these regions in processing direct or averted gaze 
and the influences of task demands remain to be better understood.  
 
2.2 Pointing with the index finger  
 
An especially important gesture that has a number of unique features is human 
pointing. Although there may be some variations of form, pointing is 
characterized by a basic interpersonal function of directing someone’s attention 
to something is very likely a human universal (Kita, 2003). Pointing is a 
special gesture that can convey an almost infinite variety of meanings such as:  
‘‘If you look over there, you’ll know what I mean.’’ To recover the intended 
meaning of a pointing gesture, therefore, requires some fairly serious 
‘‘mindreading.’’ Infants begin to point to things for other persons from around 
11 to 12 months of age (Carpenter, Nagell, and Tomasello, 1998; Leung and 
Rheingold, 1981). Bates, Camaioni, and Volterra (1975) conceptualized it as a 
kind of social tool use, as infants begin to use physical tools at around this 
same age. According to “Speech Act Theory”, it is possible to distinguish 
between two types of communicative act that have formed the basis for all 
subsequent accounts of pre-linguistic communication. The first is 
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“protoimperative” pointing and an infant points to get the adult to retrieve an 
object for them: “He/she uses the adult as a tool to obtain the object”. Instead, 
“protodeclarative” pointing implies that infant points to get the adult to attend 
to an external entity: “He/she uses the external entity as a tool to obtain adult 
attention”. The current theoretical debates about infant pointing raise the 
question whether young infants are attempting in their pre-linguistic 
communication to influence the intentional/mental states of others (cause them 
to ‘‘know’’ something) or whether, alternatively, they are simply aiming to 
achieve certain behavioral effects in others (cause them to ‘‘do’’ something). 
For example, Camaioni (1993) proposes that protoimperative gestures emerge 
first in development and only require the infant to understand the other as a 
causal agent not a mental agent who makes things happen behaviourally, 
whereas protodeclarative gestures emerge later and require the infant to 
understand the other as a mental agent whose attention may be directed to 
external entities. Moore and colleagues (1996) claimed that even 
protodeclarative gestures initially, at least are not directed at the 
intentional/mental states of others, but are simply directed at gaining adult 
attention to the self. Pointing simply directs someone’s attention to a location 
in the perceptual environment, but to correctly identify the intended referent 
requires that the communicator and the recipient know together that the 
indicated location is in some way relevant to some larger context they share. 
We will call this larger context, following Clark (1996), common ground or the 
“joint attentional frame”. And it must be emphasized that the common ground 
or joint attentional frame within which pointing gains its meaning is, of 
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necessity, common or joint. It is important that common ground need not be 
personal in the sense that you and I have personally experienced things 
together. In addition to knowing exactly what in their common ground a 
pointer is referring to, recipients must also determine why the communicator is 
pointing.  
The most important question about pointing social meaning is that we have to 
distinguish at least two levels of intentionality involved in every 
communicative act: the communicator’s more narrow referential intention of 
directing the recipient’s attention to something, and his wider social intention 
or motive for directing her attention there in the first place, in the sense of what 
he wants her to know or to do. Human motivations for communicating are 
mainly cooperative. Thus, the three most basic motivations may be 
characterized in terms of helping and sharing (the other two are also 
cooperative in different ways): 1) informative (assertive): the communicator 
wants the recipient to know something that he thinks she will find useful or 
interesting he is helping her by informing her; 2) requestive (directive): the 
communicator wants the recipient to do something that will help him, the 
communicator, in some way (including by providing needed information, as in 
questions); and 3) expressive: the communicator wants the recipient to feel 
some attitude or emotion that he is already feeling he wants her to share this 
attitude or emotion with him. To help you to infer my social intention, I will 
often produce some kind of overt (emotional) expression. Also of interest here 
is the mutual assumption of helpfulness both communicators trust that the other 
will make good faith attempts to collaborate in getting the communicator’s 
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message across (Clark, 1996) which underlies and indeed makes possible the 
kind of cooperative communication characteristic of the human species. 
Inferring the communicator’s social intention (her motive, why he/she is 
pointing for me) also depends crucially on the common ground between 
communicator and recipient. To summarize, Figure 2 depicts the different 
layers of intentionality underlying a communicator’s pointing act in the current 
analysis. Beyond any individual goals, we must recognize: the social intention 
(that you do/know/feel something); the communicative intention (that we know 
together that I want one of these things from you); and the referential intention 
(that you attend to something as a way of figuring out what it is I want from 
you).  
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Figure 2: Different levels of goals/intentions underlying pointing as a human 
communicative act, from the communicator’s perspective (C: communicator; R: 
recipient). Arrows indicate that the higher goal/intention is carried out by means of 
the lower one. (Adapted from Tomasello, Carpenter and Liszkowski, 2007)   
 
2.2.1 Brain areas involved in pointing gesture  
 
In addition to gaze and arrow cues, current social neuroscience literature 
suggests that hand-pointing gesture may automatically trigger attentional shift. 
An experimental study in adults showed that hand-pointing gestures were 
processed automatically (Langton and Bruce, 2000). The researchers used the 
interference effect of stimulus presentation on the processing of spoken 
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directional words. Their results confirmed that hand-pointing presentation 
produced an automatic interference effect. These data suggest that hand 
pointing may trigger attentional shift in the same automatic manner as the eyes 
apparently do, although to date no studies tested this issue.  
To our knowledge only a recent study published by Sato and collaborators 
(2009) investigated the commonalities in the neural mechanisms underlying 
automatic attentional shifts by gaze, hand gestures, and symbolic arrow. The 
authors measured the brain activity using fMRI while participants observed 
directional and non-directional stimuli, including eyes, hands, and arrows. 
Conjunction analyses revealed that the posterior STS, the IPL, the IFG, and the 
occipital cortices in the right hemisphere were more active in common in 
response to directional versus non-directional stimuli (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: (a) Statistical parametric maps indicating the brain regions that were 
activated in common in response to directional versus non-directional stimuli 
depicting eyes, hands, and arrows. (b) Statistical parametric maps of the 
representative brain regions that exhibited higher activation for directional 
versus non-directional stimuli depicting eyes, hands, and arrows. STS=superior 
temporal sulcus region; IPL=inferior parietal lobule; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus. (c) 
Mean percent signal changes (with SE) of representative brain regions that were 
highly activated in response to directional versus non-directional stimuli depicting 
eyes, hands, and arrows. (Adapted by Sato et al., 2009)   
 
These results suggest commonalities in the neurocognitive mechanisms 
underlying the automatic attentional shifts triggered by gaze, gestures, and 
symbols. Consistently with previous studies (e.g., Hietanen, 1999; Hommel et 
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al., 2001), the data support the hypothesis that eyes, hands, and arrows could 
automatically trigger a similar pattern of attentional shift. These common 
psychological mechanism involved in the automatic attentional shift by gaze, 
gestures and symbols are consistent with human developmental studies that 
indicate that infants follow the direction of attention of adults, which were 
indicated by eyes or hand-pointing gestures (Csibra, 2003). An animal study 
also indicated that chimpanzees showed automatic attentional shifting while 
viewing arrows (Itakura, 2001). These developmental and comparative data 
suggest that a shared psychological mechanism in human beings for the 
automatic attentional shift in response to gaze, gestures and some kinds of 
symbols may have developed through the evolutionary process. Nevertheless, 
one methodological limitation of this study should be noted. Because the 
authors did not use a cueing paradigm during image scanning, the direct link 
between neural activity and behavioral performance remained untested. Future 
research that examines the relationship between brain activity and behavioral 
performance may provide further evidence regarding the brain mechanisms 
involved in the cognitive functions subserved by the brain activity we 
observed.  
Therefore, the main objective of our first fMRI study was to overcome this 
limitation by exploring the interaction between the category of task-irrelevant 
visual stimuli (eyes, hands, or non-biological cues, i.e. arrows) and the motor-
effector (eyes vs. hands) during the orienting task (See Chapter 5).     
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Chapter 3 
Towards a “Social Somatotopy” of  
Reflexive Social Attention 
 
The brain contains multiple representations of the body. First, afferent inputs 
from the skin and proprioceptive receptors project to maps of the body surface 
and body segments in the primary somatosensory cortex (Penfield and 
Rasmussen, 1950). These somatotopic maps reflect the distribution of sensory 
receptors within the body, and underpin somatic sensation (Romo et al., 1998). 
For example, area 3b contains a distorted “homunculus”, with enlarged lips and 
hands. Neuroanatomical, neuropsychological and neurophysiological evidence 
all suggest that this primary information is further processed to construct 
higher-order, more cognitive representations of the body. These representations 
differ from primary maps in providing a supramodal, coherent scheme for body 
representation and skilled action.  
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3.1 Body representations: body schema and body image  
 
At the cognitive level, a fundamental distinction can be made between two 
different higher-order body representations which have been called body 
schema and body image (Paillard, 1999). Body schema refers to a 
representation of the positions of body parts in space, which is updated during 
body movement. This typically does not enter into awareness and is primarily 
used for spatial organization of action. The body schema is therefore a central 
representation of the body’s spatial properties, that includes the length of limb 
segments, their hierarchical arrangement, the configuration of the segments in 
space and the shape of the body surface. Body image refers to a conscious 
visual representation of the way the body appears from the outside, typically in 
a canonical position. The scientific concept corresponds roughly to the 
everyday use of the term. Moreover, the term schema has other uses in 
cognitive science. Haggard and Wolpert (2005) refer to body schema as “a 
neural representation of the body used for spatial sensorimotor processing, by 
excluding representations for primary sensory input and motor execution”.  
The body scheme could be characterized by the following seven fundamental 
properties of body representation: 
1. Spatially coded: the body scheme represents the position and 
configuration of the body as a volumetric object in space. Crucially, 
the body scheme integrates tactile information from the body surface 
with proprioceptive information about the configuration of the limbs in 
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space (Head and Holmes, 1911). This integration means that a stimulus 
on the body can be localized in external space.  
2. Modularity: body postures might be stored as individual entries in a 
database by describing the entire body configuration and body surface 
stimuli. However, the evidence suggests that the brain represents 
different body parts in different neural modules, using the resulting 
modular network to represent all postures. Therefore, the body scheme 
comprises body parts or segments, which bear spatial and categorical 
relations to each other (e.g., fingers are elements of hands, which form 
the ends of arms) (Tessari and Rumiati, 2002).  
3. Updated with movement: any body representation we used during an 
action must continuously track the positions of our body parts as we 
move. The updating process may underlie the finding that the visual 
receptive fields of many parietal neurons follow the hand when the 
hand moves (Graziano and Gross, 1993). This mechanism would allow 
the body scheme to modulate perceptual processing of objects 
according to their position in peripersonal space. This would be 
essential for control of grasping or avoidance movement.  
4. Adaptability: the body scheme is able to adapt in order to obtain 
gradual changes in the spatial properties of the body. In addition the 
body scheme can change on a shorter time scale to incorporate 
additional objects as new segments of the body representation. These 
plastic changes may occur both as gradual extensions to an existing 
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scheme, or as rapid switches between several alternative coexisting 
schemes (Braun et al., 2001).  
5. Supramodality: because the body scheme receives multiple sensory 
input, it is able to integrate body surface information and 
proprioception to describe the body as a volumetric object in external 
space. In addition, however, visual information can be in the same 
representation. Thus, a visual stimulus and a tactile stimulus at the 
same location on the body surface may form a joint representation 
within the body scheme (Rorden et al., 1999). This may involve 
transforming primary representations of vision, proprioception and 
touch either into a single sensory modality, or into an abstract, amodal 
code. 
6. Coherence: the brain must be able to maintain a coherent spatial 
organization of the body scheme across space and time, in order to 
ensure a continuity of body experience which may play a major role in 
individual self-consciousness. A basic principle of body scheme 
coherence is the resolution of inter-sensory discrepancies. For 
example, the visual and proprioceptive representations of hand position 
each have characteristic biases and variabilities, yet we perceive our 
hand in a single location because the brain optimally combines these 
sources of information (van Beers, Wolpert, and Haggard, 2002). 
These discrepancies can be exaggerated by experimental manipulations 
which put the modalities into stark conflict. For example if the forearm 
is held at a fixed extension angle and the biceps tendon vibrated an 
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illusory extension of the forearm is experienced. If a blindfolded 
subject holds his nose during this procedure, the nose is perceived to 
grow in length as the forearm is felt to extend. In this case, the 
proprioceptive information from the arm, and the tactile information 
about the contact between the fingers and nose are preserved and made 
coherent by adapting the perceived size of another body part (the 
nose). The overall coherence of the body scheme is thus preserved by 
altering the representation of a single body segment.  
7. Interpersonality: a common body scheme is used to represent both 
one’s own body, and the bodies of others. Reed and Farah (1995), for 
example, showed that participants could better perceive changes in a 
model’s body posture if they simultaneously moved their own 
corresponding body part. These results imply that the observed and 
self-generated actions were co-represented within a single modular 
body scheme. An interpersonal function necessarily implies a 
supramodal body scheme, since information about others’ bodies is 
generally visual, while information from one’s own body is generally 
tactile or proprioceptive.   
Several lines of evidence show that a common neural body scheme is used 
“interpersonally” to represent both one’s own body and others’ bodies. This 
implies a mapping function linking the codes for specific body parts across 
people. Therefore, a surprising but fascinating feature of the brain’s body 
scheme is the “commonality” between the representation of one’s own body 
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and the body of other individuals. This suggests that the body scheme could 
also form a basis for social cognition.  
 
3.2 Body-part specific reference frames for mapping reflexive 
joint attention 
 
A study published by Ricciardelli and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that 
healthy subjects tend to imitate the oculomotor behaviour of other individuals 
reflexively. Importantly, they found that the distracting effect of others’ gaze 
directed left- or rightward is significantly higher than the distracting effect of 
leftward or rightward pointing arrows and the interferential effect was maximal 
when the distracter preceded the instruction signal. The authors linked the 
results to “a tendency to share a common attentional state of another person”, 
seen that this effect was specific for body-part as the observed gaze and not for 
directional no-biological signal as arrows.  
By using a similar joint attention paradigm, Crostella et al (2009) non only 
replicated (only for saccadic task) but also demonstrated that gaze and pointing 
hand distracters that were directionally incongruent with the instruction-cue 
respectively impaired the goal-driven saccadic and pointing performance thus 
suggesting that reflexive social attention is mapped in a “somatocentred” 
fashion and not only in a spatial reference frames. By comparing the attention-
catching power of directional gaze, hand and arrow cues presented before, 
simultaneously or after an instruction cue signalling actions to be performed 
with eyes or hand, the authors found a specific relationship only between 
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reflexive joint attention and distracting stimuli with social/biological valence, 
(i.e. gaze and hand). This is in keeping with studies showing that when one 
person observes another suddenly shifting gaze or pointing, the observer's 
attention automatically and rapidly orients to the same location even when 
orienting is not relevant or is even detrimental to the task (Driver et al., 1999; 
Friesen et al., 2005; Langton et al., 1996; 2000).  
The novelty of the study concerned two main core issues. The first was that the 
interference effect of social stimuli occurred “only” when the distracting 
stimulus preceded the instruction to move. This indicates that the detrimental 
effect is due to interference with ongoing action programs in accord with 
“Premotor Theories of Attention” (Rizzolatti et al, 1987). Second, it has been 
proposed that the social modulation of reflexive attention does not reflect 
purely spatial codes but is also mapped according to “somatocentred” rules. To 
better clarify the concept, I would stress the results of this study by remarking 
that while the distracting gaze impaired saccadic performance significantly 
more than distracting biological-social (hand) or non biological stimuli 
(arrows), the distracting hand impaired pointing performance significantly 
more than distracting gaze or arrows. On the basis of these results, the authors 
concluded that the higher interference of social cues does not occur according 
to mere coding of a given position in space but it is influenced by the relation 
between the body part depicted in the distracter and the body part which 
performs the action requested by the experimental task.  
Studies of visuospatial attentional shifts have linked pointing and saccadic 
responses to exogenous and endogenous cuing respectively. The phenomena 
- 44 - 
reported in the Crostella’s study are reminiscent of behavioural studies that 
show a facilitation of hand grasping performance during observation of a hand 
in a congruent but not in an incongruent position (Craighero et al., 2002). In a 
similar vein observing another person making incongruent movements has a 
significant interference effect on movement execution that was not found 
during observation of a robotic arm making incongruent movements (Kilner et 
al., 2003). The close link between specific visual stimuli and specific motor 
actions is also suggested by neurophysiological studies on the motor mirroring 
of observed hand actions (Fadiga et al, 1995; Romani et al, 2005; Urgesi et al, 
2006). The notion that a similar mirror system may exist also for the 
oculomotor domain is supported by the finding that similar, mainly fronto-
parietal and temporal, cortical regions are recruited during execution and 
observation of eye movements (Grosbras et al., 2005). To conclude, these 
studies significantly extended previous knowledge by showing that reflexive 
shifts or visuospatial attention are modulated by social body stimuli through a 
“sensorimotor mirroring process” that takes place according to body-part 
specific reference frames.  
 
3.3 Fronto-parietal network involved in body-part specific 
triggering of visuospatial attention 
 
The specific behavioural association between distracting and acting body parts 
found in Crostella et al. (2009) studies laid the foundations for data-driven 
exploration of the neural underpinnings of this “somatotopic mapping”.  
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In the first study we used neuroimaging technique (fMRI) to explore whether 
specific nodes of the dorsal fronto-parietal network involved in body-part 
specific triggering by visuospatial attention play a specific role during saccadic 
and pointing tasks. Human neuroimaging studies show that perception of social 
attention recruits a widely distributed network, involving temporal areas 
implicated in face perception (i.e. Fusiform Gyrus and STS), fronto-parietal 
attentional regions (i.e. SPL, FEF) and areas implicated in emotion and social 
cognition (i.e. Amygdala and mPFC). Respectively, these regions are thought 
to underlie visual analysis of social attention direction, imitative attention 
shifts, emotional reactions and mental state attribution (Nummenmaa and 
Calder, 2009). Here, we predict that although fully task-irrelevant, incongruent 
distracters activate Fronto-parietal networks according to “somatotopic” body-
matching. In particular, we anticipated a greater blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) activity in those fronto-parietal nodes specifically involved 
in the “visual” and the “execution” processing of social stimuli with biological 
relevance. So, we targeted regions of interest such as, Inferior and Superior 
Parietal Lobule (SPL, IPL) and Frontal Eye Fields (FEF) with the objective to 
answer to key question such as: “Are there nodes of the fronto-parietal network 
specifically involved in body-part triggering of visuospatial attention and 
playing a specific role during saccadic and pointing tasks?”  
Current literature reports that activity in the FEF has been one of the most 
consistent cortical correlates of social cognition in imaging studies (Mundy, 
2003; Mundy and Newell, 2007). Cumulative evidence for the role of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, including FEF, in unwanted reflexive saccade 
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inhibition, short-term spatial memory and prediction suggests that this area 
controls decisional processes governing oculomotor behaviour (Pierrot-
Deseilligny et al., 2004). Indeed, the self-control of directional gaze by the 
FEF, and the effects of that eye gaze on the behaviors of other people, may be 
among the first sources of information to generate an awareness of self-
intentioned action for many infants. If self-awareness of intentional action is 
vital to understanding intentional action in others, then systems controlling 
intentional visual attention may be expected to make a primary contribution to 
social cognition. Furthermore, clinical and brain imaging studies strongly 
suggest that a segregated pattern of effector representations in the Parietal Lobe 
is present in humans (De Renzi, 1982; Jeannerod, 1986; Pause et al., 1989; 
Seitz et al., 1991). It is generally accepted that a fundamental role of the 
parietal lobe is also to describe objects for action (Jeannerod, 1994; Jeannerod 
et al., 1995; Milner and Goodale, 1995). This “pragmatic”, action-orientated 
object description has been contrasted with the “semantic” description coded in 
the inferotemporal lobe (Milner and Goodale, 1995; Jeannerod et al., 1995). 
Buccino and colleagues (2001) indicated that a “pragmatic” analysis is also 
carried out when an individual observes an object-directed action made by 
another individual. If action understanding were based on higher cognitive 
functions, this parietal analysis would be unnecessary. Taken together, their 
results strongly supported the view that during action observation there is a 
recruitment of the same neural structures which would be normally involved in 
the actual execution of the observed action. When individuals observe an 
action, they code that action in terms of the related voluntary movements. The 
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“seen” actions are mapped onto the corresponding motor representations of the 
Frontal Lobe and, in the case of object-related actions, the “seen” objects on 
the effector-related, pragmatic representations, in the Parietal Lobe. This raises 
the possibility that a crucial fronto-parietal contribution underlying these 
interference effects are present when an interaction between the motor-effector 
(saccade vs. hand-pointing) and the category of task-irrelevant visual stimuli 
presented during the orienting task (eyes, hands, or non-biological cues, i.e. 
arrows) occurs. The present fMRI study is the first to support the evidence of a 
specific BOLD response preferentially modulated by a body-matching 
response-modality. This may also be explained in terms of “action mirroring” 
in a way that, the influence of spatial compatibility on imitation is highlighted 
by the tendency to imitate in a mirrored and spatially compatible form. This is 
also supported by Urgesi et al. (2006) that using TMS found an increase in 
corticospinal excitability during the observation of a static hand that implied a 
prehensile action relative to a high-level baseline (i.e. the observation of a hand 
in a resting position). These studies suggest that static hand stimuli are capable 
of activating the mirror neuron system, but only if the hand stimulus is clearly 
related to a hand action. This may demonstrate that reflexive shifts of attention 
triggered by social signals are specifically influenced by the effector used for 
responding. From this we aim to conclude that the social modulation of 
reflexive attention does not reflect mere spatial codes, but may also be mapped 
according to body-part specific rules.  
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Chapter 4 
Brain Imaging Technique:  
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a non-invasive 
neuroimaging technique allowing to study human brain function in vivo. 
Functional MRI extends the use of Magnetic Resonance Imaging to provide 
information about biological function in addition to the anatomical 
information. In the ninetieth century, Ogawa and colleagues demonstrated that 
by measuring the blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signal, fMRI 
could be used to visualize brain function (Ogawa et al., 1990). They attributed 
the contrast increase to a “magnetic susceptibility effect” associated with the 
paramagnetic deoxyhaemoglobin in red cells. The BOLD fMRI technique is 
designed to measure primarily, changes in the inhomogeneity of the magnetic 
field that result from changes in blood oxygenation, in fact it exploits the fact 
that haemoglobin and deoxyhaemoglobin are magnetically different. Magnetic 
susceptibility refers to the amount of magnetization that can be achieved when 
a material is placed in a magnetic field. Deoxyhaemoglobin is paramagnetic 
and introduces an inhomogeneity into the nearby magnetic field, while 
oxyhaemoglobin is weakly diamagnetic and has little effect. Thus, the 
paramagnetic deoxyhaemoglobin induces a susceptibility difference between 
the blood vessels and the surrounding tissue can be used as an endogenous 
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contrast (i.e. depends on intrinsic property of the biological  tissue) (see Figure 
1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: MR-Parameters Variation dues to the cortical activation. (A) Blood-
oxygen level-dependent signal mechanism in magnetic timbre imaging. (B) 
oxyhaemoglobin and deoxyhaemoglobin blood flow during rest and activation 
(Adapted from Preuschoff K. – spm course 2010- ).  
  
Hydrogen nuclei (protons) have magnetic properties, called nuclear spin. They 
behave like tiny rotating magnets. In presence of a magnetic field the hydrogen 
atoms, present in the water molecules of the brain, align themselves with this 
field and reach an equilibrium state. Exchange of energy between two systems 
at a specific frequency is called resonance. Magnetic resonance corresponds to 
the energetic interaction between spins and electromagnetic radio frequency 
(RF). When a brief radio frequency (RF) is applied, the hydrogen atoms absorb 
energy (excitation) and their equilibrium state is perturbed. These hydrogen 
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atoms would emit energy (relaxation) at the same radio frequency until they 
gradually return to their equilibrium state. The magnetic vector of spinning 
protons can be broken down into two orthogonal components: a longitudinal or 
Z component, and a transverse component, lying on the XY plane. Relaxation 
gives rise to the magnetic resonance signal and is composed of two 
components. Longitudinal relaxation is due to energy exchange between the 
spins and surrounding lattice (spin-lattice relaxation, decay constant T1) and 
Transverse relaxation (spin-spin relaxation, decay constant T2) occurs due to 
the spins getting out of phase. T1 depends on the applied magnetic field 
strength with longer relaxation times for greater field strengths. T2 is 
independent of the applied magnetic field strength and is always shorter than 
T1. The observed transverse relaxation time T2* is always shorter than T2 due 
to the combined effect of local field inhomogeneities and T2. The fundamental 
concept underlying the formation of a magnetic resonance image is a magnetic 
gradient, i.e. a spatially varying magnetic field. Lauterbur (1973) demonstrated 
that by superimposing a magnetic field that varies linearly across space, 
hydrogen atoms would precess at different frequencies in a controlled fashion. 
Thus different points in space become identified by different resonance 
frequencies. The Fourier transform of the signal would show its strength at 
each frequency, and thus at each position. A series of changing magnetic field 
gradients and oscillating magnetic fields is referred to as the pulse sequence. 
Presently, MRI instruments use three mutually orthogonal sets of 
electromagnetic 'gradient coils' to encode the three spatial co-ordinates of the 
MR signal (Cohen et al., 1994).  
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The data acquisition is achieved in two steps: First, a particular slice is selected 
within the total imaging volume using a one-dimensional excitation pulse. 
Then a two-dimensional encoding scheme (phase and frequency) is used to 
resolve the spatial distribution of the spin magnetizations. The field of view 
defines the spatial extent along different dimensions of the image space. 
Sequential excitation of adjacent slices may lead to off-resonance excitation 
(i.e. excitation of spins to intermediate state) that results in each slice being 
pre-excited by the previous excitation pulse. To overcome these effects, 
interleaved slice acquisition can be used. There are two important factors that 
govern the time at which MR images are collected: 1) The time interval 
between successive excitation pulses, known as the repetition time (TR) and 2) 
The time interval between excitation and data acquisition, known as echo time 
(TE). The most commonly used contrast for structural anatomical images is 
T1-weighted. A number of methods exist for contrast generation in MRI 
images. The T2* contrast forms the basis of BOLD fMRI. T2* contrast 
requires long TR and medium TE and the MR signal needs to be generated 
using the magnetic field gradients rather than using the refocusing pulse that 
would eliminate field inhomogeneity effects. Due to the reduced T2* 
sensitivity, spin-echo sequences are less frequently used for BOLD fMRI. The 
measured RF signal decays over time depending on many factors including the 
presence of inhomogeneities in the magnetic field. Greater inhomogeneity 
results in decreased image intensity. The increase in neuronal activity in a brain 
area results in an initial increase in oxygen consumption. After a delay of about 
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2 sec, a large increase in localized cerebral blood flow is triggered, which over-
compensates the oxygen consumption. 
Therefore, localized increases in blood flow increase blood oxygenation and 
consequently reduce deoxyhaemoglobin. As a result, better visibility in MRI 
images is thought to correlate with neuronal activity. Simultaneous fMRI and 
electrophysiological recordings by Logothetis and colleagues (Logothetis et. al. 
2001) have confirmed that the BOLD contrast mechanism directly reflects the 
neural responses elicited by a stimulus. However, fMRI activation in an area is 
correlated with the local field potentials reflecting processing of the incoming 
input rather than the spiking activity. Hence, the absence of an FMRI signal 
does not necessarily mean that no information processing is taking place in a 
particular brain area. After fifteen years of fMRI studies, there is still much to 
learn about the source of these signals (See Heeger and Ress, 2002 for review). 
 
4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of fMRI technique  
 
The fMRI provides a non-invasive method to access indirectly neuronal 
activity in the brain with a relatively good spatial and temporal resolution. 
Before the emergence of functional MRI, radio isotope based techniques such 
as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) which measures regional cerebral 
blood flow (rCBF), were widely used for mapping the brain function. 
However, these techniques are invasive and have a low spatial and temporal 
resolution. Although animal studies provide an unprecedented approach to 
study neural mechanisms at cellular level, the limited communication and 
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cognitive capabilities restricts the investigation of brain function in animals. 
Electrophysiological methods due to their invasive nature (i.e. require insertion 
of electrodes directly into the brain) have limited use for studying brain 
function in humans. Electroencephalography (EEG) measures of the electrical 
activity of the brain by recording on a millisecond time scale from electrodes 
placed on the scalp. The magnetoencephalography (MEG) and EEG techniques 
signals derive from the net effect of ionic currents flowing in the dendrites of 
neurons during synaptic transmission. While EEG has poor spatial resolution, 
MEG technique promises good spatial and temporal resolution. The inverse 
problem of uniquely identifying the locations of neural sources giving rise to 
pattern of activity on the skull has by and large limited the value of EEG and 
MEG in mapping brain function. Lesion studies provide clear evidence that a 
brain region is necessary for a particular behaviour but do not specify the time 
course of the region’s activity. Lesion studies result in a permanent loss of a 
brain region, thus lending itself to be an irreversible process. Hence, human 
lesion studies can only be done by finding patients with isolated damage to a 
particular brain area. The temporary interruption of function within a brain 
region is possible using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (See Figure 
2).   
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Figure 2. Methods of Cognitive Neuroscience. Cognitive neuroscience techniques 
can be categorized according to their spatial and temporal resolution. (Adapted from 
Churchland and Sejnowski, 1988). 
 
4.2  Experimental Designs and theoretical assumptions  
 
Although fMRI technique offers a suitable method for investigating human 
brain function, fMRI experiments requires careful attention to experimental 
design, data acquisition techniques, and data analysis (Chein and Schneider, 
2003). Experimental design is at the heart of any cognitive neuroscience 
investigation. Because fMRI does not measure absolute neural activity, 
neuroimaging studies must be designed to quantify relative changes of activity. 
Further, the brain is constantly engaged in several controlling tasks such as 
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respiration or heart-beat. Hence, to measure specific task-related activity, we 
need to scan subjects while at rest or while performing a simple baseline task 
(Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). Assuming that brain activity scales in a linear 
fashion and that cognitive processes are additive, we can test for brain 
activations pertaining to certain cognitive processes (Berns, 1999). Although 
there is no inherent baseline associated with the blood oxygen-level-dependent 
(BOLD) signal (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001) that is measured in fMRI studies, 
researchers often have attempted to establish such a baseline by using periods 
of rest (10- to 30-s long blocks of rest or fixation, in a blocked fMRI 
experiment), the final seconds of long intertribal intervals (ITIs; in the case of 
slow, or non-overlapping, event-related fMRI), or 2- to 4-s null trials (in the 
case of rapid event-related fMRI). Because no task is being performed during 
rest, it has seemed reasonable to assume that this baseline represents something 
akin to a zero-activity condition that then can be compared with activity during 
cognitive tasks. Therefore, when activity in a particular region of the brain 
during a cognitive task is no greater than during rest, it often has been 
supposed that this particular region of the brain is not involved in the task. 
Overall, designs can be classified into three types: 1) categorical, 2) factorial or 
3) parametric (Friston, 1997). The categorical designs assume that the 
cognitive processes can be portioned into sub-cognitive processes. That is one 
can remove and add different cognitive processes by the assumption of “Pure 
insertion”. This assumption requires that one cognitive component does not 
affect the effect of another cognitive component. The categorical designs are 
further divided into subtraction or conjunction type. Cognitive subtraction 
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designs are used to test the hypothesis pertaining to activation in one task as 
compared to that in another task considering the fact that the neural structures 
supporting cognitive and behavioural processes combine in a simple “additive 
manner”. Whereas in the cognitive conjunctions type designs, several 
hypotheses are tested, asking whether all the activations in a series of task pairs 
are jointly significant. Cognitive conjunctions can be thought as an extension 
of the subtraction technique in the sense that they combine a series of 
subtractions. While cognitive subtraction studies are designed such that a pair 
of tasks differ only by the processing components of interest, cognitive 
conjunction studies are designed such that two or more distinct task pairs each 
share a common processing difference. The problem of finding a baseline that 
activate all cognitive processes except the process of interest can be overcome 
by conjunction design (Price et al., 1997). The only constraint on selecting the 
baseline is that the component of interest is the only process that differs in each 
task pair (Price and Friston, 1997). Factorial designs involve combining two or 
more factors within a task and looking at the effect of one factor on the 
response to other factor. The problem of interactions (i.e., the effect that the 
added component in the activation task has on pre-existing components) can be 
overcome when the experimental design is factorial. Price et al. (1997) 
demonstrated that when the design is factorial, conjunction analysis reveals 
commonalities in activation, while the interactions reveal task-specific effects. 
In particular, the effect of a cognitive component (i.e., an effect that is 
independent of other components) is best captured by the main (activation) 
effect of that component and that the integration among components (i.e., the 
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expression of one cognitive process in the context of another) can be assessed 
with the interaction terms (Friston et al., 1996). In parametric designs, rather 
than assuming that the cognitive processes are composed of different cognitive 
components, they are considered as belonging to different psychological 
dimensions. The systematic changes in the brain responses according to some 
performance attributes of task can be investigated in parametric designs. In 
parametric designs one can also look at the linear and non-linear types of 
relations to be determined empirically.  
An fMRI experiment to test a given biological hypothesis must be designed 
within the constraints of the temporal characteristics of the BOLD fMRI signal 
and of the various confounding effects to which fMRI signal is susceptible. 
Typically, two designs are possible 1) Epoch-based design using Blocks of 
stimulation (boxcar designs with alternating activation and rest) and 2) Event-
related design, where data may be recorded to monitor the BOLD response 
following a marked (pre-determined) event such as a single stimulus or task. 
Blocked design (Epoch-based) experiments are used mainly to average across 
many trials to obtain sufficient signal-to-noise ratios to generate functional 
activation images. The block design experiments descended from the low 
temporal resolution imaging based on blood dynamics such as PET. However, 
such blocked trial procedures do not allow separate trials within the task blocks 
to be distinguished. Blocked-designs cannot be used if we want to consider 
trials that depend on subject’s performance (e.g. correct or wrong; chooses 
among different alternatives) or need to present trials in a non-blocked fashion 
(e.g. the oddball paradigm). It is shown that the haemodynamic response is 
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delayed and lasts for several seconds even for brief stimulation (less than 
couple of seconds). As the haemodynamic response to individual trials extends 
temporally, the responses to successive trials may overlap. Hence the inter-trial 
interval between successive trials needs to last for about 15 seconds. However 
this severely limits the number of trials, which can be averaged per unit time, 
thus limiting the achievable signal-to-noise ratio. The haemodynamic response 
to successive events adds in an approximately linear fashion even at relatively 
short inter-trial intervals (2 sec and 5 sec) and hence selective averaging of 
rapidly presented individual trials is feasible. The findings of Dale (1997) 
support the Linear Time Invariant model for the haemodynamic response  
function. Dale has shown that the statistical efficiency of rapid event-related 
designs when the inter-trial interval is appropriately jittered can be up to 10 
times greater than fixed inter-trial interval designs. Further, random 
intermixing of trial types eliminates strategy effects that might otherwise 
confound the results in blocked task paradigms. In conducting a hypothesis-
based experiment, we wish to be able to attribute any observed effects to 
experimentally manipulated conditions. This can be guaranteed only if 
conditions are randomly allocated to a presentation order for each subject in a 
sensible manner. Further, this randomisation should be appropriately balanced, 
both across and within subjects. With such random allocation of conditions, 
any unexpected effects are randomly scattered between the conditions, and 
therefore do not affect the designed effects.  
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4.3) Data analysis and Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM)  
 
The main issue in analysing functional MRI images is comparing images, or 
groups of images, in a statistically meaningful way. In a typical fMRI 
experiment, a whole-brain functional image is acquired every 2-3 seconds 
resulting in a few hundred images to be analysed. Each image is acquired as a 
number of slices (e.g. 21 with thickness ~ 5 mm) with a typical in-plane 
resolution of 3x3 mm for a field of view of 192x192 mm. With these typical 
parameters, a single fMRI image would have dimensions of 64x64x21 mm. 
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) is a form of data reduction, condensing 
information (in a statistically meaningful way) from a number of individual 
scans into a single image volume that can be more easily viewed and 
interpreted. Usually a univariate approach is followed in which the parametric 
map is computed by examining every voxel location across all images. In order 
to select a particular statistical distribution models (e.g. Poisson, normal, 
Gaussian), we need to know the underlying distribution of variance of the data 
being analysed, which is usually unknown in neuroimaging data. Further, 
univariate statistical models generally assume independent data points.  
Several pre-processing steps are required before proceeding with statistical 
analysis in order to reduce artefacts and noise and to perform spatial 
transformations. The analysis of fMRI data within the framework of SPM5 
software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm Wellcome Department of Imaging 
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First, spatial transformations are important in many aspects of functional image 
analysis and involve both within- and between-subject registration followed by 
spatial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel. The first several steps put each 
image volume into a standardized spatial reference frame. The last pre-
processing step applies a Gaussian spatial filter. Usually, four scans at the 
beginning of each session are discarded to account for transients in magnetic 
field of scanner. The origin of the images is set to match the line joining 
anterior-commissure to the posterior-commissure (AC-PC line). The 3-
dimensional functional brain images are usually acquired as a number of slices 
in 2-dimensions. Hence, there will be a time difference approximately equal to 
the TR (repetition time or inter scan interval) between the first slice and the last 
slice acquired in a single whole-brain acquisition. One option to compensate 
for the time difference between bottom and top slices of the brain is to acquire 
the slices in an interleaved fashion. Hence all odd numbered slices are acquired 
first followed by even numbered slices. During pre-processing stage, it is 
desirable to temporally interpolate the slices so that it would be equivalent to 
acquiring the whole brain image at a single time point. This is usually done 
with respect to a reference slice (e.g. middle slice of the brain), which depends 
on the regions of particular interest for a given experiment. This procedure is 
referred to as slice-timing correction. In functional imaging, the signal changes 
due to any haemodynamic response can be small compared to signal changes 
that can result from subject motion. So, prior to performing the statistical tests, 
it is important that the images are as closely aligned as possible. Although the 
subjects are asked to keep their head's still, movement does occur. The 
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realignment algorithm follows a rigid-body registration procedure (Friston et 
al., 1995a). A rigid body can have a linear translational movement or a 
rotational movement in each of the three directions (X, Y and Z). 
Correspondingly, there are six parameters that need to be estimated (X, Y, Z 
translations, pitch, roll and yaw). For multi-session data, realignment works in 
two steps. First, the first functional images from each session are realigned to 
each other taking the first session as reference. Second, the remaining images 
within each session are realigned to the first image. As a consequence, all 
images are realigned to the first image from the first session. When applying 
slice-timing correction and realignment, the order of these two pre-processing 
steps needs special consideration. Applying realignment procedure first would 
account for large movements, but the images will no longer correspond to the 
specific time that the slice was supposed to have been acquired after being 
realigned. On the other hand, slice-timing correction essentially interpolates the 
data temporally and the realignment procedure would need to work on resliced 
images after the slice timing correction has been applied. The disadvantage of 
reslicing the data several times during the pre-processing stage would incur 
loss in the image quality. The movement-related activation can be substantially 
large compared to the task-related BOLD changes. Hence, often the 
realignment parameters are included as covariates of no interest in the 
statistical analysis stage. Sometimes, it is desirable to warp images from a 
number of individuals into roughly the same standard space to allow signal 
averaging across subjects. A further advantage of using spatially normalized 
images is that activation sites can be reported according to their coordinates 
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within a standard space such as the one described by Talairach and Tournoux 
(1988). SPM5 uses the average brain template created by the Montreal 
Neurological Institute, that is an average of 152 brain images and hence more 
representative of the population as compared to the Talairach and Tournoux 
atlas. The Normalization process (Friston et al., 1995a) not only considers the 
rigid-body transformations but also considers shears and zooms to match the 
individual subject’s images to the template. For accurate normalization, it 
would also be required to use nonlinear transformations that would account for 
deformations that do not vary in a linear fashion. SPM5 uses cosine basis 
functions as part of nonlinear transformations for normalization procedure. The 
normalization procedure usually can be performed by taking the mean 
functional image from the output of realignment procedure to match with the 
EPI template image in the MNI space and then the resultant parameters can be 
applied to all the functional images to be normalized. The matching of the 
brains in the Normalization step is only possible on a coarse scale, since there 
is not necessarily a one-to-one mapping of the cortical structures between 
different brains. Because of this, images are smoothed prior to the statistical 
analysis in a multi-subject study, so that corresponding sites of activation from 
the different brains are superimposed. Smoothing generally increases the signal 
relative to noise. From the matched filter theorem, to get optimum resolution of 
signal from noise, we need a filter that is matched to the signal. Since, 
haemodynamic responses are modelled to have a Gaussian shape; we need to 
use a Gaussian kernel of size at least twice the voxel size (FWHM of about 8 
mm) for smoothing the functional images. The idea of smoothing is to replace 
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the intensity value within each voxel with a weighted average (as determined 
by a Gaussian kernel centred on that particular voxel) that incorporates the 
intensity values of the neighbouring voxels. Smoothing is performed to 
compensate for residual between-subject variability after normalization. 
Smoothing also permits the application of Gaussian random field theory at the 
statistics inference stage.  
After pre-processing, the images are ready for statistical analysis. FMRI data 
are high-pass filtered to remove physiological effects such as heartbeat, 
respiration, scanner-drift etc. Statistical analysis corresponds to Statistical 
Parametric Mapping (Friston et al., 1995b) using the General Linear Model 
(GLM) and theory of Gaussian fields. The GLM is used to specify the 
conditions in the form of a design matrix, which defines the experimental 
design and the nature of hypothesis testing to be implemented. The hypothesis 
is framed as a design matrix model. The design matrix has one row for each 
scan and one column for each effect one has built into the experiment or 
explanatory variables that may confound the results. The columns of the design 
matrix correspond to experimental conditions of interest (the hypothesis under 
test) and a set of columns that model effects of no interest. This is the stage 
where the groups designated for the images are specified. This stage 
corresponds to modelling the data in order to partition observed 
neurophysiological responses into components of interest, confounds, or 
components of no interest and an error term. GLM is an equation, which 
expresses the observed response variable in terms of a linear combination of 
explanatory variables plus a well-behaved error term. Commonly used 
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parametric models, such as linear regression, t-tests and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) are special cases of the general linear model. The GLM relates what 
one observes, to what one expected to see, by expressing the observations 
(response variable Y) as a linear combination of expected components (or 
explanatory variables x) and some residual error (ε), thereby equivalent to 
linear regression.  
 
This can be expressed in the matrix form as: 
Y = X β + ε 
Here, X is called the design matrix that contains the explanatory variables and 
β is the unknown parameter to be estimated. The ordinary least squares 
approach to calculate parameter estimates β would be 
 
The fitted response would be Y = X β* and the residual is y-Y. The assumption 
underlying least squares approximation is that the residuals are drawn from 
independent and identically distributed normal (Gaussian) distribution (white 
noise). This assumption is violated by the fMRI data, which are typically 
correlated from one scan to the next. Hence the effective degrees of freedom 
(df) cannot be assumed to be number of scans minus the dfs used in the model. 
SPM5 uses the restricted maximum likelihood (ReML) approach to estimate 
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the non-sphericity (of which autocorrelation is one type) in fMRI data. MRI 
gives us the blood flow signal, but we are interested in the neural activity. It is 
possible that the neural response is quicker and the changes in blood flow take 
place a little later. To account for these and to find the neural activity from the 
MRI signal, the columns of the design matrix are convolved with the canonical 
haemodynamic response function (HRF). The temporal and dispersion 
derivatives of the HRF are used additionally to account for variation in onset 
and width, respectively, of the HRF across different brain regions. Brain 
activity specific to task is obtained by specifying linear contrasts. A contrast 
can be used to compare different conditions. The subtractive approach assumes 
that brain activity scales in a linear fashion. The conditions of interest are given 
a positive value, such as 1, and conditions that are to be subtracted from these 
conditions of interest take on a negative value, such as -1. The end  result is a 
statistical parametric map. The activations thus obtained can be overlaid or 
rendered onto the high-resolution anatomical image of the subject in order to 
accurately locate the neural activity. Statistical parametric mapping approach is 
a univariate approach. That is each voxel is analysed separately. Hence for a 
statistical threshold of p<0.05, 5% of the voxels would show activation by 
chance alone (false activation – type I error). This means a correction for 
multiple comparisons is needed. The traditional way of doing this is to use 
some version of a Bonferroni correction. However, due to large number of 
voxels involved, a straightforward implementation would severely reduce the 
estimated number of degrees of freedom. The individual voxels in most 
neuroimaging modalities (PET, fMRI, EEG, MEG etc.) are heavily correlated 
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with neighbouring voxels. Hence, to the extent that the image data approximate 
a random Gaussian field, correction for multiple comparison need to be only 
made for number of voxels that can be resolved independently (resolution 
elements or resels). The correction for multiple comparisons is controlled for 
family-wise error (FWE) rate. This assumption of random Gaussian field is 
assured by applying a Gaussian smoothing filter in the pre-processing stages. A 
serious limitation of correcting for multiple comparisons is that the number of 
false negatives (type II error) is increased. Another approach is to determine 
the false discovery rate (FDR) that controls for 5% at (p<0.05) of observed 
activations can be false positives. The FEW approach controls for a 5% chance 
of a single false positive. As a trade-off to correction for multiple comparison, 
alternative approaches have been described such as (i) using a strict 
uncorrected threshold (e.g. p<0.001), (ii) using an inference over the cluster 
size, so that it is unlikely to find activations in a cluster of size, say 30 voxels. 
(iii) small volume corrections in regions where a prior hypothesis exists (iv) a 
region of interest (ROI) analysis in which the average signal for all voxels in an 
anatomical or functional ROI is used, hence reducing the number of multiple 
comparisons voxel space to the number of ROIs.  
In order to make an inference about brain activity in a task, the contrast images 
from a group of subjects are analysed using a random effects model (Holmes 
and Friston, 1998) using student's t-test or ANOVA like methods. The contrast 
images represent spatially distributed images of the weighted sum of the 
parameter estimates for a particular contrast. In essence, it's like a difference 
image for (activation-rest) or (reward-no reward). When using a one-sample t-
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test, one contrast image for each subject is required. By doing that, the images 
are being collapsed over intra-subject variability (to only one image per 
contrast per subject) and the image-to-image residual variability is now 
between subject variance alone. When using ANOVA, a number of contrast 
images are entered from each subject. These need to be corrected for non-
sphericity. If the contrast images being entered into ANOVA are main effects 
of a condition, a within-subjects model should be used. On the other hand, if 
the contrast images have already accounted for within-subject variability, then 
an ANOVA without constant term can be used. The purpose of the Random 
Effects analysis is to find the areas that are activated in much the same way in 
all subjects, as opposed to a fixed effects model, which gives areas that are 
activated on the average across the subjects. This is really a crucial difference 
since a fixed effects analysis may yield significant results when one or a couple 
of subjects activate a lot even though the other subjects do not activate at all. 
The Random Effects analysis incorporates both within-subject variance, as well 
as between-subject variance. This allows generalization of the results to the 
population from which the subjects were drawn.  
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Chapter 5 
 Mapping reflexive shifts of attention in eye- and 
hand-centred coordinate systems 
 
Experiment 1  
 
Introduction  
 
Allocation of attention to a specific point in space may be automatically 
triggered by biological (e.g. averted gaze or pointing hands) as well as non-
biological directional signals (e.g. regulatory or warning road arrows) (for a 
review see: Itier and Batty, 2009; Frischen et al., 2007; Langton et al., 2000). 
Whether biological cues are pre-eminent in determining attentional shifts with 
respect to non-biological cues is hotly debated (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; 
Friesen et al., 2004, 2005; Hietanen, 1999; Jonides, 1981; Tipples, 2002; 
Eimer, 1997; Ristic et al., 2002, 2007; Bonato et al., 2009; Stevens et al., 
2008), mainly because laboratory based paradigms use impoverished tasks that 
hardly reproduce the situational complexity of real life human interactions 
(Kingstone, 2009; Birmingham and Kingstone, 2009). Indeed, fundamental 
socio-cognitive operations, e.g. intention and mind reading, are inherently 
linked to the power of gaze in capturing the attention of an observer and in 
triggering reflexive joint attention under daily life conditions (Smilek et al., 
2006; Kuhn and Land, 2006). Possibly because eye contact is a hallmark of 
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interpersonal interactions, a considerable number of behavioral studies focused 
on the role of gaze perception in modulating social attention (for a review see: 
Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009; Kingstone, 2009; Klein et al., 2009). 
Importantly, unlike non-social orienting cues such as arrows, gaze cues not 
only signal a seen agent's direction of attention but are also used to infer 
current goals and intentions of other individuals. This difference raises the 
important issue, explored by recent functional neuroanatomy and 
electrophysiological studies, of whether orienting attention to biological, 
socially relevant cues, such as gaze, may engage neural mechanisms distinct 
from those engaged by orienting to non-social cues. Hietanen et al. (2006), for 
example, explored at behavioural and neural levels the effect of responding to 
left or right visual targets preceded by central non-predictive gaze or arrow 
cues pointing to same or opposite direction. While the interference effects of 
cue-target directional incongruence was found for both gaze and arrows, 
changes of BOLD signal revealed that while gaze-cued orienting recruits 
occipital regions, arrow-cued orienting also recruits parietal and frontal 
regions. That arrow-cues related orienting activates a larger network with 
respect to gaze-cue related orienting is also suggested by an event- related 
potential study showing that changes of parietal and frontal attention-directed 
neuroelectric signatures are found for arrow- but not for gaze-cues (Hietanen et 
al., 2008). However, using an ingenious event-related fMRI design in which 
the central cue was an ambiguous stimulus that could appear as an eye in 
profile or an arrow, Tipper and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that attention 
to social and nonsocial cues activates a largely overlapping neural network 
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centered upon ventral and dorsal fronto-parietal and lateral occipital regions. 
Since activation in two regions of this network, namely the ventral frontal 
cortex and the lateral occipital, was higher for gaze- than arrow-cues, the 
suggestion was made that quantitative more than qualitative differences 
underlie the social vs. non-social mapping of attentional shifts (Tipper et al., 
2008).  
Although most of the original studies focused on the importance of gaze in 
social attention, body parts other than the eyes play a fundamental role in 
triggering joint attention. Studies demonstrate, for example, that full body/head 
orientation as well as hand orientation of a model modulates attentional shifts 
of an observer (Langton, 2000; Langton and Bruce, 2000; Pierno et al., 2008). 
Much less is known on whether shifts of attention are similarly triggered by 
different person-related cues. Information on whether reflexive social attention 
triggered by different person-related cues is mapped according to the social 
valence of the cue or in body-centered coordinates is very scanty. Studies 
indicate that social attention may recruit a more extensive neural network with 
respect to non-social spatial attention. Indeed, areas involved in face, gaze, 
hand and even full body perception may be called into play specifically in 
social attention tasks (Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009). This raises the question 
of whether social spatial attention may be coded according to body-centered 
coordinate systems. In a recent behavioral study, we explored whether the 
interference effect of person-related cues (averted gaze and pointing hands) and 
of non-social stimuli (arrow) was specifically influenced by the type of effector 
used for responding namely, saccadic movements and hand pointing (Crostella 
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et al., 2009). We expected that a non-specific spatial interference of social 
stimuli would produce higher interference of gaze and pointing hands than 
arrows, regardless of the body part performing the action. By contrast, we 
hypothesized that finding a relation between the type of distracting stimulus 
and the type of response would suggest that additional reference frames are 
called into action in the task. The results showed that distracting gaze stimuli 
interfere specifically with saccadic performance and distracting hand stimuli 
with pointing performance. Relevant to this issue is the fMRI study showing 
that mere observation of directional and non-directional eyes, hands, and 
arrows in the absence of any motor response, activated overlapping neural 
regions that included the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), the inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and the occipital cortices 
in the right hemisphere (Sato et al., 2009). Capitalizing on such behavioural 
and neuroimaging evidence we sought to determine whether the neural activity 
in the network underpinning the observation of person- and non-person related 
signals was modulated by the relationship between type of distracter and type 
of effector used for the response. We recorded changes of BOLD fMRI signal 
associated to conditions where three different distracters (gaze, hand or arrows) 
influenced overt directional saccadic or hand responses triggered by central 
instruction signals. This design allowed us to highlight: i) the neural network 
activated during reflexive shift of attention triggered by social and non social 
distracters; ii) the possible modulatory role of gaze and hand distracters on 
saccadic and hand pointing responses, respectively. We predicted a specific 
involvement of dorsal frontoparietal structures in modulating attentional shifts 
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triggered by directional, socially relevant stimuli (i.e. eyes and hand vs. arrow). 
The fronto-parietal attention system, which includes portions of the 
intraparietal cortex (e.g. the intraparietal sulcus, IPS) and of the superior frontal 
cortex (e.g. frontal eye field, FEF) (Corbetta et al, 2002), is involved in the 
selection of stimuli and goal-directed responses for goal-directed actions. 
Importantly specific sections of this system (FEF and some parts of IPS) may 
be differentially active when subjects plan and perform visually guided hand 
movements, instead than eye movements (for a review see Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008; Astafiev et al., 2003). It is also relevant 
that clinical and brain imaging studies suggest the presence in humans of a 
segregated pattern of effector representations in the parietal lobe (De Renzi, 
1982; Jeannerod, 1986; Seitz et al., 1991).  
Based on this evidence we investigated whether the tendency of an onlooker to 
imitate the actions of the observed model reflects the activity of a resonant 
system that works according to body-part specific reference frames. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
Eighteen right-handed volunteers (10 males - 8 females, mean age = 28 years, 
range:  23-36 years) took part in the study. All subjects had normal or contact-
corrected-to-normal visual acuity. All were in good health, free of psychotropic 
or vasoactive medication, with no history of psychiatric or neurological 
disease. After having received an explanation of the procedures, participants 
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gave their written consent. The study was approved by the independent Ethics 
Committee of the Santa Lucia Foundation (Scientific Institute for Research 
Hospitalization and Health Care). Behavioural and imaging data were analyzed 
for subjects who showed reliable interference effects (slower responses for 
incongruent vs. congruent condition both for saccade and pointing task). Five 
subjects did not meet this criterion and therefore were not included in the 
analyses that were performed on thirteen subjects (8 males, mean age: 27.5 
years; 5 female, mean age: 27 years; range:  23-32 years).  
 
Stimuli and Procedure  
Participants were positioned in the scanner, in a dimly lit environment. The 
experimental visual stimuli were presented via a mirror mounted on the MRI 
headcoil (total display size 19.5° x 14.6° degrees of visual angle, 1.024 × 768 
screen resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). The visual stimuli were back-projected 
on a screen behind the magnet. Stimulus presentation was controlled with 
Cogent2000 (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/). 
Each trial started with the appearance of a black central fixation mark (0.5° x 
0.5° in size), presented centrally against a grey background, and of two black 
squares (1.4° x 1.4° in size), presented for 500 ms at 7.5° of eccentricity in the 
left and the right visual field. The distracting stimuli consisted of digital 
Photoshop 8.0.1 (Adobe, CA) modified photographs of gaze, hand or arrow. 
The three distracters were created by using coloured photographs of: i) an 
emotional neutral-expression, full-face of a young woman looking to the right; 
ii) a man hand pointing to the right; iii) an arrow pointing to the right obtained 
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by digitally scrambling the hand distracter. The mirror images of these pictures 
were created to produce leftward directed stimuli. To make the attention-
capture effect conspicuous and the scenario reminiscent of what can be 
encountered under daily life conditions the stimuli were animated by 
presenting two frames in rapid sequence. The first frame depicted a straight 
gaze, an upward pointing fist or a T-like shape. The second frame, which 
depicted a left- or rightward oriented gaze, extended finger or arrow, replaced 
the first frame. The direction of the distracter and the one indicated by the 
instruction-cue could be 50% of the time congruent or incongruent. Before 
starting the fMRI acquisition each participant was asked to perform outside the 
scanner a training task in which they had to learn with 100% accuracy on 30 
consecutive trials per task, the association between instruction signal (red or 
blue) with leftward or rightward saccadic or pointing movements.  
In the scanner, each trial started with the presentation behind the black fixation 
mark of a straight gaze, an upward pointing fist or a T-like shape which lasted 
500 ms. At 500 ms, a second frame, that depicted left- or rightward oriented 
gaze, extended finger or an arrow, replaced the first frame and created a strong 
animation effect. The directional distracters remained on until the end of the 
trial. 75 ms after the oriented distracter presentation, the black central fixation 
mark (imperative-cue) changed to either blue or red colour. This was the 
instruction signal for the subjects to make, in separate runs, a saccade or a right 
index pointing movement towards the left (change into red) or the right 
(change into blue) target square (for saccades) and the left or right button of a 
home-made keypad (for pointing). Thus, the direction of the distracter and that 
- 76 - 
indicated by the instruction-cue could be congruent (left-red or right-blue) or 
incongruent (left-blue or right-red). The coloured cue remained visible until the 
end of the trial (See Fig 1).  
 
 
Fig 1: Schematic depiction of the events occurring during a representative trial. 
The three possible distracting stimuli namely: G) gaze, H) pointing hand, A) arrow, 
are reported. At the beginning of the trial, a straight gaze, an upward pointing fist or a 
T-like shape was presented behind a black fixation mark (500 ms). Turning the black 
fixation point into red was the imperative instruction signal for leftward saccades or 
hand pointing movements. Only incongruent conditions are represented for the sake of 
simplicity. 
 
In order to engage automatic processes and minimize expectations, the 
directional cues were equiprobable (50% congruent) and non-predictive. It is 
worth noting that the subjects were instructed to ignore the distracters and to 
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focus on the central mark colour change. Moreover, they were explicitly 
informed that the instruction cue was not informative on the direction of the 
distracters. In the hand-pointing task, subjects were also instructed to fixate the 
central cross for the entire trial. This allowed us to measure attentional shifts 
independent of eye movements. In order to avoid subjects anticipating stimuli, 
a random inter-trial interval ranging from 3.5 to 4.5 s was used. Twelve event 
types were organized in a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design. One factor was the 
Distracter: gaze, hand (both biological distracters with social valence) and 
arrow (non biological, non social distracter). The second factor was the type of 
Effector: saccadic vs. pointing movements. In order to minimize any task-
switching requirements, each participant performed 3 fMRI runs of saccadic 
movement and 3 fMRI runs of pointing movement. The order of the effectors 
was counterbalanced across participants. On each run participants were 
verbally instructed about the motor response to be performed (saccadic or 
pointing task). The third factor was the Condition: congruent vs. incongruent 
direction between instruction signal and distracter. Congruent and incongruent 
directional combinations of instruction cues and distracters were presented in 
unpredictable and randomized order. Thus, fMRI data were acquired via a 
mixed, blocked (Distracter, Effector)/event related (Condition) protocol. All 
participants underwent six fMRI runs. Each participant completed a total of 
720 trials, (360 for each effector), therefore each imaging session consisted of 
40 repetitions for each of the three distracters (Gaze/Hand/Arrow), respectively 
20 for congruent and 20 for incongruent conditions (balanced for left/right 
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direction and red-blue imperative-cues). Each scanning session lasted approx. 8 
min for a total experiment duration of about 50 min. 
 
Eye movements recording 
In the training session outside the scanner, subjects sat in front of a computer 
screen. In all subjects, eye position and saccadic movements were monocularly 
monitored using an infrared video camera (Sony EVI D31, color video camera, 
Sony JP). Participants were instructed to look at the location indicated by the 
instruction-cue and then to quickly look back at the fixation point. During the 
scanning session, again the participants’ saccadic movements were 
monocularly monitored in real-time by means of an ASL eye-tracking system 
that was adapted for use in the scanner (Applied Science Laboratories, 
Bedford, MA; Model 504, sampling rate: 60 Hz). For each subject the eye-
tracking system was calibrated before fMRI scanning. The calibration was 
repeated during the experiment whenever necessary. Eye-position traces were 
examined in a 1175 ms time window, beginning with the imperative cue onset 
until the end of the trial. In the sessions requiring pointing movements the 
maintenance of central fixation was monitored throughout the trial. We defined 
losses of fixation as changes in horizontal eye-position greater than ±2° of 
visual angle with durations at least 100 ms. For trials requiring saccadic 
responses (Saccadic Task), the saccadic RTs were calculated from the target 
onset time to when an horizontal eye position exceeded 2°. Moreover, we did 
not compute RTs for the trials in which subject made a saccade to the wrong 
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side (e.g., saccade to the left target after the central cue turned into blue) or did 
not perform any saccade at all.  
 
Hand movement recording  
In the training session outside the scanner, participants sat in front of a 
computer screen by keeping their right index finger on a central response key 
until the occurrence of the instruction signal. Then, based on the directional 
instruction cue, subjects pointed towards a left or a right key located 2 cm 
laterally with respect to the central position. In the scanner, the right hand was 
positioned in correspondence of the low abdomen in a relaxed posture with the 
right index finger extended and all other fingers flexed. This position allowed 
participants to perform central-cue instructed index finger movements toward 
the right or the left button key. The right shoulder and arm were supported and 
immobilized with cushioning wedged between the scanner bed and the coil 
surface. When the central mark changed colour, subjects pointed as quickly as 
possible in the direction of the target location (lateral key presses) and then 
returned to the resting position. Pointing involved a minimal rotation of the 
wrist with extending index without movements of the shoulder or the arm (see 
Astafiev et al., 2003). For pointing data we computed a Release RTs measure 
and we only analysed trials in which subjects maintained fixation on the central 
fixation mark. 
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Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
A Siemens Allegra (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) operating 
at 3T and equipped for echo-planar imaging (EPI) acquired functional 
magnetic resonance (MR) images. A quadrature volume head coil was used for 
radio frequency transmission and reception. Head movements were minimized 
by mild restraint and cushioning. Thirty-six slices of functional MR images 
were acquired using blood oxygenation level-dependent imaging (3.0 x 3.0 x 
2.5 mm thick, 50% distance factor, TR = 2.34 s, TE = 30 ms), covering the 
entire cortex. 
 
Data Analysis 
We used the statistical parametric mapping package SPM5 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) implemented in MATLAB (v 7.1, The MathWorks, 
Natick, MA) for data pre-processing and statistical analyses. For all 
participants, we acquired 1.290 fMRI volumes, 215 for each run. The first four 
image volumes of each run were used for stabilizing longitudinal 
magnetization and were discarded from the analysis. Pre-processing included 
rigid-body transformation (realignment) and slice timing to correct for head 
movement and slice acquisition delay. Residual effects of head motion were 
corrected for by including the six estimated motion parameters for each subject 
as regressors of no interest. Slice-acquisition delays were corrected using the 
middle slice as a reference. All images were normalized to the standard SPM5 
EPI template, resampled to 2 mm isotropic voxel size, and spatially smoothed 
using an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM. Statistical inference was 
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based on a random effects approach (Penny and Holmes, 2004). First, for each 
participant, the data were best-fitted at every voxel using a combination of 
effects of interest. These were delta functions representing the onsets of the 12 
conditions given by the crossing of our 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design: Distracter 
[gaze/hand/arrow] x Condition [congruent / incongruent] x Effector [saccadic 
movement / pointing movement] convolved with the SPM5 hemodynamic 
response function. The onset of the hemodynamic response function was 
aligned with the onset of the imperative cue with duration =0.  Onsets of trials 
in which an erroneous response or an eye movement toward the wrong side 
occurred were included in the design matrix as covariates of no interest, but 
excluded from any further analysis. Linear contrasts were used to determine 
differential activation for incongruence minus congruence conditions 
separately for 3 x 2 (Distracter x Effector) (e.g. [Gaze(Incong) > Gaze(Cong)] 
for saccadic movement) factors, averaging the 3 fMRI runs (three for the 
saccade and three for the pointing task). These 6 contrasts images were entered 
in a 3×2 factorial ANOVA with Distracter [gaze, hand, arrow] and Effector 
[saccadic movement, pointing movement]. Finally, linear compounds 
(contrasts) were used to compare the Incongruence effect using between-
participants variance (rather than between scans). Correction for nonsphericity 
(Friston et al., 2002) was used to account for possible differences in error 
variance across conditions and non-independent error terms for the repeated 
measures.  
The analyses aimed at determining: i) the brain regions called into action when 
directional cue and distracters provided conflicting directional information 
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(incongruent condition); ii) whether any modulation exerted by the biological 
distracters (gaze, hand) was specifically linked to the effector the onlookers 
used for responding; iii) whether reflexive joint attention was differentially 
modulated by the biological (gaze, hand) vs. non-biological distracters (arrow), 
irrespective of motor effector.  
We first sought to determine any specific cortical attentional network 
associated with the directional incongruence conditions (comparing 
incongruent vs. congruent condition, irrespective of distracter and effector). 
Thus, the main effect of Incongruence allowed us to identify the network 
activated by the directional conflict between task-irrelevant distracters and 
instruction signals. For this comparison, the SPM threshold was set to p-corr = 
< 0.05 at cluster level (cluster extent estimated a p-uncorr = 0.001), 
considering the whole brain as the volume of interest. To test for the interaction 
between the Interference Effect (IE) with Motor-Effector and Distracter, we 
created regions of interest (ROIs) extracting average BOLD signals (MarsBar 
0.41, ‘MARSeille Boîte À Région d'Intérêt’ SPM toolbox) from the peak 
activity of the voxels that showed a main effect of Incongruence. Each ROI 
was defined as a 10 mm radius sphere centred on the corresponding maxima of 
the whole-brain analysis (see table II), and p-values were Bonferroni-corrected. 
We expected that our manipulations of IE would affect activity within the 
dorsal fronto-parietal attentional systems depending on specific relationships 
with Distracter and Effector (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Crostella et al., 
2009; Ricciardelli et al., 2002). Accordingly, we used a combination of 
anatomical and functional criteria to identify six ROIs in the dorsal attentional 
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system: the frontal eye field (FEF), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) bilaterally. The bilateral frontal ROIs included a 
portion of middle frontal gyrus (FEF) located laterally to the superior frontal 
sulcus (Paus, 1996). Because of the large extension of parietal cortex clusters, 
we decided to distinguish between posterior and anterior anatomical regions, 
i.e. bilateral posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) 
respectively. Bilateral PPC included a portion of superior parietal lobule close 
to superior parietal gyrus and precuneus. Bilateral IPS ROIs were instead 
located more anterior and close to the inferior parietal lobule, the angular gyrus 
and along the intraparietal sulcus.           
For each ROI, we tested the 3-way interaction IE x Effector x Distracter in 
order to provide information on whether the cost of directional incongruence 
was mapped on different brain regions depending on specific relationships with 
distracter and motor effector. For example, this interaction allowed exploring 
whether observation of incongruent saccades performed by the distracting gaze 
induced differential brain activity in the onlookers’ when performing the 
saccadic with respect to the hand-pointing movement. It should be noted that 
main effect and interactions are orthogonal and, therefore, our ROI selection 
procedure was unbiased. Moreover, based on the prediction that interference 
effects are stronger when elicited by social (gaze and hand) than by non-social 
(arrow) distracters, we tested the interaction between the IE and the biological 
vs. non-biological distracters, irrespective of motor effector. 
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Results 
 
Behavioural performance  
Both saccadic and release mean RTs were calculated collapsing left and right 
target trials. Incorrect responses (movements performed following distracters 
instead than instruction cues), misses (no response), anticipations (RTs < 100 
ms) and retards (RTs > 1.500 ms) were not included in the analysis. Overall, 
we discarded 12.7 % of trials for saccadic sessions and 7.5% of trials for 
pointing sessions. Following previous studies (Murphy and Klein, 1998; 
Spence et al., 2001a,b; Kitagawa and Spence, 2005), we computed an inverse 
efficiency score by dividing, for each condition and in each subject, the mean 
correct RTs by the percentage of directionally correct responses. The inverse 
efficiency score provides a way to combine RT and accuracy measures of 
performance into a single measure (Townsend and Ashby, 1983) and allows 
controlling for any speed-accuracy trade-off effects. As for RT and error 
measures, higher inverse efficiency scores indicate worse performance. Table I 
reports inverse efficiency scores in the saccadic and hand pointing tasks, for 
each distracter type and incongruent and congruent conditions, acquired during 
fMRI scanning.  
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Distracter  
 
G H A 
Congruent 512(33) 511(44) 494(30) 
Saccade  
Incongruent 608(56) 634(41) 648(55) 
Congruent 528(30) 511(24) 499(21) 
Hand pointing  
Incongruent 552(30) 521(25) 534(24) 
 
Table I. Behavioural performance for Saccadic and Hand-Pointing tasks. Inverse 
efficiency scores (mean RT/percentage of correct responses, S.E.M. in brackets) are 
represented separately for saccadic and release RTs as a function of Distracter [G= 
Gaze / H= Hand / A= Arrow] and Condition [Congruent / Incongruent].   
 
The inverse efficiency scores were entered in two separate 3 x 2 repeated-
measures ANOVAs (one for saccadic and one for pointing task) with 
Distracter (gaze, hand, arrow), and Condition (congruent, incongruent) as 
within-subjects effects. In the saccadic task, the main effect of Condition (F 
(1,12) = 22.297, p = .001) was explained by the worse performance in the 
incongruent than congruent trials (629 vs. 505 ms/percentage of correct trials). 
No other effects or interactions were significant. Also in the pointing task, the 
main effect of Condition was significant (F (1,12) = 8.521, p = .01) because of 
the worse performance in the incongruent than congruent trials (535 vs. 510 
ms/percentage of correct responses). Again, no other effects or interactions 
were significant.  
To sum up, saccadic and release RTs/percentage of correct trials scores during 
MR scanning show that the incongruent cues worsened both saccadic and 
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pointing performances. However, this effect was independent from the type of 
Distracter (as indicated by the non-significant Distracter x Effector 
interaction). 
 
fMRI data 
Main effect of Incongruence 
To highlight the neural underpinnings of the interference effect triggered by 
incongruent distracters, we tested for the main effect of incongruence 
irrespective of Distracter and Effector (See table II).  
 
Anatomical Area 
Cluster  
Size 
p-corr x y z 
z 
scores 
Parietal Lobe 
R PPC 7804 < .001 14 -66 58 6.09* 
L PPC   -22 -70 46 5.67* 
R IPS   42 -56 58 3.97* 
L IPS   -32 -44 40 4.98* 
Frontal Lobe  
R FEF 930 < .001 36 0 56 5.81* 
L FEF 507 < .001 -28 0 54 5.54* 
R Cingulum Mid 397 < .001 8 14 46 4.16 
L Precentral G 376 .002 -52 2 38 4.90 
R Insula 1346 < .001 34 24 8 5.21 
L Insula 564 < .001 -30 20 6 4.89 
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Table II. Mean MNI coordinates of activation foci associated with Incongruence 
Effect. Anatomical locations, peak coordinates in MNI space (Montreal Neurological 
Institute), and statistical values for the main effect of incongruence (incongruent > 
congruent trials, irrespective of distracter and effector). p-values are corrected for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level, considering the whole brain as the volume of 
interest. R/L PPC= Right/Left Posterior Parietal Cortex; R/L IPS= Right/Left 
Intraparietal Sulcus; R/L FEF= Right/Left Frontal Eye Field; R/L Insula= Right/Left 
Insula; R Cingulum Mid= Right Middle Cingulum; L Precentral G= left Precentral 
Gyrus. With the asterisk (*) we indicated the regions of interest (ROIs) within the 
dorsal fronto-parietal attentional network. ROIs were extracted averaging BOLD 
signals (see Methods) from a 10 mm sphere centred on the cluster peak.  
 
This contrast revealed the expected activation of the ventral and dorsal frontal 
and parietal regions. The parietal region consisted of a large cluster including 
the right superior and inferior parietal cortex bilaterally. The frontal region 
included the left precentral gyrus, the right middle frontal cortex bilaterally, the 
right supplementary motor area, the most posterior portion of the inferior 
frontal gyrus, the operculum, bilaterally, and the pars triangularis extending 
into the insula and the middle portion of the right cingulate cortex (See Fig 2).  
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Fig 2: Brain regions activated by Incongruence [Incongruent > Congruent trials]. 
Clusters showing higher activity in the incongruent than congruent irrespective of 
distracter and effector are rendered on 3-dimensional (3D) views of the SPM template. 
This contrast revealed the activation of frontal and parietal regions. The frontal region 
included the left Precentral Gyrus (L Precentral G), the right Middle Frontal (L/R 
FEF) cortex bilaterally, the right Supplementary Motor Area (R SMA), the most 
posterior portion of the Inferior Frontal Gyrus, the Operculum, bilaterally and the Pars 
Triangularis (IFG) extending into the Insula and the middle portion of the right 
Cingulate Cortex. The parietal region included the right superior and inferior Parietal 
Cortex bilaterally. These regions were used as regions of interest to assess any 
differential influence of  distracter/instruction signal incongruence on brain activity 
(SPM thresholds are set to p-corr. = 0.05 at cluster level).   
 
The Main Effect of Incongruence considering the three distracters ([G=Gaze / 
H=Hand / A=Arrow], averaging across saccadic / hand-pointing motor 
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effector) was used to define the centre of each ROI in the two hemispheres. 
Within each ROI, we tested for: i) the critical interaction: IE of Distracter 
(Gaze and Hand) on the paired saccadic and hand pointing task; ii) the IE of 
biological (Gaze, Hand) vs. non-biological distracters (Arrow), irrespective to 
effector. 
 
Interference Effect of Distracters in the Saccadic and Hand Pointing Tasks   
We investigated the possible influence on BOLD signal of the pairing between 
body-part related (gaze or pointing hand) distracter of motor-effector used for 
the response (eyes or hand) within each frontal and parietal ROI. The mean 
BOLD activation for each Distracter and Effector in the frontal and parietal 
ROIs is shown in figure 3. Statistics, for the interaction effect and additional t-
test in each ROI are reported in table III.   
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 IE for 
Distracter by 
Effector 
IE  
for Saccade 
[G] >[H] 
IE for 
Pointing 
[H] >[ G] 
Side 
Anatomical 
Area 
t-test  
Values 
p 
corr  
t-test  
values 
p 
uncorr 
t-test  
values 
p 
uncorr  
FEF 3.06 < .01 3.04 < .01 1.82 n.s. 
IPS 2.47 < .05 1.32 n.s. 2.52 < .01 
 
L 
PPC 1.87 n.s. 1.43 n.s. 1.36 n.s. 
FEF 2.33 .068 2.36 < .05 1.41 n.s. 
IPS 2.32 .069 0.71 n.s. 2.79 < .01 R 
PPC 2.33 .068 2.57 < .01 1.22 n.s. 
 
Table III. Interference effect of Distracters in the Saccadic and Hand-Pointing 
Tasks. Anatomical locations of ROIs, t-test and p-values (Bonferroni-corr) for the 
Interference Effect (IE) of social distracter [Gaze= G / Hand= H] by effector 
[Saccade/Pointing], in the Left/Right (L / R) hemispheres. A significant interaction 
was found for L FEF and L IPS, while a trend toward significance was found for R 
FEF and R IPS. Additional t-test (p-uncorr) confirmed a significant larger differential 
effect for ([G] > [H]) distracter in the L and R FEF, while bilateral IPS showed a 
larger IE for ([H] > [G]) (see Results section for more details), indicating a selective 
correspondence between G/H body-part and saccadic/hand-pointing effector.  
 
Left FEF was specifically modulated by the interaction IE x Distracter x 
Effector, while right FEF showed a trend toward significance. To further 
confirm the specificity of these effects, we compared the IE of gaze vs. hand 
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distracter for saccadic motor effector. This revealed that left and right FEF 
were modulated by the selective correspondence between ‘Gaze’ body-part and 
‘Saccadic’ effector (See bars figure 3, left panel: [G] > [H]). The opposite 
pattern was found in left IPS region; as for left FEF, this region resulted 
specifically influenced by the interaction IE x Distracter x Effector, while right 
IPS showed a trend toward significance. Additional t-test confirmed that this 
effect was due to a larger IE for ‘Hand pointing’ than gaze-distracter during 
‘Hand pointing’ movements (See bars Fig 3, right panel: [H] > [G]).  
 
 
 
Fig 3: Activity in the bilateral Frontal Eye Field and Intraparietal Sulcus regions 
elicited by the Interference Effect of the two social Distracters during Saccadic 
and Pointing movements. Central panel: 3D rendering of the canonical MNI template 
showing the localisation of four regions of interest (ROI) corresponding to the left 
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(green) and right (blue) frontal eye fields [FEF] and to the left (pink) and right (red) 
Intraparietal Sulcus [IPS] is reported in the axial section. Left panel: signal plots for 
the Interference Effect [IE(inc>cong)] in the right FEF (up) and the left FEF (down) as 
a function of the two biological distracters [G=Gaze / H=Hand] and effectors [Saccade 
/ Pointing]. Right panel: signal plots for the Interference Effect [IE(inc>cong)] in the 
right IPS (up) and the left IPS (down) for each biological distracter [G=Gaze / 
H=Hand] during saccadic and hand-pointing task. In each plot, the level of activity for 
the four conditions represents the average amplitude of the hemodynamic response for 
the [IE(inc>cong)] belonging to the corresponding condition (e.g., Gaze or Hand 
trials, for Saccade) and expressed in arbitrary units (a.u., ±  90% confidence interval). 
The asterisks indicate significant ([G] vs. [H]) difference for left/right FEF and ([H] 
vs. [G]) difference for left/right IPS. 
 
This demonstrates that activity in these regions is specially influenced by the 
motor effectors used to perform the task. This effect was stronger in the left 
than in the right hemisphere. Finally, left PPC was not sensitive to this 
interaction given that results were not replicated (albeit a significant IE for 
Gaze more than Arrow was found for right PPC).         
 
fMRI activations associated to the Interference Effect of Biological vs. Non-
Biological distracters  
In order to explore whether reflexive joint attention was differentially 
modulated by the different categories of distracters (e.g. biological and social 
vs. non-biological non social cues) independently from motor-effector, we 
compared the IE for biological (gaze and hand) vs. non-biological distracters 
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(arrow). Statistics for the interaction effect and additional t-test in each ROI are 
reported in table IV.   
 
 IE for 
Bio vs. Non-
Bio 
IE  
for [G] > [A] 
IE 
for [H] > [A] 
Side 
Anatomical 
Area 
t-test 
Values 
p 
Corr 
t-test 
values 
p 
uncorr 
t-test 
Values 
p 
uncorr 
FEF 1.74 n.s. 2.03 < .05 1.09 n.s. 
IPS 3.00 < .05 2.18 < .05 2.24 < .001 
 
L 
PPC 2.52 < .05 2.26 < .05 2.24 < .05 
FEF 1.38 n.s. 1.52 .066 1.00 n.s. 
IPS 1.41 n.s. 0.71 n.s. 2.13 < .05 R 
PPC 3.07 < .01 2.82 < .01 2.74 < .01 
 
Table IV. Interference Effect of Biological vs. Non-Biological Distracters. 
Anatomical locations of ROIs, t-test and p-values (Bonferroni-corr) for the 
Interference Effect (IE) of biological [Gaze= G / Hand= H] vs. non-biological 
distracter [Arrow= A], in the Left/Right (L / R) hemispheres. A significant interaction 
was found for L/R PPC and L IPS. Additional t-test (p-uncorr) confirmed significant 
larger differential effect for biological vs. non-biological ([G] > [A]) and ([H] > [A]) 
in bilateral PPC and L IPS, irrespective to Effector (see Results section for more 
details) (albeit some trends were found for bilateral FEF and R IPS). These results 
confirm a larger IE driven by the biological distracters with social valence, (Gaze and 
Hand) respect to Arrow.   
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Significant interactions, more predominant in the left hemisphere were found 
within the parietal ROIs. In particular, in the left and right PPC the activation 
for the IE triggered by biological distracters (gaze, hand) was larger than the 
activation for the IE triggered by non-biological distracter (arrow) (See Bars 
Fig 4: [G] > [A]).  
 
 
 
Fig 4:  Activity in the bilateral Posterior Parietal Cortex regions elicited by the 
Interference Effect of the two Biological Distracters respect to Non-biological 
Distracter. Right panel: 3D rendering of the canonical MNI template showing the 
localization of two regions of interest (ROI) corresponding to the left (yellow) and 
right (light blue) posterior parietal cortex [PPC] is reported in the axial section. Left 
panel: the relative plots show the mean Interference Effect [IE(inc<cong)] of the three 
distracters (averaged across the two effector respectively). A significant interaction 
was observed in these ROIs: biological distracter [G= Gaze / H= Hand] interfered on 
shifts of attention more than the non-biological [A= Arrow] distracter. The asterisks 
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indicate significant higher IE for ([G] than [A]), and higher IE for ([H] than [A]) in 
both regions. The level of activation is expressed in arbitrary units (a.u., ±90% 
confidence interval).  
 
In other words, the BOLD signal in these regions was higher when the 
directional conflict between distracter-instruction signals involved biological 
(gaze, hand) distracters than when the conflict involved the non-biological 
(arrow) distracter. Confirmatory t-tests demonstrated that this effect was due to 
both a significant IE for gaze vs. arrow distracters and to a significant IE for 
hand vs. arrow distracters in left IPS and bilateral PPC. Finally, these analyses 
did not reveal any significant interaction for right and left FEF or right IPS, 
with the exception of a larger IE for [G] > [A] in bilateral FEF and a larger IE 
for [H] > [A] in right IPS.  
 
Discussion 
The present study had the aims to ascertain whether a possible differential 
attention orienting-power of directional Ingroup vs. Outgroup Gazes may relies 
upon commons neural substrates. Importantly, we aimed to explore whether the 
relationship between gaze motor effector used in the experimental task 
(Saccadic or Hand pointing response) was reflected in a specific modulation of 
the activity in the dorsal fronto-parietal nodes of the reflexive attention 
network.  
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Behavioural and neural correlates of reflexive attention 
A cost of directional incongruence between distracters and instructions signals 
was found. All distracters in the behavioural performance showed a 
congruency effect both for saccadic and pointing task. This is in keeping with 
studies showing that attention is captured by gaze and arrows to a similar 
extent (Kuhn and Benson, 2007; Kuhn and Kingstone, 2009; Sato et al., 2009) 
and at variance from studies showing that social distracters like averted gaze or 
pointing hands induce stronger attentional capture more than symbolic arrow 
(Ricciardelli et al., 2002; Langton and Bruce, 2000). It is worth noting that in 
many complex daily life interactions, the tendency to follow others seems to be 
very strong. Thus, the lack of predominance of gaze- over arrow- distracters in 
triggering reflexive attention of arrows in some studies may be due to a floor 
effect induced by the extremely simplified reality of laboratory conditions 
(Kingstone, 2009; Birmingham and Kingstone, 2009). However, one may 
observe that the present behavioural results differed also from our previous 
study where gaze and hand distracters interfered more with eye and hand 
pointing movements respectively (Crostella et al., 2009). It should be noted 
however, that, differently from Crostella et al., (2009) in the current study the 
pointing movement was defined as a index finger extension toward the right or 
the left button key with the shoulder and the arm immobilized instead of a free 
hand arm movement in the space, accounting substantial difference in motor 
programming and executing. 
At any rate, the present study demonstrated that, despite the instruction to focus 
on the imperative signal, subjects could not ignore the distracters. Importantly, 
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the behavioural interference of directional incongruence between instruction 
signal and distracters was reflected in an increase of the BOLD signal. Such 
increase occurred in a fronto-parietal network that included the left precentral 
gyrus and the right middle frontal cortex bilaterally, the right supplementary 
motor area, the most posterior portion of the inferior frontal gyrus, the 
operculum, bilaterally, and the pars triangularis extending into the insula and 
the middle portion of the right cingulate cortex as well as posterior regions of 
the superior and inferior parietal cortex bilaterally. Previous studies highlighted 
the importance of fronto-parietal networks in a variety of attentional tasks, 
including covert and overt reorienting of attention to non biological stimuli 
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008; Szczepanski et al., 2010), 
as well as to the direction of others’ gaze (Grosbras et al., 2005). While studies 
indicate that gaze and arrows may modulate attention-shifts related activity in 
different brain regions (Hietanen et al., 2006) even in the absence of 
differences in behavioural tasks (Engell et al., 2010), only one study has thus 
far explored the neural network activated by mere observation of directional vs. 
non-directional eye gaze, hand-pointing gestures and arrows (Sato et al., 2009). 
This study showed activation in inferior frontal and inferior parietal areas as 
well as in the superior temporal sulcus common to the three distracters, even if 
an increase of activity in temporo-parietal clusters and in the amygdala was 
found for directional arrows and directional eyes respectively.   
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Body-part specific reference frames for mapping reflexive social attention in 
the fronto- parietal cortex 
In keeping with previous neuroimaging studies (Grosbras et al., 2005; Hietanen 
et al., 2006; Sato et al., 2009; Tipper et al., 2008), our results highlight the 
fundamental role of fronto-parietal structures in mediating gaze and hand 
related shifts of attention. However, our study expands significantly previous 
knowledge by combining, for the first time, two main issues, namely the 
possible specificity of the neural representation of different effectors used for 
response and the influence of social and non social distracters in modulating 
reflexive attention. It is widely held that movements performed with different 
effectors are coded in different cortical regions. Distinct posterior parietal 
modules, for example, may preferentially code for saccades and reaches, 
respectively (Glimcher, 2003; Colby and Goldberg, 1999). More recent studies 
indicate that far from being a strict principle, effector-selectivity implies a 
gradual transition of preference from one effector to another, with areas of 
balanced activation to saccades and reaches and areas with significant 
preference for reaches (Levy et al., 2007). Similarly, effector preference was 
found in parieto-frontal areas during eye or hand movement planning but no 
region responded exclusively to either effector (Beurze et al., 2009). A 
predominance of left lateralized maps for coding the preparation of pointing 
movements in the presence of equivalent coding of saccadic and reaches 
preparation in frontal areas has also been reported (Astafiev et al., 2003). 
Testing the hypothesis of a difference in the visuospatial maps recruited by 
pointing and saccades, Hagler and colleagues (2007) identified multiple maps 
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in both posterior parietal cortex and superior frontal cortex recruited for eye 
and hand movements, including maps not observed in previous studies. 
Although their analysis revealed subtle differences between pointing and 
saccades, including hemispheric asymmetries, no evidence of pointing-specific 
maps of visual space was found.  
In the present study we explored whether biological directional distracters such 
as directional gaze and pointing gestures, influenced the neural underpinnings 
of reflexive shifts of attention in relation to the motor effectors used for the 
response, namely eyes or hands. To this aim, we compared the BOLD signal in 
the fronto-parietal ROIs that turned out to be involved in reflexive attention. 
We found a functional dissociation in the frontal and parietal nodes of the 
reflexive joint attention network, hinting at a specific influence of gaze and 
hand distracters in the saccadic and hand pointing tasks respectively. Overall, 
the fMRI data indicated that the observed interference with voluntary orienting 
varied as a function of central distracter-type and motor-effector. In particular, 
we observed greater IE-related activation in the frontal ROIs for shifts of 
spatial attention triggered by gaze in the saccadic task and in the parietal ROIs, 
specifically bilateral IPS, for shifts of attention triggered by hand in the 
pointing task. This result is in keeping with previous studies indicating the 
importance of parietal regions in mediating interference of hand movements 
incongruous with planning of a different hand movement (Grefkes et al, 2004) 
or of hand-related attention switching tasks (Rushworth et al, 2001). 
Tellingly, a main point of novelty of the present study is that the fronto-parietal 
network subserving reflexive shifts of social attention is specially sensitive to 
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the relationship between specific body-related distracters and the responding 
body parts. Importantly, an effector-specific activation of frontoparietal 
networks in humans has also been found in a recent study on cortical temporal 
dynamics of visually guided behaviour (Hinkley et al., 2010). In this study, 
high-gamma activity was observed in SEF and subsequently in visual cortex 
and FEF bilaterally, followed by a low-beta power decrease over caudal PPC 
during saccade execution. Thus, hand or saccadic movements implied a 
different functional connectivity between frontal and parietal areas.  
Mirroring of attention in the fronto-parietal system 
In our experimental paradigm, participants were specifically instructed to 
ignore the visual distracting stimuli (gaze, hand and arrow), to focus on the 
central imperative go signal and to maintain the fixation on the central point. 
Given that the distracter was presented before the unpredictable central cue, the 
cost of re-orienting to fully irrelevant-task distracters is likely due to 
interference with ongoing action programs. This may be in keeping with pre-
motor theories of attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1987) and with the notion of 
mirroring others’ actions (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). Behavioural studies 
indicate that priming a given motor response is more effective if the visual 
prime shares specific properties with the requested response suggesting that 
perceptual codes and action plans may share a common representational 
medium (Craighero et al., 2002). Neuroimaging studies indicate that viewing 
hand, mouth and foot actions may induce a specific increase of the BOLD 
signal in the frontal and parietal representations of the acting body parts 
(Buccino et al., 2001). A clear link between action mirroring and sharing of 
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attention between individuals has been established in a single cell recording 
study from the monkey parietal lobe (Shepherd et al., 2009). This study 
demonstrates an increase of activity of parietal neurons not only when the 
monkey oriented his attention towards their receptive field, but also during 
observation of another monkey orienting in the same direction. It is also 
relevant that overlapping fronto-parietal cortical representations are called into 
play during executed, observed, and imagined reaching in humans (Filimon et 
al., 2007). That reflexive shifts of social attention may be coded in body-part 
specific coordinates and may reflect a specific tendency to imitate other 
movements, is indirectly suggested by a behavioural study showing that 
distracting gaze and hand pointing distracters impaired saccadic and pointing 
performance respectively (Crostella et al., 2009). The pattern of activation 
found in the present study likely represents neural evidence that mirroring of 
attention may be coded according to body-part specific reference frames.  
 
Influence of social vs. non-social distracters on changes of BOLD signal in 
the fronto-parietal network underlying reflexive attention  
As reported in the results section, the performance to incongruent trials was 
impaired with respect to congruent trials irrespectively of the distracter (gaze, 
pointing hand or arrow). Importantly, however, despite the equivalent 
interference effect of the three distracters at the behavioural level, higher 
changes of BOLD signal for biological (gaze and hand-pointing) than non 
biological distracters were found in the bilateral PPC and left IPS regions. This 
suggests that hemodynamic brain responses may be more sensitive than 
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behavioural responses in signalling selective influences on attentional shifts 
and thus in highlighting the special contribution of the parietal-frontal network 
to reflexive social attention (Deaner and Platt, 2003). Thus biological stimuli, 
possibly because of their social relevance, may have an inherently higher 
power in catching attention than non-biological stimuli even when this is not 
elected in the behavioural performance. This result is in keeping with a recent 
fMRI study showing that even though the interference of gaze and arrows was 
comparable at the behavioural level, only the latter distracter modulated neural 
activity in the temporo-parietal attention network, thus indicating that different 
neural substrates underpin reflexive attention mediated by biological and non-
biological cues (Engell et al., 2010).  
 
Conclusion 
Our study indicates that frontal and parietal cortical regions map the conflict 
between a central cue instructing leftward or rightward saccadic or hand 
pointing movements directions and to-be-ignored distracters (gaze, hand and 
arrow) pointing in opposite direction. Crucially, however, the detrimental 
effect of the directional conflict induced by gaze and hand distracters brought 
about differential activation in parietal and frontal structures depending on 
whether subjects performed a saccadic or hand-pointing task. In particular, the 
distracting effect of pointing gestures is associated with higher parietal activity 
when the motor task is performed with the hand. By contrast, the distracting 
effect of averted gaze is associated with high frontal activity when the motor 
task is performed with the eyes. It is worth noting that the distracting effect of 
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arrows induced increased activity in the fronto-parietal network independently 
from the effector used for the response but overall to lesser degree than 
biological distracter. This pattern of results indicates, for the first time, that 
reflexive social attention is coded in the fronto-parietal cortex according to 
body-part centred coordinate systems. 
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Chapter 6 
“Politics in your eyes”: Behavioral and Neural evidences of 
Reflexive Social Attention modulated by Political Affiliation 
 
An interesting study published by Shepherd and collaborators (2006) 
demonstrated that “Social Status” gates social attention in low- and high- status 
monkeys. By probing the impact of social status on gaze-following in rhesus 
macaques performing a simple visual orienting task, the results  confirmed 
prior reports that gaze-following in nonhuman primates, as in humans, is 
composed of reflexive and voluntary components (Tomasello et al., 2001; 
Friesen et al., 2004). The fact that the strength of these mechanisms varies with 
social status may allow to speculate that variation in reflexive and voluntary 
gaze-following among monkeys may share features with variation in social 
attention in humans. For example, the balance between reflexive and voluntary 
social attention may be set by neuromodulatory systems associated with 
differences in personality or temperament (Claarke and Boinski, 1995; 
Bercovitch and Ziegler, 2002).  
No human studies have so far addressed the issue of the variables that can 
influence the relationship between the individual who provides the interfering 
gaze and the individual who is influenced by the gaze. Political psychology 
studies indicate that choice behaviors, such as voting preferences, are strongly 
influenced by how the candidate is perceived and by the voters’ specific 
personality traits (such as for example the perceived similarity with political 
leaders) (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004). These series of experiments will test 
- 106 - 
the hypothesis that the social status attributed to the individual influences his 
capability to orient the gaze of an observer. We applied the gaze-cuing 
paradigm (only saccadic task used in the first fMRI experiment) to individuals 
with known political preferences and set of values that influence voting 
behaviour (Caprara et al., 2007). In both experiments, the distracting gaze 
belonged to political leaders or opinion-makers of the same or opposite 
coalition with respect to the experimental subjects. We hypothesized that the 
attentional catching effect of gaze was stronger when the similarity between 
the observed model and the observing individual was high (e.g. when the 
experimental subject report a strong tendency to identify himself with the 
model). We anticipated that the onlooker may follow the direction shown by 
the gaze of his/her favourite political leader based on the inference that the 
indicated direction may signal a potential danger or a source of reward. These 
studies allowed us to explore whether the automatic behaviour underlying 
reflexive joint attention mechanism can be implicitly modulated by the social 
status of the gazing individual and by the onlookers’ personality.  
In the next sections, first I will present results obtained on a behavioral 
experiment realized by tracking saccadic movement during a gaze-cuing task 
and second, using the same paradigm (but different distracting face and 
experimental subjects) some “preliminary conclusions” about BOLD responses 
underlying the interference effect of in-group politicians and opinion-makers in 
voters belonging to the same or different political affiliation.  
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Experiment 2  
 
As mentioned before, a recent study on monkeys (Shepherd et al, 2006) 
showed that low-status male rhesus macaques reflexively follow the gaze of all 
familiar rhesus macaques, but high-status macaques selectively follow the gaze 
only of other high-status monkeys. In this study we wanted to test if a similar 
modulation can be assessed in humans, whereas, at least in Western Countries, 
have organized their societies in democracies in which at least two groups 
compete to take the power. Choosing a party or a political group generically 
gives us a social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Affiliation allows us to 
rapidly categorize individuals between in- and out-group. This act of 
categorization may be made consciously or unconsciously (Perdue et al., 
1990). In this study, we anticipated that political affiliation can affect the 
automatic process of reflexive social attention. To explore this possibility, we 
first divided 27 participants in two groups, left-wing (N=14) and right-wing 
(N=13), on the basis of a questionnaire in which they reported their political 
orientation and their voting behaviour. During the behavioural task, 
participants were asked to perform a left or right-ward saccadic movement 
towards two lateral targets according to the colour changing of an imperative-
cue. During the task, a face appeared and performed a gaze congruent or 
incongruent with the direction cued by the imperative signal. Congruent and 
incongruent distracting gaze were equiprobable and occurred 75 ms before the 
imperative cue, in order to optimize the interference with the task (Ricciardelli 
et al., 2002). Distracting faces portrayed well-known actual or former political 
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leaders and opinion-makers: Silvio Berlusconi (an actual political leader), 
Bruno Vespa (an opinion-maker), Antonio Di Pietro (an actual political leader) 
and Romano Prodi (a former political leader). Before the saccadic task, each 
distracting gaze was judged by subjects as belonging to two democratic and 
liberal political party (i.e. Berlusconi and Vespa were considered centre-right 
wing, Prodi and Di Pietro centre-left wing). We hypothesized that if reflexive 
social attention would be modulated by the political affiliation of the observer, 
then a higher gaze-following effect should be enhanced when they had to 
perform the incongruent saccadic movement respect to that one indicated by 
the member of their own political party. Furthermore, we investigated the role 
of personality dispositions in reflexive social attention. Numerous studies have 
underlined the relation between the personality characteristics of voters and 
their political affiliation. Among them Caprara and Zimbardo (2004) offered a 
conceptual framework that highlights the congruencies between voters’ traits, 
programs of favoured political coalitions, and personalities of political leaders. 
In accordance with the “Congruency Model”, we hypothesized that perceived 
similarity would be correlated with the modulation of reflexive social attention 
according to different political affiliation of voters. In particular, we predicted 
that the more people perceive their own personality as similar to the personality 
of the distracters, the more they would follow their gaze. In order to assess this 
hypothesis, subjects described themselves using a list of 25 adjectives and 
provided their perceptions of Berlusconi, Prodi, Vespa and Di Pietro using the 
same list and we computed a perceived similarity index. 
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Following previous researchers (Crostella et al., 2009), we used participants 
accuracy in performing the task as a dependent variable. A Gaze Following 
Index (GFI) was deducted by subtracting the incongruent trials minus the 
congruent trials for each observed-face. Thus, GFIs were entered in a 2x4 
mixed model ANOVA with the subject group (centre-left, centre-right) as 
between-subject factor and the four observed-faces (Berlusconi, Di Pietro, 
Prodi, Vespa) as within-subjects factor. In accordance with our hypothesis, 
ANOVA showed a significant interaction between Distractor and Group 
(F(3,75)=6,87, p = .002, η2p = .18). In fact, right-wing participants scored 
higher GFIs when attending to in-group distractors than their out-group: with 
Berlusconi (mean: 18.4% GFI) more than Di Pietro (mean: 8.5% GFI, p = .02) 
and Prodi (mean: 4.1% GFI, p < .01); with Vespa (mean: 17.2% GFI) more 
than Di Pietro (p < .05) and Prodi (p < .01); GFIs with Berlusconi and Vespa 
didn’t differ each other (p = .77), neither with Prodi and Di Pietro did (p = .13). 
On the other side, within centre-left group, the post-hoc showed a trend (p = 
.14) leading to a difference between Berlusconi and Di Pietro, showing Di 
Pietro followed more than Berlusconi (mean: 8.9% GFI vs. 2.1%). Our 
hypothesis on the relation between congruency model (Caprara and Zimbardo, 
2004) and gaze-following behaviour strength was confirmed by a significant  
positive correlation between perceived similarity and GFI with Berlusconi as 
distracter (r = .50, p < .01). Positive correlations were found also with Prodi (r 
= .27, p = .18) and Di Pietro (r = .27 p = .18) although they fail to reach 
statistical significance. Consistently with our hypothesis, we found that 
reflexive social attention is influenced by complex higher-order cognitive and 
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social dimensions as politic affiliation and personality dimensions. In particular 
we found that within the right-wing group, this attention-catching power was 
revealed to be stronger when distracters political affiliation was coherent (i.e. 
Berlusconi and Vespa). Within left-wing group, on the other hand, we failed to 
find such significant difference, even if there’s was a difference in trend 
between Di Pietro and Berlusconi that shows that left-wing onlookers tend to 
follow more their leader’s Gaze than the gaze of the opponent coalition leader. 
Anyway, the difference we found within the left-wing group is not only less 
significant but clearly less strong than the effect we found in the right-wing 
group. This asymmetry could be due to a difference between stimuli: while 
Silvio Berlusconi is currently the leader of the centre-right coalition, during the 
period in which we ran the experiment, centre-left coalition did not have a 
stable leader because they were in a transitory political situation, so we chose 
the leader of a minor centre-left party. Another possible explanation could deal 
with personality differences in authority acceptance between the two groups. 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), indeed, is a strong predictor of political 
orientation (Dukitt, 2001; Feldman, 2003) and people who scored high in 
RWA scale are likely to accept more a strong leadership and tend to conform 
more to the others. This may explain the reason why right-wing voters tended 
to follow their leader, in an implicit and automatic way.  
As hypothesized, perceived similarity played a role in this effect. In fact, the 
more the voters perceived themselves as similar to Berlusconi, the more they 
were likeable to follow his gaze. The fact that the correlation between GFI and 
perceived similarity scores with Di Pietro and Prodi did not reach significance 
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probably is due to the fact that Berlusconi showed a personality that matched 
with the voters belonging to their political party. It is important to stress that 
our results are not explainable by other variables such as media exposure or 
influence, because distracters ratings on these dimensions failed to correlate 
with the relative GFI scores.   
To conclude, this study suggests that reflexive social attention mechanism is 
not subserved by a specific module, impermeable to contextual cues, as we 
demonstrated that political affiliation, that needs a complex social knowledge 
can penetrate the neural circuits controlling gaze cuing. This finding is very 
challenging because this modulation is driven by information that is not 
immediately available from the visual features of the distractor, but relies on a 
cognitive and affective complex dimension, i.e. political affiliation. Political 
affiliation has already demonstrated to play an important role in categorize 
very rapidly individuals as in-group vs. out-group members in an automatic 
manner (unconsciously and rapidly). It seems that this dimension plays an 
important role in our live. Not surprisingly, if we consider that humans have 
been evolved in large-scale societies in order to manage cooperation behavior, 
political groups and collective political behaviors as voting in elections (Fowler 
and Schreiber, 2008) could be considerate a prerogative of human society. 
Within this framework, our data suggest that we tend to follow the gaze of an 
in-group more than out-group member, with whom we share ideology (Jost, 
Federico and Napier, 2009), but also stable values and personality traits. 
According to our results, this process seems to be stronger in right-wing 
groups, but we are not able to explain it definitively in a unique way, probably 
- 112 - 
because of a dispositional difference toward authority and conformism, as 
right-wing political orientation correlate with a scale that measure these 
ideological dispositions (Altemeyer, 1988).  
Finally, we found that politicians whose personality hold a better match with 
that of voters are not only more likeability to be voted (Caprara et al., 2007), 
but also exert a powerful attentional capture on voters.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six subjects took part in the study. All had normal or corrected to 
normal vision with no history of neurological or psychiatric disease and were 
naïve to the purposes of the study. Because of errors in eye movement data 
collection, three subjects were excluded from analysis. We further excluded 
five participants (15%), from whom less than 50% of trials were recorded. This 
left 28 subjects (12 males, mean age = 25.25; SD = 2.89). After having 
received an explanation of the procedures, they provided their written informed 
consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the independent 
Ethics Committee of the Santa Lucia Foundation (Scientific Institute for 
Research Hospitalization and Health Care). Data were recorded among 24th of 
July, 2009 and 24th October, 2009. 
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Stimuli and Procedures 
 
Measures 
Participants were administered a self-reported questionnaire in order to collect: 
a) socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, and education level; b) 
concern in politics; participants were asked their degree of interest in politics, 
from 1 (not at all interested) to 5 (highly interested), and the frequency with 
which they discuss politics with their family members, colleagues at work, 
acquaintances, and friends, from 1 (never) to 5 (every day); c) political 
orientation, participants were asked to place themselves on seven Likert type 
scale ,where 1 is “extreme left wing”, and 7 is “extreme right wing”; d) voting 
behaviour, participants were asked for which party they voted in the last 
European political elections (June, 2009). For each Likert scale we presented a 
photography of each distractor face. Under each photography, participants had 
to answer in a 1 to 5 Likert scale in order to rate: 
a) Exposure: “please rate how much do you know, through the media, and 
about issues linked to his role, the personality x” where 1 is “I know him 
very well” and 5 is “I don’t know him at all”. 
b) Influence: “please rate how much do you think x is influent within the 
Italian political landscape” where 1 is “very influent” and 5 is “not influent 
at all”. 
Finally, subjects had to rate which is the political orientation of the distractor, 
considering his ideas, in a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is extreme left wing, and 7 is 
extreme right wing. Furthermore, subjects had to answer to the item of the 
following tests, presented in a computer monitor by Cogent2000 software 
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(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/). The presentation of the scales was 
randomized between subjects.  
 
Right-wing authoritarianism scale: The participants completed an Italian 
version of Altemeyer’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. The scale includes 
30 statements on a seven-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (“strongly 
disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). To reduce response set, half of the items 
were negatively worded (e.g. “The 'old-fashioned ways' and the 'old-fashioned 
values' still show the best way to live”) and half were positively worded (e.g. 
“You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view by 
protesting for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school 
prayer”). Items were coded so that a high score indicated high authoritarianism. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the present study was .96 (see Supplemental Materials). 
 
Personality measures: Participants rated themselves on the Five Factors of 
personality described themselves using a list of 25 adjectives and provided 
their perceptions of Berlusconi, Prodi, Vespa and Di Pietro using the same list. 
The list included five markers each of: Energy/Extraversion (happy, 
determined, dynamic, energetic, active); Agreeableness (cordial, generous, 
loyal, sincere, unselfish); Conscientiousness (efficient, scrupulous, precise, 
conscientious, diligent); Emotional stability (optimistic, self-confident, solid, 
relaxed, calm); and Intellect/Openness to experience (sharp, creative, 
innovative, modern, informed). The adjectives were selected from a larger list 
of adjectives that have previously been identified in the Italian lexicon as being 
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among the most frequently used to describe human personality and also the 
most representative of each of the dimensions of the Big Five (Caprara and 
Perugini, 1994). Each adjective was rated for how characteristic it was of each 
target on a 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much so”) scale. To measure similarity, 
an index was created that represented the similarity between the self and each 
of the four personalities. First, perceived dissimilarity was computed for each 
adjective by using the generalized Euclidean distance measure, (d) between the 
personality ratings of the self and the four politicians in question. Dissimilarity 
was calculated at an overall level, averaging scores across all 25 adjectives. 
These scores  were transformed into a range from 0 to 1 by using the following 
equation: ∂ = d/dmax, where ∂ is the normalized index and d is the raw index. 
Finally, we subtracted from 1 by converting the distance or dissimilarity scores 
into similarity scores, ranging from 0 (not similar at all) to 1 (completely 
similar) (See Supplemental Materials).   
 
Additional Results  
The two groups didn’t differ for age (p=.47) nor education (p=.42) nor interest 
in politics (p=.54). We didn’t find any correlation between GFI and models 
reported influence or mediatic exposure (ps>.05). Emotions toward Berlusconi 
(computed as positive emotions minus negative emotions) correlated positively 
with Berlusconi’s GFI (r=.44; p=.03), but it seems to be a side effect of the 
political affiliation. In fact, a significant interaction between the reported model 
orientation and the group occurred (F(3,72)=19.96, p<.00001). Duncan post-
hoc comparison confirmed that right- and left-wing participants showed an 
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emotional in-group bias toward all of the models (ps<.01) but Di Pietro (albeit 
the difference showed a trend toward significance (p=.06)).  
 
Eye movement recording 
The study was performed in a quiet room with medium illumination (about 64 
cd/m2). Subjects sat on a comfortable chair in front of an LCD monitor, 
positioned at about 57 cm from their eyes. Eye position and eye movements 
were measured monocularly in real-time by means of an infrared video-based 
system (ASL 504 Remote Tracker, Applied Science Laboratories, USA). The 
experiment was created and ran with E-Prime software (version 1.1, 
Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) on an IBM compatible 
computer. Saccadic eye movements were collected via a blocked protocol in a 
2x4 factorial design. In each block, stimuli comprised the factorial combination 
of the two Condition respect to the imperative cue (congruent and 
incongruent), and the four types of Observed-faces (Berlusconi / Prodi / Vespa/ 
Di Pietro). These factors were manipulated among the two types of political 
orientation of participants (left or right-wing political orientation). Each trial 
started with the appearance of a black central fixation mark (0.21° x 0.21° in 
size) presented on a light gray (about 47 cd/m2) background, and of two black 
squares (0.43° x 0.43°) presented at 10.2° of eccentricity in the left and the 
right visual field. After 575 msec, the color of the central mark changed to 
either blue or orange. This was the imperative signal for making a fast and 
accurate saccade toward the left (change into blue) or the right (change into 
orange) target square. The coloured cue remained visible until the end of the 
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trial. A distractor’s gaze was presented behind the central fixation mark, at 
intervals of 75 ms from the onset of the instruction-cue (stimulus onset 
asynchrony, SOA) because we demonstrated that gaze following specifically 
occurs at this interval (Crostella et al., 2009; Cazzato et a., 2010). The gaze 
could belong to one of these personalities linked to the world of Politics: a) 
Silvio Berlusconi; b) Antonio Di Pietro; c) Romano Prodi; d) Bruno Vespa. 
While a) and d) were considered to be center-right wing (their means were 
respectively 5.6 and 4.7 both of them significantly over the 4, ts more than 2.9,  
ps<.01 ), b) and c) are considerate to be centre-left wing (respectively 3.1 and 
3.0, both of them significantly below 4, ts=less than -3.9, ps<.001). Distractor 
a) and distractor b) are actually involved in politics, being a) the actual Prime 
Minister and the leader of the centre-right coalition and b) one of the most 
visible leaders of the centre-left coalition). Instead, distractor c) is a former 
center-left coalition leader, but is not involved in politics anymore, and 
distractor d) is an opinion-maker journalist, well known among the general 
public as a sympathizer of the center-right political coalition, actually in power. 
For each observed-face we prepared a RGB digital photography (6.76° x 
6.76°). To enhance their saliency, the stimuli were animated by two frames 
presented in rapid sequence. The first frame (lasting 500 ms) was replaced by a 
second frame lasting 600 ms. The first frame depicted a straight gaze. The 
second frame depicted a gaze which could be oriented leftward or rightward (as 
shown in figure 1 of the main text). The direction of the distractor and that one 
indicated by the instruction-cue could be congruent (C) (for instance: both 
leftward) or incongruent (for instance: one leftward and the other rightward). 
- 118 - 
Note that subjects were instructed to ignore the distracting stimulus and to 
focus their attention on the central mark colour change. Subjects were tested in 
four separate blocks, each associated with one type of observed-face. In each 
block, the two instruction cues (leftward or rightward) and the two distractors 
(congruent or incongruent) were equally probable and were presented in a 
random sequence. Each of the 4 possible combinations was repeated 12 times, 
for a total of 48 trials per block. We analyzed subjects’ directional accuracy by 
focusing on the first horizontal saccade that followed the instruction cue and 
had an amplitude larger than 2°. Saccadic RTs were also collected. Only RTs 
for correct trials were considered. Trials in which signal was dirty were 
excluded (725 out of 5376, 13,5%). Trials were rejected from the analysis 
described below if the latency was either less than 100 ms (anticipations) or 
greater than 500 ms (delays). The proportion of rejected trials was 3,4% of the 
total trials.  
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Experiment 3  
 
The first experiment aimed at investigate whether reflexive social attention is 
permeable to high-order social variables such as political affiliation and the 
perception to be similar to an ingroup political representative. To explore this 
issue we used a social attention paradigm in which the directional gaze of 
right- or left-wing Italian politicians or opinion-makers could influence the 
oculomotor behaviour of ingroup or outgroup voters. The results showed a 
strong interference effect of Right-wing leader (Berlusconi), being right-wing 
voters prone to follow more their ingroup leader than the outgroup leader. The 
effect was not clearly evident in left-wing group, seen that the attentional 
capture effect did not approach the significance for the ingroup faces. We can 
speculate that these results seem to reflect the current political equilibrium, 
indicating that complex social variables penetrate and influence automatic 
shifts of attention.  
On the basis of our results, we performed an fMRI study with the idea to 
explore brain responses underlying the gaze following effect (i.e. interference 
effect) of in-group politicians and opinion-makers in voters belonging to the 
same or different political affiliation. First, we anticipate that covert and 
reflexive components of the fronto-parietal attentional network should be 
involved in the oculomotor execution by signalling the incongruence between 
observed-gaze and direction of saccade to be performed of an onlooker. This 
signalling or reorienting to salient stimuli should be called into action when 
similarity between voters and ingroup political members is high. In addition, 
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we expected to highlight the involvement of subcortical areas, linked to 
emotional and “metalizing” components, as well to frontal and parietal nodes 
well known to be involved in gaze-cuing task.  
 
Experimental Procedure  
 
Subjects  
We recruited volunteers by placing flyers at public places and university 
campus (Città Universitaria at “Sapienza” University of Rome); posting 
information on internet political discussion group and in a virtual social 
network. Recruitment materials requested right-handed men and women, ages 
18-36 years, who were supporting right- or left-centred wing coalition and 
were informed about main principal political events and the actual Italian 
political situation. We carried out all the screening and scanning sessions from 
late December 2009 until early April 2010, close to the local elections (March 
the 28th-29th on 2010). Potential subjects were screened by phone using a 
magnetic resonance imaging questionnaire (to rule out safety risks, 
neurological disorder and eyeglasses) and a political attitudes questionnaire 
using general questions to evaluate interest in politics and political orientation. 
We included subjects evaluating themselves as strong right- or left-wing 
politically orientated. In addition after scanning session, participants were 
asked to fill in several Likert scales assessing the interest and attitude toward 
politics. A rating for each face about political orientation, influence, exposure 
and emotional valence as well as answer to questionnaire on their personality 
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(See Stimuli and Procedures section) was requested to them.  A total of thirty 
healthy participants were scanned (male: 19; mean age: 23.11 years, range: 19-
29, female: 11; mean age: 23.73 years, range: 18-27). The reported analysis 
were based on 28 normal subject (14 right-wing: male, N= 8; female, N= 6; 14 
left-wing people: male, N= 10; female, N= 4), therefore two subjects were 
excluded because of technical problems during data acquisition. All were 
Italian citizens, right-handed and native Italian speakers. All subjects had 
normal or contact-corrected-to-normal visual acuity. After having received an 
explanation of the procedures, participants gave their written consent. The 
study was approved by the independent Ethics Committee of the Santa Lucia 
Foundation (Scientific Institute for Research Hospitalization and Health Care).  
 
Stimuli and Procedure  
 
Self-report measures 
1) Likert Scales  
After scanning session, participants were administered a self-reported 
questionnaire in order to collect their degree of interest in politics, from 1 (not 
at all interested) to 5 (highly interested), and the frequency with which they 
discuss about politics with their family members, colleagues at work, 
acquaintances, and friends, from 1 (never) to 5 (every day). In addition, with 
the aim to be sure about their political orientation, participants were asked to: 
a) place themselves on seven Likert type scale, where 1 is extreme left-wing, 
and 7 is extreme right-wing; b) express their voting behaviour, namely in the 
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last National political elections (April, 2008), the European political elections 
(June, 2009) and the intention to vote in the future local political elections 
(March, 2010). These measures allowed us to control that participants political 
attitude was coherent and strong with respect to their voting preference about 
past and future political coalition. None of the subjects that declared to vote for 
the right- or left-wing coalition had ever voted for the opponent party in the 
past. For each Likert scale we presented a photograph of each distracting face. 
Under each photograph, participants had to answer in a 1 to 5 Likert scale in 
order to rate (See Supplemental Materials): 
a) Exposure: “please rate how much do you know, through the media, and 
about issues linked to his role, the personality x where 1 is “I know him 
very well” and 5 is “I don’t know him at all”; 
b) Influence: “please rate how much do you think x is influent within the 
Italian political scenario” where 1 is “very influent” and 5 is “not influent 
at all”; 
c) Emotional valence: is an overall score computed for each face by 
subtracting negative emotion scores by the positive ones; we asked to 
participants: “please rate how much do you think x arouses positive 
emotions” where 1 is “not positive at all” and 5 is “very positive” and 
“please rate how much do you think x arouses negative emotions” where 1 
is “not negative at all” and 5 is “very negative”. Negative values indicated 
a negative emotional valence while positive values indicated a positive 
emotional evaluation of each Observed-face.     
- 123 - 
Most importantly, subjects had to rate which is the political orientation of the 
distracter, considering his ideas, in a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “extreme left 
wing”, and 7 is “extreme right wing”. These rating allowed us to categorize 
the four characters accordingly to the participants’ point of view. No subjects 
rated as left-wing politically oriented Berlusconi or Vespa, nor Bersani or 
Floris were judged as belonging to right-wing coalition. Finally, subjects had 
to answer to the item of the following tests, presented in a computer monitor 
by Cogent2000 software (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/). The presentation of 
the scales was randomized between subjects.  
 
2) Personality traits and Similarity Score 
As in Experiment 2, participants described themselves using a list of 25 
adjectives and provided their perceptions of Berlusconi, Bersani, Vespa and 
Floris using the same list. The list included five markers each of: 
Energy/Extraversion (happy, determined, dynamic, energetic, active); 
Agreeableness (cordial, generous, loyal, sincere, unselfish); Conscientiousness 
(efficient, scrupulous, precise, conscientious, diligent); Emotional stability 
(optimistic, self-confident, solid, relaxed, calm); and Intellect/Openness to 
experience (sharp, creative, innovative, modern, informed). The adjectives 
were selected from a larger list of adjectives that have previously been 
identified in the Italian lexicon as being among the most frequently used to 
describe human personality and also the most representative of each of the 
dimensions of the Big Five (Caprara & Perugini, 1994). Each adjective was 
rated for how characteristic it was of each target on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
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much so) scale. To measure similarity, an index was created that represented 
the similarity between the self and each of the four personalities. First, 
perceived dissimilarity was computed for each adjective by using the 
generalized Euclidean distance measure, (d, Cronbach & Gleser, 1953) 
between the personality ratings of the self and the four politicians in question. 
Dissimilarity were calculated at an overall level, averaging scores across all 25 
adjectives. These scores were transformed into a range from 0 to 1 by using the 
following equation: δ = d/dmax, where δ is the normalized index and d is the 
raw index. Finally, we subtracted δ from 1 by converting the distance or 
dissimilarity scores into similarity scores, ranging from 0 (not similar at all) to 
1 (completely similar). 
 
Experimental Paradigm: Gaze-cuing task  
Participants were positioned in the scanner, in a dimly lit environment. The 
experimental visual stimuli were presented via a mirror mounted on the MRI 
headcoil (total display size 19.5° x 14.6° degrees of visual angle, 1.024 × 768 
screen resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). The visual stimuli were back-projected 
on a screen behind the magnet. Stimulus presentation was controlled with 
Cogent2000 (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/). Each trial started with the 
appearance of a black central fixation mark (0.5° x 0.5° in size), presented 
centrally against a grey background, and of two black squares (1.4° x 1.4° in 
size), presented for 500 ms at 7.5° of eccentricity in the left and the right visual 
field. Twelve digital pictures, three for each face, were gathered from the news 
media in internet. The distracting gaze consisted of digital modified 
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photographs of the face of well-known Italian right- or left-wing political 
leaders (Silvio Berlusconi, Pier Luigi Bersani) or right- or left-wing perceived 
opinion-makers (Bruno Vespa, Giovanni Floris). It is important to note that, 
while Silvio Berlusconi is the actual Prime Minister and the leader of the 
centre-right coalition and Pier Luigi Bersani is the leader of the centre-left 
coalition, Bruno Vespa and Giovanni Floris are both opinion-maker journalists, 
and were categorized by our participants as sympathizers of the right and left-
wing political coalition respectively (See Results section). The choice of each 
photo was determined on the basis of the following criteria: a) the individual 
had no facial hair; b) the individual was facing the camera; c) the individual 
had a neutral or smiling expression (to control for emotional content, we chose 
for each character two neutral and one smiling photo); d) the image had an 
acceptable resolution; e) the photo was taken under normal conditions. For 
each face, the irises and pupils of the eyes were cut from the original 
photographs and pasted to fit on the right or left side of the eyes using 
Photoshop 8.0.1 (Adobe, CA). To obtain a striking attentional-capture effect, 
the stimuli were animated by presenting two frames in rapid sequence. The 
first frame depicted a straight gaze, while the second frame, which depicted a 
left- or rightward oriented gaze, replaced the first frame. The direction of the 
distracting face and the one indicated by the instruction-cue could be 50% of 
the time congruent or incongruent. Before starting the fMRI acquisition each 
participant was asked to perform outside the scanner a training task in which 
they had to learn with 100% accuracy on 48 consecutive trials, the association 
between instruction signal (red or blue) with leftward or rightward saccadic 
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movements. In the scanner, each trial started with the presentation behind the 
black fixation mark of a straight gaze which lasted 500 ms. At 500 ms, a 
second frame, that depicted left- or rightward oriented gaze, replaced the first 
frame and created a strong animation effect. The directional distracters 
remained on until the end of the trial. 75 ms after the oriented distracter 
presentation, the black central fixation mark (imperative-cue) changed to either 
blue or red colour (Ricciardelli et al., 2002; Crostella et al., 2010; Cazzato et 
al., 2010). This was the instruction signal for the subjects to make a saccade 
movement towards the left (change into red) or the right (change into blue) 
target square. Thus, the direction of the distracter and that indicated by the 
instruction-cue could be congruent (left-red or right-blue) or incongruent (left-
blue or right-red). The face remained visible until the end of the trial. In order 
to engage automatic processes and minimize expectations, the directional gazes 
were equiprobable (50% congruent) and non-predictive. It is worth noting that 
the subjects were instructed to ignore the distracting gaze and to focus on the 
central mark colour change. Moreover, they were explicitly informed that the 
instruction cue was not informative on the direction of the distracters. In order 
to avoid subjects anticipating stimuli, a random inter-trial interval ranging from 
3.5 to 4.5 s was used (See Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Trial event with a possible distracting face (incongruent condition). At 
the beginning of the trial, a straight gaze was presented behind a black fixation mark 
(500 ms). Turning the black fixation point into red was the imperative instruction 
signal for leftward saccades. Only incongruent condition is represented for the sake of 
simplicity. 
 
Eight event types were organized in a 4 x 2 factorial design. One factor was the 
type of Observed-faces: Berlusconi-Bersani-Vespa-Floris. The second factor 
was the Congruence: congruent vs. incongruent direction between instruction 
signal and observed-face. Congruent and incongruent directional combinations 
of instruction cues and distracters were presented in unpredictable and 
randomized order. These factors were manipulated among the type of Political 
Affiliation supported by the participants (left- or right-wing political 
orientation). Thus, fMRI data were acquired via a mixed, blocked (Observed-
faces)/event related (Congruence) protocol. All participants underwent five 
fMRI runs. Each participant completed a total of 720 trials, therefore each 
imaging session consisted of 36 repetitions for each of the four observed-face 
(Berlusconi-Bersani-Vespa-Floris), respectively 18 for congruent and 18 for 
incongruent conditions (balanced for left/right direction and red-blue 
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imperative-cues). Each scanning session lasted approx. 10 min for a total 
experiment duration of about 50 min.  
 
Eye movements recording 
In the training session outside the scanner, subjects sat in front of a computer 
screen. In all subjects, eye position and saccadic movements were monocularly 
monitored using an infrared video camera (Sony EVI D31, color video camera, 
Sony JP). Participants were instructed to look at the location indicated by the 
instruction-cue and then to quickly look back at the fixation point. During the 
scanning session, again the participants’ saccadic movements were 
monocularly monitored in real-time by means of an ASL eye-tracking system 
that was adapted for use in the scanner (Applied Science Laboratories, 
Bedford, MA; Model 504, sampling rate: 60 Hz). For each subject the eye-
tracking system was calibrated before fMRI scanning. The calibration was 
repeated during the experiment whenever necessary. Eye-position traces were 
examined in a 2500 ms time window, beginning with the imperative cue onset 
until the end of the trial. Saccadic RTs were calculated from the target onset 
time to when an horizontal eye position exceeded 2°. Mean saccadic RTs and 
accuracy were calculated collapsing left and right directional target trials. We 
did not compute those saccadic movements performed following distracting 
gaze instead than instruction cues (incorrect responses), misses (no response), 
anticipations (RTs < 100 ms) and retards (RTs > 800 ms).  
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Image Acquisition and Analysis 
A Siemens Allegra (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) operating 
at 3T and equipped for echo-planar imaging (EPI) acquired functional 
magnetic resonance (MR) images. A quadrature volume head coil was used for 
radio frequency transmission and reception. Head movements were minimized 
by mild restraint and cushioning. Thirty-six slices of functional MR images 
were acquired using blood oxygenation level-dependent imaging (3.0 x 3.0 x 
2.5 mm thick, 50% distance factor, TR = 2.34 s, TE = 30 ms), covering the 
entire cortex. We used the statistical parametric mapping package SPM5 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) implemented in MATLAB (v 7.1, The MathWorks, 
Natick, MA) for data pre-processing and statistical analyses. For all 
participants, we acquired 1.275 fMRI volumes, 255 for each run. The first four 
image volumes of each run were used for stabilizing longitudinal 
magnetization and were discarded from the analysis. Pre-processing included 
rigid-body transformation (realignment) and slice timing to correct for head 
movement and slice acquisition delay. Residual effects of head motion were 
corrected for by including the six estimated motion parameters for each subject 
as regressors of no interest. Slice-acquisition delays were corrected using the 
middle slice as a reference. All images were normalized to the standard SPM5 
EPI template, resampled to 2 mm isotropic voxel size, and spatially smoothed 
using an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM. Statistical inference was 
based on a random effects approach (Penny and Holmes, 2004). First, for each 
participant, the data were best-fitted at every voxel using a combination of 
effects of interest. These were delta functions representing the onsets of the 8 
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conditions given by the crossing of our 4 x 2 factorial design: Observed-face 
[Berlusconi / Bersani / Vespa / Floris] x Congruence [congruent / incongruent] 
convolved with the SPM5 hemodynamic response function. The onset of the 
hemodynamic response function was aligned with the onset of the imperative 
cue with duration = 0. Onsets of trials in which an erroneous response or an 
eye movement toward the wrong side occurred were included in the design 
matrix as covariates of no interest, but excluded from any further analysis. 
With the aim to investigate whether the reflexive joint attention mechanism is 
modulated by the interaction between Observed-face and Political Affiliation 
“with and without” taking into account the Congruence factor, two main fMRI 
analysis were performed:    
1) In the first analysis, linear contrasts were used to determine differential brain 
responses for incongruent minus congruent conditions (IE = Incongruence 
Effect) separately for the 4 Observed-faces (e.g. [Berlusconi (Incong) > 
Berlusconi (Cong)]).  
2) In the second analysis, again for each Observed-face, linear contrasts were 
used to determine the mean effect of congruent and incongruent condition (FO 
= Face Observation effect) (e.g. [Berlusconi (Incong) + Berlusconi (Cong)], 
both analysis averaging the 5 fMRI runs.  
Four contrasts images were entered in a 4×2 factorial ANOVA with Observed-
face [Berlusconi / Bersani / Vespa / Floris] and type of Political Affiliation 
supported by participants [Right- / Left-wing] separately for each analysis. 
Finally, linear contrasts were used to compare the IE or the FO, using between-
participants variance (rather than between scans). Correction for nonsphericity 
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(Friston et al., 2002) was used to account for possible differences in error 
variance across conditions and non-independent error terms for the repeated 
measures. Both analysis aimed at determining: a) the brain regions called into 
action when directional cue and the observed-faces provided conflicting 
directional information (only for IE analysis); and irrespective of Political 
Affiliation of voters, whether reflexive joint attention was differentially 
modulated by: b) the Social Role of each Observed-face [Political Leader > 
Opinion-Maker]; c) the Political Coalition of each Observed-face [e.g. (Right-
wing faces) > (Left-wing Faces)]. Finally, respectively to the Political 
Affiliation of participants, d) whether any modulation is exerted by Ingroup’s 
Observed-face [e.g. (Right-wing Group (Berlusconi + Vespa)) > (Left-wing 
Group (Bersani + Floris))];  e) if reflexive joint attention resulted modulated by 
the social membership of Ingroup Political Leader with respect to Opinion-
maker [e.g. (Right-wing Group (Berlusconi > Vespa))].     
 
Results 
 
Demographics 
Given that the gaze-cuing paradigm required the subject has a strong 
preference for a certain political coalition, we asked to participants to express 
their preference on a scale from 1 “strongly left-wing” to 8 “strongly right-
wing”, including the “apolitical” condition to assess our critical manipulation. 
None declared to be “apolitical”, therefore no subject of our sample was 
excluded for this reason. Therefore, we obtain a final sample of two right-wing 
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and left-wing participants groups of 14 subjects respectively. No significant 
differences in age [t(1,26) = .241, n.s.], nor in years of education [t(1,26) = -
.192, n.s.] were found between the two group. With regard to interest in 
politics, a significant difference was found between group, given that left-wing 
participants declared to be more interested [t(1,26) = -3.280, p =.003] and 
informed about politics [t(1,26) = -2.362, p = .026] with respect to right-wing 
participants.        
 
Self-report measures   
Each Likert scale about Exposure, Influence and Emotional valence was 
investigated by means of a repeated-measures of variance with Observed-face 
(4 levels: Berlusconi/Vespa/Bersani/Floris) as within-participant factor and 
Group (right- or left-wing voters) as between-group factor. Planned 
comparison were Bonferroni corrected. We displayed these results in Figure 2 
A-B.  
 
Ratings of Familiarity, Political Influence and Emotional Valence for In- 
and Out-group Character. 
A significant main effect of political orientation of observed-face [F(3,26) = 
17.802, p < .001] was found. Planned comparisons revealed that Berlusconi 
was the most familiar character, while Vespa significantly differed with respect 
to Berlusconi and Bersani. Bersani instead was less familiar than right-wing 
character and did not  differ from Floris. Finally left-wing opinion-maker Floris 
only significantly differed from Berlusconi. The interaction between exposure 
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of each observed-face and Group [F(3,26) = 3.008, p < .05] revealed that right-
wing participants rated as familiar right-ingroup faces more than left-wing 
outgroup faces. Not surprisingly, left-wing participants rated as familiar left-
wing ingroup faces less than outgroup right-wing faces, being Berlusconi the 
most familiar also for the left-wing group. (See Figure 2 A). As illustrated in 
Figure 2 B, a main effect of observed-face was found when we asked to 
participants to rate how much do they think each character is influent within 
the Italian political landscape [F(3,26) = 27.943, p < .001]. Both group reported 
that Berlusconi was the most influent with respect to the other observed-faces. 
Finally, no interaction between observed-face and Group was observed 
[F(3,26) = .766, n.s.].  
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Figure 2: Ratings of Familiarity (Exposure) and Political Influence for In- and 
Out-group Characters. A) On the y axis, the Exposure scores, ranging from 1 (“I 
know him very well”) to 5 (“I don’t know him at all”). B) On the y axis, the Influence 
scores, ranging from 1 (“Very Influent”) to 5 (“Not Influent at all”). On the x axis, 
right-wing character are depicted in a black square line (Berlusconi, Vespa) while left-
wing characters are illustrated in red square line (Bersani, Floris). Scores for both 
Likert scales are reported for right- and left-wing participants.    
 
A) 
B) 
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The analysis of Emotional Valence scores revealed no significant main effect 
of each observed-face [F(3,26) = .568, n.s.] while a significant interaction 
between Observed-face and Group was found [F(3,26) = 34.299, p < .001]. 
Planned comparison revealed that right-wing participants rated as positive 
ingroup right- characters more than left-wing outgroup faces. Exactly the 
opposite emotional evaluation was expressed by left-wing participants who 
rated left-wing ingroup faces more positively than right-wing faces. This 
“positive ingroup bias” was confirmed by the fact that right-wing faces were 
evaluated as positive more by right- than left-wing group, and right-wing group 
judged left-wing characters as negative more than left-wing group did.  
 
Perceived Similarity Questionnaire  
To measure similarity, we asked participants to evaluate whether the following 
traits were applicable to each face: Energy/Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Emotional stability, Intellect/Openness to experience. Than 
we computed an overall index representing the similarity between the self and 
each of the four personalities. A repeated-measures of variance with Observed-
face (4 levels: Berlusconi/Vespa/Bersani/Floris) as within-participant factor 
and Group (right- or left-wing voters) as between-group factor revealed a main 
effect of Observed-face [F(3,27) = 3.812, p < .05]. Planned comparison 
showed that Berlusconi had higher perceived ratings than Vespa and Floris 
Opinion-makers. While Vespa only differed from right-wing leader as being 
evaluated as less similar than Berlusconi. No difference was found for Bersani 
with respect to the other face, while surprisingly Floris only differed from 
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right-wing Leader being perceived more similar than Berlusconi. Importantly, 
a significant interaction between Observed-face and Group was found [F(3,26) 
= 31.170, p < .0001]. Planned comparison showed that right-wing voters 
perceived themselves as more similar to in-group faces (Berlusconi/Vespa) 
than did out-group faces (Bersani/Floris); exactly the opposite pattern was 
found for left-wing participants showing higher mean scores of similarity with 
Bersani and Floris than for Berlusconi and Vespa. These results are in line with 
the emotional valence scores seeing that participants judged as more similar to 
them, the characters with the same political orientation, showing a mere 
preferential “ingroup bias” for their political representatives.   
 
Saccadic Performance in the scanning session.         
Following previous studies [Kitagawa and Spence, 2005; Murphy and Klein, 
1998; Spence et al., 2001a,b; Cazzato et al., 2010], we computed an inverse 
efficiency score by dividing, for each condition and in each subject, the mean 
correct RTs by the number of erroneous directionally responses. The inverse 
efficiency score provides a way to combine RT and accuracy measures of 
performance into a single measure [Townsend and Ashby, 1983] and allows 
controlling for any speed-accuracy trade-off effects. As for RT and error 
measures, higher inverse efficiency scores indicate worse performance. Table 1 
reported Inverse efficiency scores as a function of the four Observed-face: 
Berlusconi, Vespa, Bersani or Floris and Congruence: Congruent or 
Incongruent trials for Right- and Left-wing participants respectively.  
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The inverse efficiency score was entered in a 4 x 2 x 2 repeated-measure 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Observed-face (4 levels: Berlusconi / 
Vespa / Bersani / Floris) and Congruence (2 levels: congruent / incongruent) as 
2 within-participant factors and Group (Right- / Left-wing voters) as between-
group factor. A main effect of Condition [F (1,26) = 65.377, p < .001] was 
explained by the worse performance in the incongruent than congruent trials 
(444 vs. 525 ms/errors). No other effects or interactions were significant.  
 
 
Right-wing Voters 
 
Left-wing Voters 
 
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
Berlusconi 443.98 544.58 433.64 510.47 
Vespa 450.52 543.51 440.07 501.21 
Bersani 447.60 533.93 438.78 512.87 
Floris 446.79 536.59 446.19 513.94 
 
Table I. Behavioural performance during Gaze-following task. Inverse efficiency 
scores (mean RT/erroneous movement) are represented separately for Right- and Left-
wing voters as a function of Observed-face [Berlusconi / Vespa / Bersani / Floris] and 
Condition [Congruent / Incongruent].   
 
Since the analysis on behavioral performance was performed on a total of 5 
fMRI runs (n = 720 trials), we cannot exclude that the “automaticity” of our 
critical gaze-following manipulation was affected by the duration of the total 
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experiment and by the large number of trial. Therefore, additional analyses are 
required to verify whether reducing the number of observations may highlight 
the interaction we are looking for. Next step will be to compare the 
performance obtained from the experiment outside the scanner (Experiment 2) 
and that one obtained inside the scanner (Experiment 3) only considering the 
first fMRI run (n = 144 trial).   
 
fMRI Results 
For the first analysis, we tested for the overall conflict effect (Interference 
Effect, IE) between directional instructions provided by the colour central cues 
and the direction provided by the characters’ gazes (irrespective of political 
affiliation of voters and observed-face) by subtracting incongruent minus 
congruent trials. On the other hand, to individuate brain responses correlating 
with the Face Observation effect (FO) (therefore those brain areas not 
specifically sensitive only to the conflict interest as tested in the previous 
analysis) relative to each observed-faces, we tested the main activation of 
congruent and incongruent trials in a main effect of observation. For both 
analysis, a regions of interest (ROIs) approach was applied by extracting 
average BOLD signals (MarsBar 0.41, ‘MARSeille Boîte À Région d'Intérêt’ 
SPM toolbox) from the peak activity of the voxels showing a main effect of 
Interference or a main effect of Observation. Each ROI was defined as a 10 
mm radius sphere centred on the corresponding maxima of the whole-brain 
analysis, and p-values were Bonferroni-corrected. It should be noted that main 
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effect and interaction contrasts are orthogonal and, therefore, our ROI selection 
procedure was unbiased (Friston et al., 1996).  
 
Brain responses associated with the directional conflict between gaze and 
instruction signals: interference effect.  
To identify areas associated with greater responses to the conflict between the 
directional instructions provided by the colour cues and the direction of the 
character saccade, we compared incongruent vs. congruent condition 
(Interference Effect: IE), collapsed over Group and Observed-face. For this 
comparison, the SPM threshold was set to p(FEW-corr) < 0.05 at voxel-level 
(cluster extent estimated a p-uncorr = 0.001, k = 62), considering the whole 
brain as the volume of interest (See table II).  
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Anatomical Area 
Cluster  
Size 
p-corr X Y Z 
z 
scores 
Parietal Lobe 
R Precu 466 < .001 12 -58 58 4.84* 
R SPL   18 -64 58 4.58* 
R SMG 255 <.01 62 -38 38 4.06* 
R STS   64 -40 24 3.85* 
Frontal Lobe  
L FEF 418 <.001 -24 -2 58 4.74* 
R SMA 958 <.001 18 0 62 4.63 
R Mid Cingulum   8 20 36 3.98 
L Insula 247 <.05 -32 20 6 3.84* 
R Insula   34 22 8 4.06 
L Lingual G 710 <.001 -10  -74 4 4.29 
 
Table II. Mean MNI coordinates of activation foci associated with Incongruence 
Effect. Anatomical locations, peak coordinates in MNI space (Montreal Neurological 
Institute), and statistical values for the main effect of incongruence (incongruent > 
congruent trials, irrespective of Observed-face and Group). p-values are corrected for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level, considering the whole brain as the volume of 
interest. R Precu= Right Precuneus; R SPL = Right Superior Parietal Lobule; R SMG 
= Right Supramarginal Gyrus; R STS = Right Superior Temporal Sulcus; R/L FEF= 
Right/Left Frontal Eye Field; R/L Insula= Right/Left Insula; R Cingulum Mid= Right 
Middle Cingulum; L Lingual G = left Lingual Gyrus. With the asterisk (*) we 
indicated the regions of interest (ROIs) within the dorsal fronto-parietal attentional 
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network. ROIs were extracted averaging BOLD signals (see Methods) from a 10 mm 
sphere centred on the cluster peak.  
 
As expected, this comparison produced mainly an extensive activation in the 
dorsal and central fronto-parietal attentional network including anterior frontal 
regions as the Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) namely the Frontal Eye Fields 
(FEF) bilaterally, and posterior parietal regions as the right Superior Parietal 
Lobule (SPL) and bilateral Precuneus (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Frontal 
regions also included the Superior Frontal Gyrus (SFG), the Supplementary 
Motor Area (SMA) extending to the middle portion of the Cingulate Cortex in 
the right hemisphere and left Insula. Furthermore, additional right parietal 
portion included Supramarginal Gyrus (SMG) extending to temporal region as 
Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS). Finally, a wide cluster in bilateral occipital 
areas spreading bilaterally from the Calcarine Scissure to the Lingual gyri was 
also activated (See Figure 2). No regions were obtained from the reverse 
contrast (“Facilitation effect”), even at a relaxed statistical threshold of p< 
.005. 
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Figure 2: Brain regions activated by Interference Effect [Incongruent > 
Congruent trials]. Clusters showing higher activity in the incongruent than congruent 
condition irrespective of observed-faces and political affiliation of voters are rendered 
on 3-dimensional (3D) views of the SPM template. This contrast revealed the 
activation of dorsal and central attentional fronto-parietal networks. The regions 
included the Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) i.e. the Frontal Eye Fields (FEF) bilaterally, 
and posterior parietal regions as the right Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL) and bilateral 
Precuneus. Frontal regions also included the Superior Frontal Gyrus (SFG), the 
Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) extending to the middle portion of the Cingulate 
Cortex in the right hemisphere and left Insula. Furthermore, right parietal portion 
included Supramarginal Gyrus (SMG) extending to Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS). 
Finally, a wide cluster in bilateral occipital areas spreading bilaterally from the 
Calcarine Scissure to the Lingual gyri was also activated. These regions were used as 
regions of interest to assess any differential influence of distracter/instruction signal 
incongruence on the brain responses (SPM thresholds are set to p(FWE-corr) = 0.05 at 
voxel level).   
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First, to analyze the brain regions activated when participants performed a 
saccadic movements incongruently with respect to the gaze direction of Right-
wing and Left-wing Characters, we tested for the interaction of IE x Right- or 
Left-wing Characters irrespective of leaders/Opinion-makers and Group 
[Effect of Political Affiliation of Characters]. No regions resulted specifically 
modulated by this interaction. Additional comparison showed that left FEF and 
right SPL reported a trend toward significance, being the IE greater for Ingroup 
faces in Left-wing voters [i.e. IE for Left-wing Faces in Left-wing group: left 
FEF: t = 1.64; p = .052; right SPL: t = 1.58; p = .058].  
Next, we explored whether fronto-parietal regions are called into action when 
participants performed a saccadic movements incongruently with respect to the 
gaze direction of Leaders and Opinion-makers (irrespective to political party); 
thus we contrasted the fMRI signal between Leaders vs. Opinion-makers (i.e. 
IE[Leaders > Opinion-makers]). The interaction IE x Leaders surprisingly 
revealed no significant greater brain responses in the ROIs we investigated. To 
the opposite, when we tested for the interaction IE x Ingroup’ Opinion-makers, 
several regions resulted specifically modulated (i.e. IE[Opinion-makers > 
Leaders]). For example, the IE in left FEF was greater for Opinion-makers than 
Leaders (t = 1.85, p < .05) and a trend toward significant was found 
specifically for Ingroup’ Opinion-makers (irrespective of Left-wing Political 
Affiliation) (i.e. IE[ Vespa > Floris] + [Floris > Vespa]; t = 1.64; p = .053). As 
well as left FEF, right SMG and right SPL showed a greater IE for Ingroup’ 
Opinion Makers (right SMG: t = 2.45; p = .008; right SPL: t = 2.19; p = .015). 
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Additional comparison, confirmed that this effect in right SMG was due to a 
greater IE for Ingroup’ Opinion-maker in Left-wing Voters (i.e. IE[Floris > 
Vespa]; t = 2.84, p = .003]. Finally, Left Insula resulted specifically modulated 
only for Right-wing voters by the interaction IE x Opinion-maker x Group (i.e. 
IE[Vespa + Floris] > [Berlusconi > Bersani]; t = 1.88, p = .038). Additional 
comparison revealed that this effect in left Insula was only specific for: ingroup 
Opinion-makers (i.e. IE[Vespa > Floris] + [Floris > Vespa]; t = 2.02; p = .023) 
and most important for Right-wing Opinion-maker (Bruno Vespa) in Right-
wing voters (i.e. IE[Vespa > Floris] in Right-wing Group; t = 1.83, p = .035).       
Finally, we hypothesized that our manipulations of IE would affect neural 
responses within the dorsal fronto-parietal attentional systems, depending on 
specific relationships with Observed-face and Political Affiliation of voters 
(Group). To test this prediction, we analysed the differences in brain responses 
when participants performed saccadic movements incongruently with respect 
to the gaze direction of Leader and Opinion-makers belonging to the “Same” 
political party. In other words, we were interested in testing the specific 
interference effect of gazes belonging to the same political party, namely the IE 
for “Ingroup characters”. The unique region of interest resulting specifically 
modulated by the interaction IE x Observed-face x “Same” Political Affiliation 
of voters was left FEF (i.e. IE([Berlusconi + Vespa] > [Bersani + Floris] + 
[Bersani + Floris] > [Berlusconi + Vespa]); t = 2.05, p = .021). The result is 
illustrated in Figure 3. No other ROI approached the significance for the IE of 
“Ingroup Bias” contrast.  
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Figure 3: Brain responses in left Frontal Eye Field elicited d by the Interference 
Effect of Ingroup Left- and Right-wing characters. Right panel: 3D rendering of 
the canonical MNI template showing the localization of the region of interest (ROI) 
corresponding to the left (pink) frontal eye field [FEF] is reported in the coronal 
section. Left panel: the relative plot shows the mean Interference Effect 
[IE(inc<cong)] of the Right- and Left-wing Faces in Right- and Left-wing participants. 
A significant interaction was observed in this ROI: Right-wing Ingroup faces [R-F = 
Right-wing Faces] interfered on shifts of attention more than the Outgroup Left-wing 
faces [L-F = Left-wing faces] distracter. Exactly the opposite pattern was found for 
Left-wing voters. The level of activation is expressed in arbitrary units (a.u., ±90% 
confidence interval).  
 
Correlations with “Perceived Similarity Scores”  
To further understand the relationship between subjects’ perceived similarity 
responses relative to ingroup characters and their brain activity, we looked at 
how their subjective ratings of the Leaders and Opinion-makers correlated with 
their brain activity while performing incongruent saccadic movements with 
respect to ingroup gazes. Surprisingly, only in Left-wing voters, activation in 
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right SMG and left IPL (MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -56, -24, 50, data not 
shown) was greater during gaze-following shifts towards left-wing ingroup 
characters’ gaze with whom participants more strongly associated themselves 
(with respect the outgroup political members). That is, left-wing participants 
perceiving themselves as “similar to ingroup” demonstrated greater 
engagement of right SMG and left IPL as a function of IE for ingroup character 
(more than right-wing outgroup characters). In Figure 4, we only depicted the 
positive correlation between Ingroup “Perceived Similarity scores” (compared 
to outgroup characters) and the relative IE for ingroup characters in right SMG 
(t = 3.31; p < .001).    
 
 
 
Figure 4: Scatter plot displaying the relation between BOLD responses and 
“Perceived Similarity Scores” in Right Supramarginal Gyrus for Left-wing 
Participants. The x axis displays the “Perceived Similarity score” difference 
calculated by subtracting the scores for ingroup left-wing faces minus the scores for 
outgroup right-wing faces for left-wing voters (higher values indicate stronger 
perceived similarity with respect to own ingroup characters). The y axis displays the 
difference of the parameter estimate associated with incongruent trials minus the 
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parameter estimate associated with congruent trials for ingroup left- larger than right-
wing outgroup faces in left-wing voters (thus, greater  values indicate grater IE for 
left- faces more than for right-wing faces). In right SMG, left-wing voters who 
perceived themselves more similar to ingroup than outgroup also showed larger 
BOLD response (Interference Effect) while performing saccadic movements 
incongruently with respect to the gaze direction of  their political representatives (with 
respect to the outgroup characters).  
      
Brain responses associated with the “observation” of Gaze irrespective of 
directional conflict between directional gaze and instruction signals: Face 
Observation effect.  
To identify areas associated with greater brain responses, irrespective of the 
“conflict” between the directional instructions provided by the colour cues and 
the direction of the character’s saccade, we performed a two-sample t-test 
analysis. By testing the main effect of Observation, we aimed at identifying the 
brain regions activated by the mean of incongruent and congruent condition 
(Face Observation: FO), collapsed over Group and Observed-faces. For this 
comparison, the SPM threshold was set to p(FEW-corr) < 0.05 at voxel-level 
(cluster extent estimated a p-uncorr = 0.001, k = 180), considering the whole 
brain as the volume of interest (See Table III). As for the IE analysis, first we 
extracted average BOLD signal from the peak activity of the voxels showing a 
main effect of FO, second we tested our interaction on a flexible factorial 
model (again by using MarsBar). Because, this analysis was not based on a 
differential effect as for IE analysis (i.e. incongruent > congruent trials) but 
instead took into account the mean activation of congruent and incongruent 
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trials, we observed strong and extensive activation not only in the dorsal 
fronto-parietal network but also in the occipital visual cortex (See Figure 5).  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Brain regions activated by Observation Effect [Incongruent + 
Congruent trials]. Clusters showing higher activity in the incongruent plus congruent 
condition irrespective of observed-faces and political affiliation of voters are rendered 
on 3-dimensional (3D) views of the SPM template. This comparison revealed a wide 
cluster in bilateral Inferior Occipital Gyri extending to right middle temporal gyrus 
occipital region. In the frontal lobe, we found an extensive cluster in Precentral and 
Middle frontal gyri (including FEF) extending bilaterally in right and left hemispheres. 
Parietal regions included significant activation in superior and inferior parietal lobe 
only in Left Hemisphere. Finally, a significant cluster was found in Left Insula 
including left Putamen. These regions were used as regions of interest to assess any 
interaction between the observation of character according to the same or different 
political affiliation. (SPM thresholds are set to p(FWE-corr) = 0.05 at voxel level).   
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As shown in Table 3, this comparison revealed a wide cluster in bilateral 
Inferior Occipital Gyri extending to right middle temporal gyrus occipital 
region. In the frontal lobe, we found an extensive cluster in Precentral and 
Middle frontal gyri (including FEF) extending bilaterally into right and left 
hemispheres. Parietal regions included significant activation in superior and 
inferior parietal lobe only in Left Hemisphere. Finally, a significant cluster was 
found in the Left Insula including left Putamen.           
 
Anatomical Area 
Cluster  
Size 
p-corr x Y Z 
Z 
Scores 
Occipital Lobe 
R Occipital Inf 1673 < .000 24 -96 2 7.18 
R Temporal Mid   42 -68 0 4.15 
L Occipital Inf 1952 <.000 -20 -98 -6 7.07 
Frontal Lobe  
L Precentral G 10868 <.000 -56 6 34 6.92* 
R Precentral G   54 0 48 6.66* 
Parietal Lobe 
L SPL 2442 <.000 -34 -54 60 5.77* 
L IPS   -34 -46 50 5.74* 
L Insula 322 <.001 -30  20 6 4.80* 
L Putamen   -24 4 10 3.60 
- 150 - 
Table III. Mean MNI coordinates of activation foci associated with Observation 
Effect. Anatomical locations, peak coordinates in MNI space (Montreal Neurological 
Institute), and statistical values for the main effect of Observation (incongruent + 
congruent trials, irrespective of Observed-face and Group). p-values are corrected for 
multiple comparisons at cluster level, considering the whole brain as the volume of 
interest. R/L Occipital Inf = Right/Left Occipital Inferior Gyrus; R Temporal Mid = 
right middle temporal gyrus; R/L Precentral G = Right/left Frontal Precentral Gyrus; L 
SPL = Left Superior Parietal Lobule; L IPS = Left Intraparietal Sulcus; L Insula = Left 
Insula; L Putamen = Left Putamen. With the asterisk (*) we indicated the regions of 
interest (ROIs) within the dorsal fronto-parietal attentional network. ROIs were 
extracted averaging BOLD signals (see Methods) from a 10 mm sphere centred on the 
cluster peak.  
 
Using the same procedure as outlined in IE analysis, we explored the brain 
regions activated when participants “observed” the gaze direction of Right-
wing Characters with respect to Left-wing Characters [Political Affiliation of 
Observed-faces]. Thus, we tested for the interaction of FO x Right- or Left-
wing Characters irrespective of Leaders/Opinion-makers and Group. No 
regions resulted specifically modulated by this interaction. Indeed, neither 
specific modulation of FO Left- or Right-wing face, nor greater FO for Left- 
more than Right-wing faces (and vice versa) with respect to political affiliation 
of voters were found.      
Next, we explored whether the observation of Leaders with respect to Opinion-
makers could elicit larger BOLD responses in our participants. Therefore, 
irrespective of political party, we contrasted the BOLD signal between Leaders 
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and Opinion-makers (i.e. FO[Leaders > Opinion-makers]). The interaction FO 
x Leaders surprisingly revealed a significant greater brain responses in left SPL 
and IPS, and bilateral Precentral Gyri ROIs (i.e. (FO([Berlusconi + Bersani]) > 
[Vespa + Floris]) + (FO([Bersani + Berlusconi] > [Floris + Vespa]); L SPL: t = 
3.07, p = .001; L IPS: t = 3.15, p = 001; R Precentral Gyrus: t = 1.69, p = .047; 
L Precentral Gyrus: t = 1.97, p = .03). Additional comparison showed that this 
effect was due to a significant interaction of FO x Leaders x Group specifically 
for the Right-wing voters (i.e. (FO[Berlusconi + Bersani]) > (FO[Vespa + 
Floris]) in Right-wing Voters); L SPL: t = 2.13, p = .019; L IPS: t = 2.35, p = 
.011). A trend toward significance was shown only in Left Precentral Gyrus for 
the same interaction (t = 1.58, p = .059). The same interaction of FO x  Leaders 
x Group specifically for the Left-wing voters (i.e. (FO[Bersani + Berlusconi]) 
> (FO[Floris + Vespa]) in Left-wing Voters) was confirmed only in the left 
parietal ROIs: L SPL: t = 2.22, p = .015; L IPS: t = 2.17, p = .017). 
To further explore the BOLD responses specifically associated with the 
Ingroup’ Leader FO effect, we investigated the interaction FO x Leader, with 
respect of Ingroup Leaders (i.e. (FO([Berlusconi > Bersani]) + (FO([Bersani > 
Berlusconi])). Only Left SPL ROI resulted specifically modulated by this 
interaction (t = 1.66, p = .05). An additional contrast confirmed that this effect 
in Left SPL was due to a significant FO effect only for Ingroup Leader in right-
wing participants (i.e. FO[Berlusconi > Bersani] in Right-wing participants); t 
= 2.45, p = 008). Finally, a crucial contrast testing for the Leadership of 
Berlusconi in right-wing voters (i.e. (FO[Berlusconi > Vespa]) > (FO[Bersani 
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> Floris])) striking confirmed that this effect was reflected in both left Parietal 
regions (L SPL: t = 2.77, p = .003; L IPS: t = 2.35, p = .011) (See Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Brain responses in left Superior Parietal Lobe elicited by the 
“Observation” of Ingroup and Outgroup Faces only in Right-wing voters. Left 
panel: 3D rendering of the canonical MNI template showing the localization of  regions of 
interest (ROIs) corresponding to the Left (yellow) Precentral gyrus centred on [-56 -6 34] peak 
and left (blue) is reported in the axial section. Right panel: the plot shows the mean Face 
Observation effect [FO(inc + cong)] of the Right- and Left-wing Faces in Right-wing 
participants only for Left SPL. We depicted a “cross” on Left Precentral Gyrus to indicate no 
significant modulation for this area. A significant interaction was observed in L SPL ROI: 
Right-wing Ingroup faces enhanced greater FO effect more than outgroup left-wing faces. 
Interestingly, this effect was also specific and greater for Right-wing Leader Berlusconi than 
ingroup Opinion-maker and Outgroup Faces. The level of activation is expressed in arbitrary 
units (a.u., ±90% confidence interval).  
 
On the contrary, when we tested for the interaction FO x Opinion-makers with 
respect to the Leaders and taking into account the political affiliation of voters, 
no regions of interest resulted significantly modulated (i.e. (FO[Opinion-
makers] > [Leaders]).   
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Finally, we aimed to test whether the “observation” of gaze belonging to the 
same political party, namely the FO for “Ingroup characters” could elicit 
greater BOLD responses in the ROIs mentioned above. None of the ROIs 
approached the significance for the FO of “Ingroup Characters”, highlighting 
the core role of left FEF in controlling and inhibiting the proneness of gaze-
following behavior with respect to your own ingroup member, as shown by the 
Interference Effect analysis.   
 
Discussion  
The aims of this study were to 1) explore how the gaze of a Political Leader or 
an Opinion-maker may interfere with saccadic movements of an onlooker; 2) 
clarify whether high-order social variables such as the political affiliation could 
modulate reflexive joint attention mechanism; 3) answer to the following 
questions: “How does the “personological similarity” between a ingroup 
character and a voter interfere with reflexive shifting of attentional 
mechanism?”; and finally, “Does this personality dimension correlate with the 
magnitude of this interferential effect?”.  
Although participants were instructed to ignore distracting gaze of each 
political character and to focus only on the instructions provided by the central 
cue, a cost to reorient in incongruent trials irrespective of Observed-face and 
Group was found. At behavioral level, the absence of the significant 3-way 
interaction of Group x Observed-face x Congruence may be explained by the 
fact that, compared to the behavioral study outside the scanner, the fMRI 
experiment contains long sessions of trials. Therefore two main potential 
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explanations may minimize the automatic effect: first, the adaptation effect 
along the five functional runs may have obscured the automatic effect even if 
our paradigm comprises a datasets of three different pictures for each observed 
face. Second, the long duration we need to acquire meaningful fMRI data, may 
induce expectation effect in participants again minimizing the reflexive effect 
of joint attention. As mentioned before, next step will be to isolate the 
performance obtained from the first functional run in order to verify the 
robustness of gaze following behavior by comparing the experiments inside 
and outside the scanner. Although somewhat preliminary, we found that brain 
responses of interference effect according to political affiliation of voters and 
ingroup characters were reflected in the activation of the dorsal Fronto-parietal 
network. In particular, we observed a modulation of left FEF for ingroup 
characters according to the same political party. Such interference effect was 
also found to be significant for ingroup media opinion-makers. In the R SMG 
again a specific modulation was found for ingroup media opinion-makers and 
specifically for the ingroup left-wing Opinion-maker (Giovanni Floris). 
Interestingly, these results were found to positively correlate with ingroup 
perceived similarity only for left-wing voters. Although no behavioral main 
effect seems to suggest difference in our sample group, further analysis are 
required to verify if these differences specifically found for the left-wing voters 
may rely on other personality or emotional dimensions. Ongoing analysis on 
pure face observation effect seems to suggest a difference between left and 
right-wing voters in the processing of the “ethological social meaning” of the 
gaze provided by their relative ingroup characters. We can speculated that left 
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FEF is more engaged in left-wing voters while performing saccadic movements 
with respect of incongruent gaze of ingroup characters, thus left-wing voters 
may be more prone to “mentalize” (See Chapter 2 for an exhaustive 
explanation of joint attention and ToM) with their own ingroup members than 
with the outgroup. One may speculate that left-wing voters are more prone to 
infer the mental states or the intention to communicate something important by 
looking and following the gaze of their political ingroup. On the contrary, 
right-wing voters seem to process only the “saliency” in terms of social identity 
of their ingroup representatives, without being sensitive to the interference 
effect. This relation is expressed by the BOLD responses observed in Parietal 
ROIs (left SPL and IPS) by means of the FO contrasts. However, further (still 
in process) analyses are required to verify these issues for example by 
analysing separately the two groups and correlating their brain responses to 
self-reports and personality scales.             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 156 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 157 - 
Future Directions 
 
Reflexive social attention mediated by gaze-observation: 
 role of the perceived fairness of others induced  
by economic interactions 
 
  
By means of the gaze-cuing paradigm, we intend to investigate the attentional 
shifting mediated by other’s gaze when two individuals are playing an 
economic game. The main novelty of the present study consists in exploring 
whether reflexive shifts of joint attention in an onlooker are specifically 
influenced by the gaze of models who are perceived (by the onlooker) as fair or 
unfair on the basis of their previous interaction in an economic game. In this 
direction, Neuroeconomics reported that economic decisions are influenced by 
the way an individual perceives a “proposer model” that make a monetary 
offer. This happens in relation to personality traits such as altruism or 
selfishness, allowing to establish an emphatic relationship, rather than a 
revenge, and depends on the perceived personality of the model.  
Classical “Theory of economic decision-making” assumes that people should 
behave rationally, maximizing gains and minimizing losses. On the contrary, 
previous studies reported that in the Ultimatum Game, as well as in other 
economic contexts, this assumption is systematically violated. In this game, 
two players have to split a sum of money. One player acts as Proposer, who 
suggests how the money should be divided between the Proposer and the 
Decisor. The second player – playing as the Decisor – has to decide whether to 
accept or to reject the offer. If the Decisor accepts the offer, both players gain 
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the amount agreed upon. If the Decisor rejects the offer, neither participant 
receives anything. A perfectly rational Proposer should make the smallest 
possible offer to maximize his/her gain, while a perfectly rational Decisor 
should accept any offer since – in economic terms – even a small amount is 
better than gaining nothing. In reality, however, players systematically do not 
conform to these predictions: Proposer makes equal/fair offers (such as 50:50 
or 60:40) because they are more likely to be accepted, and responders reject 
unequal/unfair offers (such as 90:10 or 80:20) to “punish” the Proposer and to 
motivate him/her to make fairer offers. This kind of behavior realizes a sort of 
“altruistic punishment”, a lesson of “good behavior” for the social group 
benefit in comparison of an individual reputed egoist, even if this action leads 
to a personal disadvantage. Numerous behavioral and self-report studies using 
the ultimatum game have established that people dislike unfair treatment.  
For example, as stinginess of an offer relative to the stake size increases, a self-
reported feeling of contempt also increases, as does the likelihood to reject the 
offer. Similarly, unfair offers that are rejected tend to elicit activity in the 
anterior insula, and the more likely a person is to reject unfair offers, the more 
activity this insula region exhibits.  
Sanfey and collaborators used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
to monitor the brain activity of responders while playing ultimatum games. 
Those who showed greater activation in the bilateral anterior insula, a part of 
the brain associated with negative emotions, were more likely to reject unfair 
offers. Those who showed greater activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, an area linked to problem solving and cognitive conflict, were more 
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likely to accept unfair offers. In an fMRI study, McCabe et al. studied brain 
activation in humans who played sequential two-person simplified Ultimatum 
Games for cash rewards. Half of the time, subjects played as player 1, the other 
half as player 2. Each time they played, their counterpart was either a computer 
playing a fixed probabilistic strategy or a human who was recruited to play 
outside the scanner. Subjects were told for each play whether they were 
playing the computer or the human. The authors conjectured that subjects 
would use “mentalizing” to infer the intentions of the other player. Mentalizing 
would play an important role in the binding of mutual pay-off information to a 
cooperative event representation and thus invoke cognitive strategies to delay 
gratification, and therefore induce trust and reciprocity. Recent research has 
shown that the arMFC is not only involved in representing our own thoughts, 
feelings and beliefs, but also in representing the mental states of other people, 
and is activated in a variety of social cognition tasks such as self-knowledge, 
person perception and mentalizing (for a review see Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
The authors argue that the observed activation in cooperators is consistent with 
shared reciprocity intentions, resulting in the inhibition of both individual 
reward seeking by player 2 and risk avoiding behaviour by player 1.  
 
The present project aims to explore mechanisms and neural underpinnings of 
reflexive joint attention triggered in an onlooker by the interfering gaze of 
individuals who are perceived as fair or unfair. Fair/unfair perception will be 
induced by asking to confederate subjects (Proposer) to play fairly or unfairly 
in an economic decision game largely used in neuroscience studies, namely the 
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Ultimatum Game. “The Ultimatum Game illustrates the tension between 
economic self-interest, on the one hand, and reciprocity and equity motives, on 
the other”. In this game, two anonymous individuals, a proposer and a 
responder (experimental subject), have to agree on the division of a given 
amount of money, say $20, according to the following rules: The proposer can 
make exactly one suggestion on how the $20 should be allocated between the 
two by making an integer offer X to the responder. Then the responders can 
either accept or reject X. In case of a rejection, both players earn $0; in case of 
acceptance, the responder earns X and the proposer earns $20 – X. If economic 
self-interest alone motivates the responder, he will accept even a very low 
offer, say $1, because $1 is better than $0. However, if concerns for reciprocity 
and equity motivate him, he might reject low offers because he views them as 
insultingly unfair and inequitable. The responder thus faces a conflict in case of 
low offers between his economic self-interest, which encourages him to accept 
the offer, and his fairness goals, which drive him toward rejecting it. Strong 
evidence suggests that many people reject low offers in the game, even if stake 
levels are as high as 3 months’ income. Rejection rates up to 80% have been 
observed for offers below 25% of the available money.  
We aim to address the hypothesis that social factors and personality traits as 
fairness or trustworthiness, strongly influence the economic decision-making 
process and the shifting of reflexive joint attention induced by the individual 
who provides the interfering gaze, in this case the Proposer, and the individual 
who is influenced by the gaze, the Decisor. Drawing on this series of 
experiments, we plan to test the hypothesis that, the social status attributed to 
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the Decisor-player influences his capability to shift the attention of the 
onlooker-Decisor. We further expect that, also reflexive attentional orienting 
considered as an automatic process, when it is induced by a player’s gaze 
perceived as a fair/unfair model, may reflect the relation hypothesized above 
(i.e. the interfering effect is bigger when Proposer-Player is perceived as a 
fair/unfair model than a neutral condition by the Decisor). Therefore, our 
objective is to investigate whether an automatic behavior such as reflexive joint 
attention may be modulated at an (unconscious) unaware level as a function of 
the perceived unfairness of a player-Proposer. In our paradigm, participants 
(always Decisor) have to accept or reject the monetary offers of a Proposer that 
tries to negotiate an equal/unequal offer. In a second phase, inside the fMRI 
scanner, participants/Decisor will attend the saccadic task by means of joint 
attention paradigm, in which the interfering and distracting gaze would be that 
one perceived as fair/unfair or neutral Proposer-player.  
In line with the current literature, we aim at replicate the well-documented 
pattern of accepting fair offers and increasing the rate of rejection as offers 
become less fair. Therefore, we predict a bigger rejection rate during the 
economic exchange between the Decisor and the unfair/egoist Proposer. In 
contrast, a model perceived as fair/benevolent should be rated as more 
trustworthy than the unfair model, thus receiving more acceptance offers even 
in case of low offers. We do not expect any difference in the case of the neutral 
condition (i.e. Lottery) in which the gaze presented as Proposer has no moral 
responsibility about the offers (in this case a PC will make random offers thus 
presenting both fair and unfair offers). In the crucial gaze-cuing task, we 
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hypothesized an oculomotor interfering effect produced by the fair/unfair 
Proposer-model with respect to the neutral Proposer-model. In particular, we 
expect to find a larger gaze interfering effect when the Decisor perceives the 
Proposer as an unfair model than on the neutral condition. Therefore, the 
interfering effect of gaze on saccadic movement would be higher when the 
participant feel himself frustrated because of Proposer’s unfair behavior. We 
have no specific prediction about the direction of the interference: the Decisor 
onlooker may follow or avoid the direction shown by the fair/unfair gaze based 
on the inference that the indicated direction may signal a potential danger or a 
source of reward. Capitalizing on such behavioural expectations we will try to 
determine whether the neural activity in the network underpinning the 
observation of an interfering gaze may be modulate by the type of perceived 
fair/unfair model. We will record changes of BOLD fMRI signal associated to 
conditions where the three different perceived models influence overt 
directional saccades triggered by central instruction signals. We predict a 
specific involvement of dorsal frontoparietal structures in modulating 
attentional shifts triggered by directional, socially relevant stimuli (i.e. eyes). 
Moreover, we predict more interference of gaze belonging to fair/unfair models 
than the neutral one. This would suggest that the tendency of an onlooker 
(Decisor) to imitate the actions of the observed fair/unfair model (Proposer) 
reflects the activity of a resonant system that works according to how we 
perceive the person we interact as trustworthy or selfish. Moreover, in 
accordance with “theories of inequity aversion” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), we 
expected to observe enhanced activity in brain areas not only involved in 
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attentional and execution mechanism relative to saccadic movement per se, but 
also areas related to emotions and reward processing (bilateral anterior insula, 
ACC, ventral striatum and OFC) in response to unfair offers of human partners 
in the Ultimatum Game. In contrast, we predict an enhanced activity in reward-
related areas such as striatum, rostral ACC, and OFC during mutual 
cooperation between the participants and the “fair model-Proposer”. Moreover, 
we expect activity in Striatum and rostral ACC solely when Decisor playing 
with human but not computer partners. On theoretical and empirical grounds, 
we predict that the face of a fair or unfair person would elicit “automatic” 
emotional non responses reflecting evaluative processes. Furthermore, we 
expect to find brain circuitry related to social cognition including the 
Amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, insula, Fusiform gyrus, and superior 
temporal sulcus, implicated in the perception of defectors as well as 
cooperators. The results will allow to explore whether the neural underpinnings 
of an automatic behaviour like “reflexive joint attention” can be implicitly 
modulated by the perceived personality of the gazing player individual.  
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